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ABSTRACT: Although resilience is an often-used term that can motivate and justify the 
deployment of significant resources, it has been criticized as meaningless and defined to 
death. Seeking to overcome this paradox—that the term is both conceptually powerful and 
derided as meaningless due to semantics—this dissertation seeks to reframe our approach 
to resilience by focusing on what it creates, rather than how it is described. Synthesizing 
natural hazards, environmental, and urban sociology with critical approaches to 
environmental justice, ideology, design, and the production of space, I argue that disaster-
based environmental inequality sometimes originates in the pre-event preparedness phase, 
as programs focused on building resilience reflect and reproduce existing social priorities. 
These priorities may manifest both before and after the occurrence of disaster and may take 
shape by seemingly neutral efforts to protect people and structures. The goals of this project 
are to emphasize the importance of critical approaches to disaster planning well before a 
disaster focuses the public eye, as well as to challenge the assumption that uncritical 
disaster design and resilience planning represents a win-win. To illustrate this point, I 
introduce two case examples. The first is an analysis of the adoption of climate resilience 
criteria by the ratings agencies that analyze the creditworthiness of U.S. municipalities and 
their bond debt. I argue that the inclusion of environmental metrics in these ratings, while 
 v 
potentially beneficial, may prejudice the ability of lower-income counties and potentially 
lead to a financial cumulative disadvantage. The second is a qualitative analysis of the 
experiences of residents of the lower Florida Keys with Hurricane Irma in 2017. Here, I 
find that trauma arising from the storm was joined by a deeper sort of trauma resulting 
from bureaucratic frustrations that arose from the structures and regulations, like building 
codes, put in place to ensure hurricane safety. Over time, this trauma discouraged local 
residents from staying and encouraged real estate speculation, potentially contributing to 
the conversion of working class neighborhoods to tourism and vacation rentals. This 
evidences how well meaning yet uncritical climate and disaster resilience regimes can lead 
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PREFACE: THE FLORIDA KEYS, HURRICANE IRMA, AND RESILIENCE 
 
“[M]y family’s going to eat as long as anybody eats. What they’re trying to do is 
starve you Conchs1 out of here so they can burn down the shacks and put up 
apartments and make this a tourist town. That’s what I hear. I hear they’re buying 
up lots, and then after the poor people are starved out and gone somewhere else to 
starve some more they’re going to come in and make it into a beauty spot for 
tourists.” 
 
― Ernest Hemingway, To Have and Have Not, 1937 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Background: The Lower Florida Keys. 
The lower Florida Keys occupy a unique spot in the United States geographically 
and culturally. A chain of small islands extending southwest from the greater Miami area, 
they are often described as a Caribbean tourist paradise that happens to be connected to the 
U.S. mainland by a road: the tail end of US Route 1 (US1) that is appropriately named the 
Overseas Highway. This description, however, belies a much more complex and 
hardscrabble history punctuated with periodic tragedy. Moreover, it belies the idea that the 
tourism conception of the Keys is natural; rather, tourism and the built form that supports 
it are the product of mutually reinforcing constructions. The first was a social construction 
of place derived both from its beauty and tropical amenities and federal and state efforts to 
overcome the Great Depression (Rogers 1996). The second involved the construction of 
infrastructure that was developed to transport, house, and serve tourists, as well as to 
support a number of local economies that ranged from cigar manufacture to sponge and 
sea turtle harvesting to the industry that initially gave Key West its raison d’etre: 
scavenging the wrecked ships that unsuccessfully tried to navigate the nearby Florida 
 
1 Residents who were born and raised in the Florida Keys. 
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Straits (Rogers 1996; Viele 2011a, 2011c). The lower Keys are also notable for the variety 
of migrations evident in their history: the Cuban and Bahamian influences are still palpable 
in the area, as are accents from across the mainland United States, the Caribbean, and Latin 
America. 
Reading post-settlement histories of the Keys a familiar—although non-exclusive—
formula soon emerges. Someone recognizes the local potential for an industry, tries it out, 
struggles for a period, and eventually either fails or abandons the effort, seeking greener 
pastures elsewhere (Viele 2011a, 2011b, 2011c). Over time, tourism stepped into the 
economic vacuum left by these industries, though not without help. By 1935, with eighty 
percent of the residents of Key West on emergency public assistance due to the decline of 
ship salvage and the overall effects of the Great Depression, the Federal Emergency Relief 
Administration took over the city and through the labor of local residents began to 
refashion its streets and buildings in the form of a resort town (Rogers 1996). This was a 
matter of image as much as substance: a 2018 exhibit at the Key West Art and Historical 
Society documented the efforts of Works Progress Administration artists who, through 
copious use of pastels, created an attractive vision of what vacationing at the end of the 
road could be. Any visit to the many art galleries and shops in the Keys hawking Guy 
Harvey paintings and maritime ephemera demonstrates the durability of these efforts.   
Hurricanes, unfortunately, also figured into the form of the local development 
trajectory. In September of 1935 a massive storm hit the Keys, killing approximately 400 
people, most of whom were railroad workers whose rescue train was washed off the single 
causeway that provided overland access to the Keys while en route to save them. The storm 
so damaged the causeway that it was sold to the state, signaling an end to Henry Flagler’s 
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famous attempt to run a railroad over the open ocean. Out of this death and destruction—
coupled with federal and state largesse—came perhaps the single most important 
development in the tourism economy of the Keys: a road from the mainland was built on 
the remains of the railroad causeway. This allowed automobile access for the first time, 
opening the Keys to the American motorist (Rogers 1996).  
Yet lifelong residents of the Keys, colloquially known as Conchs in reference to the 
large-shelled mollusk that occupies local waters and gift shops, are nothing if not persistent. 
So, too, are the newcomers who have opted to make the Keys their home. An independent 
streak runs deep in the Keys, as evidenced by its one-day secession from the United States 
in 1982, after the Reagan administration put a roadblock at the northern end of US1, the 
single road serving the island chain. This effectively imposed a federal search for drugs or 
other contraband on any Keys resident who sought to travel to the mainland, and in 
unforgivable Keys fashion resulted in a miles-long traffic jam on their beloved route of 
ingress and egress: they take traffic on the Overseas Highway extremely seriously (Conch 
Republic 2001a). In the words of an informal local history:  
At noon, on the day of secession, at Mallory Square in Key West Florida, Mayor 
Wardlow read the proclamation of secession and proclaimed aloud that the Conch 
Republic was an independent nation separate from the U.S. and then symbolically 
began the Conch Republic’s Civil Rebellion by breaking a loaf of stale Cuban bread 
over the head of a man dressed in a U.S. Navy uniform. After one minute of 
rebellion, the now Prime Minister Wardlow turned to the Admiral in charge of the 
Navy Base at Key West, and surrendered to the Union Forces, and demanded 1 
Billion dollars in foreign aid and War Relief to rebuild our nation after the long 
Federal siege! (Conch Republic 2001b)  
 
Notwithstanding the humorous approach taken to secession, the protest worked and 
the roadblock was subsequently removed, although the requested foreign aid never 
materialized. Prior to Hurricane Irma in 2017, the annual celebration of the Conch Republic 
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was preserved as a subset of local lore that was used primarily as am organizing story for 
tourists and new residents, in a town that celebrates local lore of Harry Truman’s vacation 
house, Ernest Hemingway’s carousing and six toed cats, and the roosters that noisily 
occupy seemingly every bit of public space. After Irma, the name of the Conch Republic 
was appropriated by a number of local residents who were disgusted with official delays 
in cleanup and resolved to clean—by hand—local waterways, estuaries, and mangroves of 
the flotsam and jetsam deposited there as the storm ripped buildings and boats apart. That 
the lore of place and community was so easily deployed to organize around an 
environmental catastrophe—and the perception of an official failure to respond—
illustrates some of the depth of caring and spirit of the place.  
As many of my research participants and other contacts in the Keys have related, the 
strong sense of pride in place found in the Keys is countenanced by its insular nature. This 
may not be particularly surprising for an island chain, but this is also a place that is wholly 
dependent on the mainland for everything from basic utilities to trash removal. It may also 
be explained, however, by a desire to be among people who are more tolerant than 
elsewhere and a desire to protect the area’s uniquely accepting atmosphere. In the words 
of one local activist: 
Key West is the end of the road…and like all end of the road places, when it 
starts…people start to frequent that area, they start to move into that area. It always 
starts with like the rebels and the fishermen and the people that, that the rest of 
society tends to think [are] the bottom rung. [They are] the first to live in places 
like this. And…they’re also some of the hardest working people. And again…it 
tends to form really close communities where people are watching out for each 
other and strangers are not, are not permitted a lot of leash. And because we are so 
far away from the mainland…the laws are a little different down here, things that 
may affect the rest of Florida. While they allegedly apply to us, they aren’t 
generally paid as much attention to sometimes…because we are so far from any of 
that sort of political oversight or government oversight. 
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To understand the lower Keys it is also critical to understand each island has its own 
character based partially on place and partially on how, why, and when it developed. 
Despite being at the end of the chain, Key West is the administrative, bureaucratic, and 
tourist center. As you move up the chain in the lower Keys, the islands morph from the 
formerly working class but now rapidly gentrifying Stock Island to a number of residential 
keys featuring some mixture of single family homes, mobile home and RV parks, and 
palatial waterfront mansions. Long-term residents know the differences between islands 
and tend to identify with their own island or neighborhood.  
On the northern end of the lower Keys is Big Pine Key, which has traditionally been 
known as the working class center of the islands. Big Pine Key is also commonly believed 
to be the island worst hit by Hurricane Irma. It sat on the leading edge of Irma to the right 
side of the eye, where the counter-clockwise spin of the Coriolis effect and the trajectory 
of the hurricane’s path have an additive effect on wind speed and storm surge. While Irma 
affected each of the lower Keys in different ways, it is safe to say that Big Pine suffered 
especially, and featured a population that may have been least able to cope with the 
destruction physically and financially. Official storm statistics paint a horrible picture of 
Big Pine Key after Irma: compared to only 264 houses that were unaffected by Irma and 
about 2,200 that were affected or had minor damage, 299 housing units had major damage, 
and 473 were completely destroyed. These include included 52 mobile homes or RVs that 
were destroyed on that island alone (Monroe County Emergency Management n.d.) In 
short, about 24% of the housing stock on Big Pine Key was destroyed instantaneously or 
suffered major damage that would require major repair.  
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The prefatory quote from Hemingway’s To Have or Have Not suggests that the 
development of tourism in the Keys has long created concerns that the island would 
become a series of resorts with no place for locals. In 1937 these concerns developed 
shortly after the New Deal and after the hurricane of 1935 severed the railroad connection 
used by most early travelers, and shortly before the 1938 completion of the automobile 
road that again linked Key West with the mainland (Rogers 1996). Housing, hurricanes, 
and official response were of the moment then, and they are now. Like the many hurricanes 
that have come before—and particularly the hurricane of 1935—Hurricane Irma in 2017 
had the potential to fundamentally alter the character of the lower Keys and its population. 
The fear of this was palpable among many people with whom I spoke as well as in official 
accounts.  
Two years after Hurricane Irma I found concerns that were eerily reminiscent of 
those expressed by Hemingway two years after the Hurricane of 1935. These include the 
tension between tourism and residents, and how housing—the right to determine the 
meaning of place and the built form of space (Gieryn 2000)—factors centrally in these 
disputes. Yet the mechanisms that are reflected in these fears are far more complex than 
the burning and rebuilding of Depression-era shacks: similar concern, different 
manifestation. Even bearing in mind Hemingway’s propensity for embellishment (among 
other later-recognized literary and personality faults), it is relatively clear that the 
intersection of hurricanes, housing, and who may lay claim to life in the Keys is not a new 
question. However, in an age of intensified storms and real estate investment, it is one 
worth revisiting.     
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Background: Why Hurricane Irma?  
On September 10, 2017 Hurricane Irma roared ashore in the lower Florida Keys, 
making its center of landfall on the quiet and beautiful but somewhat unremarkable 
residential island of Cudjoe Key. A massive category four on the five-category Saffir-
Simpson scale, it had weakened slightly since its initial landfall on Barbuda in the eastern 
Caribbean. Although it had once featured sustained winds in excess of 180 miles per hour, 
as it passed over islands in the Caribbean they sapped its strength, resulting in a downgrade 
to category three. While residents of the Keys had prepared for this hurricane like they 
often do in the late summer and early fall, it appeared to be only moderate strength. Many 
Keys residents had experienced these before and consider them part of life.  
The day before it made landfall, however, the National Weather Service reported 
that it was reorganizing and strengthening off the coast of Florida due to unusually warm 
water in local seas. While it had previously been forecast to only sideswipe the Keys and 
instead hit mainland south Florida, as its path bent west it became clear that the low-lying 
island chain was at substantial risk of a direct hit. Recognizing the changes in both speed 
and direction, Governor Rick Scott held a press conference on the evening of September 
9th. He related that the Florida Keys were already endangered by winds and storm surge. 
He continued:  
This is a deadly storm and our state has never seen anything like it. Millions of 
Floridians will see major hurricane impacts with deadly storm surge and life 
threatening winds…Evacuations are in place throughout the state and more that 5.6 
million Floridians have been ordered to evacuate. You need to listen to local 
evacuation orders. If you live in southwest Florida you need to be on the road by 
noon or find shelter (Associated Press 2017). 
 
His language here is important. Although the storm was headed for the Keys the 
evacuation order covered all of southwest Florida and well over five million residents who 
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lived on the mainland with many escape routes from danger. The storm was massive. One 
participant described watching it approach during these last hours and noticing that it 
appeared on satellite to be larger than Florida. A satellite image of the storm superimposed 
next to 1992’s infamous Hurricane Andrew showed a difference that was barely believable.  
My own interest in Hurricane Irma was, at that time, not academic. Rather, it was 
personal. I had lived for a year on Cudjoe Key, during which time I volunteered with the 
Red Cross, serving on the local volunteer disaster action team and training to provide 
disaster relief in the inevitable event of the next hurricane. I still had friends in the lower 
Florida Keys, including in the mobile and modular home dominated retirement community 
in which I had lived. On September 10th I watched the storm come ashore and on September 
11th—for the second time in my life on that date—I grappled with understanding seemingly 
incomprehensible destruction.  
Shortly thereafter, those who had followed the evacuation order began posting on 
social media searching for those who had not. There were repeated and increasingly 
desperate pleas for any information about friends, family who had stayed, as well as 
animals who had been left, sometimes due to a belief that they would not be welcome in 
shelters or other places of refuge to the north. Driven both by concern about my friends 
who had not yet been located (all of whom eventually were) and a sense of voyeuristic 
curiosity that seems to be common after disasters, I paid close attention to both traditional 
and social media. I spent hours each day watching the Keys-local Facebook groups whose 
purpose shifted from selling old furniture, spinning yarns, and complaining about local 
politics to relating news of who was alive and well, whose homes were still standing, and 
who had an intact roof. Any news was critically important: one participant was only able 
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to contact his family outside of the Keys after it was discovered that a local supermarket 
had a working land line, and the sense of relief arising from that communication to his 
distant family cannot be overstated.  
Over time, the topics of conversation on these groups began to shift. Once personal 
whereabouts and safety were established, the subject matter quickly refocused firmly on 
housing. Over time, as satellite and aerial maps of residential areas were released, residents 
of the lower Keys pored over them seeking confirmation that their houses remained in one 
piece. In many cases the news was not good. Once rudimentary communications were 
established, those who defied Governor Scott’s order and stayed in the filthy shelter of last 
resort at the elementary school on Sugarloaf Key or in fortified houses, along with those 
who had received permission to return before the official exclusion order was lifted, would 
remit appraisals of their neighborhoods and neighbors’ houses. Many residents, however, 
did not find out whether they had a place to return to until they were allowed to once again 
journey south weeks after the islands were evacuated.  
As the scope and scale of the storm’s damage began to become evident—along with 
the fact that its physical impacts were qualitatively different and worse than those of local 
hurricanes in relatively recent memory like Hurricane Wilma in 2005 and Hurricane 
Georges in 1998—conversations on social media shifted again. This time, they began to 
broach the difficult subject of rebuilding and recovery. The focus on housing remained 
central. Questions of rebuilding seemed, at least in the eyes of this distant observer, to 
nearly always be yoked to discussions of banks and mortgages, insurance, legal and 
administrative approvals like permitting, and the lack of contractors. Rather than just the 
built environment, these choices involved a complex of difficult choices about the variety 
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of social, governmental, and institutional forces that influence how and why the built 
environment takes the form it does.  
Critically, stories of rebuilding must be tempered by an understanding of the strain 
of the hours, days, weeks, and months of personal labor in the late summer South Florida 
heat that were required to begin to clean up the mess created by the collision of buildings, 
land, wind, and water. By some accounts, the storm left a toxic film over the landscape 
consisting of everything that one might keep in a garage or boatyard mixed the remnants 
of local vegetation and salt water. If outdoors, this stew would putrefy and dry in the sun. 
If inside houses, it would fester and breed mold. Everything was out of place. One 
participant reported finding live ocean fish in a second floor bathtub that was washed over 
by storm surge. A recent study (Ross et al. 2019) demonstrated that Big Pine Key suffered 
32% tree mortality, including to the eponymous slash pines that dominate the landscape. 
Larger trees uprooted by wind and significant numbers of smaller freshwater-dependent 
trees were killed due to storm surge and saltwater inundation, combining early acute death 
with chronic wasting of many trees that initially survived (Ross et al. 2019). There were 
also bodies. Although south Florida in September and October is typically extremely hot, 
the storm made it worse due to the lack of shade from tree death and stripped foliage, the 
loss of roofs from houses, and for extended periods after the storm the unavailability of the 
electricity needed to supply air conditioning. Over time, the fuel load from so many dead 
trees contributed to a massive brush fire on Big Pine Key that threatened the homes of 
study participants while they tried to rebuild, adding insult to injury. For many residents, 
including the many elderly people who had retired to the area, the initial shock was too 
much.   
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Some of those who I knew threw their hands up and left nearly immediately, others 
resolved with varying degrees of success to hold on and tough it out, while others who 
were minimally affected directly viewed the storm as more of a personal inconvenience 
(though this should not imply that they lacked empathy for their neighbors who had not 
been so lucky). Simply put, the more that I watched, the more it became clear that issues 
of long-term trauma were likely related to migration and displacement, and this trauma 
could not be reduced to a single factor. Where trauma, migration, and displacement seemed 
to be joined, however, were on the subjects of housing and affordability.  
Developing these themes required an understanding of these varied elements; I 
sensed that there were a considerable number of themes focused on housing that could not 
be adequately captured by rapid response methods like demographic projection, economic 
assessment, or remote sensing alone. While there was broad general agreement that the 
Keys had lost pre-Irma residents and overall population, the details of the mechanisms of 
these processes were difficult to trace. Demographic estimates seemed inappropriate to 
capture the experience of the lower Keys, because they lumped the various Keys together 
regardless of the magnitude of damage or the pre-existing characteristics of the population 
(Associated Press 2018; Goodhue 2018; Rayer and Wang 2018). Other estimates, like those 
in the media, were questionable because they were developed from anecdotal estimates 
made shortly after the storm (e.g. Allen 2017). It also seemed like the rapid disaster 
assessments that are typically completed after storms could provide insight into what 
happened and what the geophysical drivers or infrastructure damage were—and could do 
so far more quickly than I could—but could not adequately explain the systemic questions 
that I suspected were mediating the storm experience. 
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For example, since the storm, two rapid assessments of building damage in the lower 
Keys—conducted by engineers and geophysical scientists—have suggested that the causes 
of much local housing damage was storm surge and elevated wave heights (i.e. combined 
effects of hydrodynamic forces), particularly in Big Pine Key on the leading edge of the 
storm (Xian et al. 2018; Tomiczek et al. 2020). One of these studies found that on Big Pine 
Key there was a positive, significant correlation between proximity to the coastline and 
overall damage. This finding makes intuitive sense, especially if you have spent 
considerable time on Big Pine and know its topography. Oddly, based on their rapid survey 
methodology they found a negative yet small and statistically insignificant relationship 
between size of housing structure by square meter (i.e. as a proxy for mobile home, single 
family homes etc.) and damage category (limited, minor, major, total) (Xian et al. 2018). 
In other words, their statistical measure suggests that housing type was potentially 
unimportant. This makes less intuitive sense. 
While their innovative study serves a highly useful purpose—quickly assessing 
structural vulnerability—and the researchers were careful to include socio-economic 
concerns, the methodology used (driving at about 10 miles per hour, photographing houses 
and comparing them to satellite photos) reveals some weaknesses at the intersection of 
housing and affluence that could be remedied by later interviews. The first is that buildings 
that appear undamaged or minimally damaged from the outside may be wet and molding 
inside. Post-storm mold was a common, serious complaint. In some cases it required 
demolition, even when the structure suffered low water intrusion heights and might appear 
fine from aerial photographs or roadside observation. Second, it ignores that structural 
damage has to be placed in the context of the combination of joblessness, community and 
 13 
other psychosocial stressors, as well as the cumulative effects of damage that for these and 
other reasons might be not be repaired quickly. In effect, while it focuses on housing form, 
it misses some of the combined influence of community and time (Xian et al. 2018).  
Finally, although Xian et al. (2018) find that proximity to water is more important 
than type of housing on Big Pine Key, this may be because many neighborhoods near the 
water on Big Pine Key consist of mixed housing types. Conversely, while they observe that 
housing type is the single most significant factor on Marathon Key to the north, which lost 
all of its mobile home parks, it may be that the spatial arrangement of that island exposed 
them to different storm effects than on Big Pine. This is especially true for a neighborhood 
on Big Pine known as the Avenues, which was within the main crosshairs of storm surge 
and features mixed working class housing. It has many larger homes in terms of square 
footage than the mobile home parks that tend to be further inland and at higher elevation, 
but traditionally served as housing for working class families. They also may ignore the 
population effects in the lower Keys of the loss of housing on Marathon (to the north of 
the study area), as people may seek replacement housing further south. This is not to imply 
that their method or analysis was faulty or useless: rather, rapid post-storm assessments 
like this may require parsimony and speed that necessarily obscures other qualities of the 
environment under study. Moreover, they are careful to mention the need for greater 
attention to socioeconomic characteristics, even while trying to quickly distill patterns of 
visible housing damage (Xian et al. 2018). In sum, their results combined with the more 
qualitative approach here emphasize the importance of mixed methods that take account of 
structural analysis, sociological analysis, and an appreciation of local housing geographies.   
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As I continued to watch social media generalized complaints began to filter out that 
some constellation of housing, local bureaucracy, and building regulations were 
contributing to displacement in ways that prejudiced the interests of less affluent residents 
of the lower Keys. Over time, my initial climate migration question took on attributes of 
an environmental justice question. Surprisingly, many of these complaints were focused 
on laws and standards that had been passed for the express purpose of ensuring hurricane 
safety. Other complaints focused squarely on the official response. I suspected that I was 
watching the development of housing-based inequality in the aftermath of a natural 
disaster, but did not fully understand or appreciate the complexity of the systems by which 
it was being produced. Nor did I fully understand how seemingly well intentioned—and 
from a public safety standpoint essentially unassailable—rules like hurricane resistant 
building codes were a leading source of stress in the very communities they were intended 
to protect. Those who remained contended with, and complained of, severe consequences 
to their health, especially but not exclusively to mental health. Rules and practices intended 
to protect health, safety, and housing were jeopardizing them instead. Extending the 
paradox, difficulties in recovery and rebuilding derived from a variety of housing-related 
sources were, as I would come to understand over the subsequent two years, a source of 
constant complaint that enveloped concerns about mental health, displacement, and 
collective trauma.  
INITIAL RESEARCH GOALS AND AGENDA 
Based on this, this research project initially included two separate yet related goals. 
First, I sought to better understand the relationships between hurricanes, housing, and 
displacement over time, using the lower Keys as a case study. Beyond my personal 
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motivation, it made sense as a study area because it is a small collection of communities 
that have been repeatedly impacted by hurricanes. In addition, Keys residents and local 
government are active in their attempts to get ahead of hurricane threats through various 
rules and regulations, and the lower Keys happened to be the center of landfall of probably 
the least studied hurricane of the unprecedented 2017 season (compared to Hurricane 
Harvey in Texas and Hurricane Maria in Puerto Rico). Second, I hoped to better understand 
the complex linkages between hurricanes and the development of environmental 
inequality, especially at the intersection of housing affordability and residential instability. 
This would connect individual and community-based stories about housing concerns and 
stresses to broader features of our political economic system, including resilience and 
preparedness initiatives, real estate capital and speculation, and the development of laws 
and regulations.  
As I embarked on this project it gradually became clear that that the processes by 
which we regulate the construction of our built environment—what might be called 
urbanization or development—serve as a link between disasters and sociospatial 
inequality. This suggested the need for a new approach to conceptualizing resilience and 
disaster planning that examined the specific mechanics of inequality formation. Coupling 
Henri Lefebvre’s (1991, 2003) classical insights about urbanization with contemporary 
studies on resilience and sociological developments, Chapter 1 explores a new way to 
theorize and understand resilience. Given the increasing prominence of resilience in socio-
environmental planning, I argue that resilience and preparedness efforts represent a distinct 
response to environmental change that operates through our built environment in ways that 
can create landscapes and inequality. Understanding resilience merely as measure of the 
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ability of a system to “bounce back” after a shock (i.e., Holling 1973) misses how its use 
can contribute to unjust outcomes well in advance of any disaster. Taking a sociospatial 
approach, alternatively, allows us to theorize how the complex interactions between 
systems of power, the built environment, and environmental change may lead to both 
increased disaster risk and inequality.  
Chapter 2 builds off of this foundation through an analysis of credit ratings agencies, 
their ratings of municipal bonds, and the recent inclusion of resilience criteria in these 
ratings. The development of a private financial response to climate change and disaster risk 
potentially will to encourage particular pathways of climate response in a vast majority of 
American localities. Importantly, this provides a significant real-world example of how the 
introduction of environmental resilience into existing, seemingly non-environmental socio-
financial processes may have broad landscape design consequences. This inquiry was 
driven by my realization, while I was collecting data in the Keys, of the importance of local 
government decisions and the forces that drive them. After discovering that municipal bond 
credit ratings agencies have begun to formally include environmental uncertainty and risk 
in their analyses, I realized that these changes may provide incentives for municipal 
managers to choose certain forms of resilience and environmental planning. In this way, it 
connects to the lower Keys’ experience by exploring the incentivization of particular 
modes of resilience planning for municipal managers and bureaucrats.  
Returning the analysis to the local context of the Florida Keys, in Chapter 3 I explore 
how real estate capital, speculation, and regulations focused on hurricane preparedness 
contribute to population displacement and residential instability. Unexpectedly, trauma and 
mental health began to factor significantly in this story. While the existence of trauma and 
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mental health questions in disaster is perhaps unsurprising, what was novel is the way that 
housing and trauma are reciprocally linked in nearly every participant account. The 
thematic connection between housing, trauma, and speculation was strong and appears to 
evidence a process that wears people down in disaster-affected communities over time, 
greasing the wheels of disaster opportunism. Therefore the analysis focuses not only on the 
political economy of housing through disasters, but also the ways that mental health and 
trauma seem to be deployed (intentionally or unwittingly) in the interests of real estate 
capital development. In short, the combined pressures of housing insecurity and navigating 
post-disaster housing bureaucracy can make community members more susceptible to 
displacement by capital investment. Over time, this can promote the conversion of 
neighborhoods to tourism and vacations rentals. 
If the Keys represent something of a test case for the effects of climate change and 
storms in the United States due to issues of location and topography, the hope is that local 
experiences derived from this small island chain may translate to suggestions for other 
communities that are exploring how to cope with future disaster. Whether this is derived 
from their long history with hurricanes or their geographic isolation and exposure to high 
seas (the highest point is the Keys is a closed garbage dump outside of Key West known 
as Mount Trashmore), examples developed here with experiments into resilience and 
preparedness can teach about other contexts as sea levels rise and storms intensify. The 
Keys are small when compared to some other disaster-affected areas favored by scholars. 
This presents an opportunity to focus on discrete themes that affect the disaster experience, 
while helping to reform the process of hurricane preparation and preparedness in the name 
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of achieving real socio-environmental resilience, rather than a version laden with the 
danger of exploitation.  




CHAPTER I. RESILIENCE SPACES: RETHINKING RESILIENCE AND THE 
DISASTER EXPERIENCE FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF MATERIALIST 
ENVRONENTAL SOCIOLOGY  
 
CHAPTER PREFACE AND AGENDA.  
The term “resilience” remains central to disaster preparedness and planning regimes in 
a changing world. However, it has been condemned as meaningless buzzword, as well as 
a product of neoliberal ideology and political projects. This paper proposes an alternative 
conceptualization of resilience that synthesizes materialist approaches in disaster studies 
and urban and environmental sociology around questions regarding the use of risk 
reduction models for the material benefit of elites. It illustrates how resilience manifests 
through the production of space, emphasizing that resilience efforts are meaningful in their 
consequences, that these consequences are directed by a unique set of political concerns, 
and that special attention should be paid to the often-ignored effects of pre-disaster 
resilience planning. An understanding of resilience that foregrounds these relationships 
facilitates an analytical turn towards traceable effects on housing and other basic human 
needs well in advance of the next disaster, which could support better integration of critical 




C.S. Holling (1973) is typically credited with articulating a notion of “resilience” 
that has become influential in various scholarly and policy arenas (Anderson 2013; 
Bourbeau 2018; Colker 2020). In contrast to other ecological concepts like “stability,” 
Holling (1973:14) defined “resilience” as “a measure of the…ability [of systems] to absorb 
change and disturbance and still maintain the same relationships between populations or 
state variables.” Notwithstanding its increasingly central role in the collective management 
of environmental change and risk, it has been criticized as over-defined and meaningless 
jargon and dismissed as a sort of newspeak buzzword (Reghezza-Zitt et al. 2012; Linkov 
et al. 2014; Rogers 2015; Dawson 2017; Andresen 2019). Yet resilience is a concept that 
has the capacity to justify capital-intensive projects, to direct massive expenditures for 
public and private disaster planning, and to influence the ways that individuals and 
communities grapple with disasters well in advance of their occurrence (Gotham and 
Greenberg 2014; Tierney 2015; Dawson 2017; Colker 2020).  
This presents a contradiction at the heart of the way we consider and plan for 
environmental change: how can something be characterized as meaningless if its outcomes 
are so consequential? Moreover, how can scholars analyze resilience in ways that provide 
insight about its effects, avoiding the morass of jargon? Conversations about resilience 
often focus on maintenance of socio-environmental equilibrium after a disaster event, 
without adequate consideration of how resilience efforts might drive pre-disaster 
conditions and generate impacts both before and after disaster. Like Holling (1973), in 
these conversations resilience is seen as a descriptive measure of change rather than a driver 
of change. Rethinking resilience from the standpoint of what it accomplishes allows a 
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deeper analysis of how it and deployed across social, spatial, and temporal scales (Neisser 
and Runkle 2017).  
To address these questions, I develop a materialist perspective on resilience that 
examines the consequences of how resilience may be used and exploited. In the process I 
synthesize ideas from the sociologies of natural hazards, the environment, and urban 
spaces, as well as scholarship on ideology, resilience politics, and critical design. Rather 
than adding yet another confusing definition of resilience to the many that already exist, I 
argue that it is best considered in light of its creative nature. Resilience, in other words, can 
be used to create, develop, and justify courses of action that have material consequences, 
and these consequences originate from the interaction of risk assessment, structures of 
power, and how space is produced (Lefebvre 1991, 2003; Gotham and Greenberg 2014; 
Dawson 2017). This argument also builds on various existing criticisms of resilience—
including that a return to a pre-existing state of inequality may be an undesirable bounce-
back and that resilience may serve as a tool of economic exploitation (Cretney 2014; 
Tierney 2015; Anguelovski et al. 2016)—to develop a new critical approach that focuses 
on the distinctive contexts of disaster-sensitive urban development, planning, and design.  
One element of this involves an explicit retheorizing of resilience that deviates from 
much of the literature that builds upon Holling’s (1973) insights. This includes a departure 
from the common conceptualization of resilience as primarily as a measure of post-disaster 
processes of adaptation, coping, and bounce back that is based on a pre-existing array of 
social, infrastructural, and other qualities external to the disaster experience (e.g., Cutter et 
al. 2008; Gotham and Greenberg 2014; Cutter, Ash, and Emrich 2014; Tierney 2015; 
Graham, Debucquoy, and Anguelovski 2016; Dawson 2017). Another element involves 
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supplementing previous work that illuminates how sociospatial inequalities are 
(re)produced during disaster impacts and recovery and how resilience may reflect 
neoliberal priorities (Adams 2012; Cretney 2014; Gotham and Greenberg 2014; Tierney 
2015). While useful, these works may ignore the possibility of a resilience logic that is 
somewhat independent of neoliberalism—even if it tends to be neoliberal-friendly. They 
may occlude the distinctive role that pre-disaster preparedness and planning regimes play 
in producing “uneven landscapes of risk and resilience,” which are 
“landscape[s]...conditioned by the existing degree of inequality and risk and the strengths 
or weaknesses of social and environmental protections” (Gotham and Greenberg 2014:6).  
Put simply, while a vast majority of sociological studies of disaster look at past 
events that have already occurred, resilience efforts may produce space in ways that 
support inequality without any need for an intervening disaster (Lefebvre 1991; Gould and 
Lewis 2018a). Moreover, they may create the conditions that mature into inequality with 
the occurrence of a disaster (Pellow 2000; Gould and Lewis 2018a). While modern disaster 
research has inordinately benefitted from the recognition that post-disaster crises may 
“originate in social conditions that are far removed from the [disaster] events themselves” 
(Gotham and Greenberg 2014:6), it is likewise useful to foreground how uneven landscapes 
of risk also derive from disaster planning and preparedness efforts that depend on the 
anticipation of a disaster event.2  
 
2 Among other considerations, these include infrastructural development, building codes, evacuation plans, 
land use modifications, and choices about coastal armoring, abandonment, or managed retreat (O’Neill, Van 
Abs and Gramling 2016; Koslov 2016). In the chapters that follow a number of discrete examples are 
provided. These include a case study analysis of how building codes, evacuation plans, and land use policies 
influenced the experience of the Florida Keys with Hurricane Irma, as well as the potential for broad systemic 
effects arising from the inclusion of a resilience metric into rating agency appraisals of municipal bonds.  
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This is similar to efforts that have: identified ways that maladaptive climate change 
resilience planning that can add to sociospatial inequality through distributive and 
procedural inequities (Anguelovski et al. 2016; Anguelovski, Irazabal-Zurita, and 
Connolly 2018; Davoudi 2018); the financialization of resilience infrastructures like dykes 
and sea walls (Shatkin 2019); the integration of existing systems of oppression into 
revanchist resilience plans (Alvarez and Cardenas 2019); or through the promotion of 
gentrification through resilience initiatives (Gould and Lewis 2018a). Despite this recent 
scholarly interest, according to Anguelovski, Irazabal-Zurita, and Connolly (2018:133) 
“[w]hile much attention has been paid to the drivers of and approaches to urban 
resilience…the socio-spatial implications of concrete interventions have not received much 
consideration….” I add to these developments by offering a novel theoretical foundation 
through which potential drivers, mechanisms, and consequences of concrete resilience 
interventions may be identified, analyzed, and reformed both before and after disaster.  
A focus on elements of the planning process does not imply that conditions like 
structural inequality that are farther removed from the disaster event are any less important. 
Rather, it seeks to emphasize that at a time of greater overall disaster risk and intensified 
efforts to plan and prepare in the name of resilience (IPCC 2014; Angus 2016; Colker 
2020) the sociospatial consequences of disaster planning and response3 should be subject 
 
3 While planning and response are often thought of in a pre-disaster/post-disaster binary, this distinction is 
rarely so neat. For examples, many disaster “planning” regimes are undertaken in response to prior disasters, 
even those that happened at a great distance (i.e. they may also be in response to scientific advances, better 
understanding of environmental risk, and dissemination of information (Satake et. al 1996; Fowles, Liu, and 
Mamaril 2009; Shtob 2019)). “Response” regimes are often described as planning for the next disaster in 
addition to recovery. As used here, planning denotes activities that are undertaken generally in anticipation 
of a future event, while response denotes activities that are undertaken shortly after a disaster. The greater 
point is that these efforts bleed together. Planning may set the table for reproduction of inequality that only 
comes to pass in the post-disaster responsive phase. Alternatively, planning may result in inequality well 
before any disaster. Yet it is clear that more attention—scholarly, media, and lay—tends to be given to 
disaster initiatives that occur in the aftermath of a newsworthy event than in other contexts.  
 24 
to heightened scrutiny at all stages of the disaster cycle. In this way this effort can dovetail 
with those focused on the sociospatial consequences of structural inequality and disaster, 
inviting analyses of how environmental change manifests in landscapes of uneven 
development in concert with other structural formations.     
Moreover, this approach is relevant to a diverse array of communities and localities 
as its purview includes any municipality with a disaster plan or budget. An important goal 
is to continue the necessary work of demythologizing the experience of disaster (Tierney 
2003; Tierney, Bevc, and Kuligowski 2006) by analyzing what is actually made in the 
name of resilience (as opposed to stated intentions). Dressing bad policy in the clothes of 
public safety and protection from disaster may be an easy means of uncritical justification. 
One benefit of an outcome-focused approach is to avoid political misdirection and sleight 
of hand. Another is to support proactive analysis of resilience efforts—and efforts focused 
on similar concepts like adaptive capacity—well before a hazard event occurs. A third is 
to produce a means of analysis of disaster planning and response that, while initially 
focused on resilience, may be applied to successor terms or ideas should “resilience” fall 
out of vogue.  
There is an additional pragmatic purpose for the materialist approach: it may help to 
identify elements of our sociospatial systems that may be responsible for the production of 
disaster space. Drawing on the sociology of urban spaces and borrowing from the fields of 
urban planning and critical design, I outline some potential consequences of resilience 
through the political economies of real estate development, planning, and finance at a time 
when real estate interests wield considerable influence through political structures and the 
built environment (Logan and Molotch 1987; Lefebvre 1991; Foster, Clark, and York 
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2011; Gotham and Greenberg 2014; Boehnert 2014, 2019; Gould and Lewis 2016, 2017; 
Cowley et al. 2018; Stein 2019).  
Focusing on how space is produced by through the interaction of agents such as 
architects, designers, and developers (Lefebvre 1991, 2003), I highlight the staggering 
influence of real estate development in the production and regulation of contemporary 
space (Stein 2019) to illustrate the potential danger arising from its interaction with the 
justificatory power of resilience and disaster readiness (Gotham and Greenberg 2014; 
Dawson 2017). In this way, I build upon previous analyses of how disasters and other crises 
influence the way that space is produced across scales. This reflects what Gotham and 
Greenberg (2014:229) describe as “crisis-driven urbanization,” or “spatial dynamics” that 
depend on “the vagaries and contingencies of disasters…and the crisis dynamics they 
entrain,” but applies to the periods of relative calm before the storm.  
In addition to the departure from the post-disturbance view of resilience that has 
been common since its importation into the social sciences from ecology (Holling 1973), 
this requires rethinking how the pre-disaster state of “equilibrium” is influenced by the 
potential of future disturbance through planning. While this is certainly not the first attempt 
to think about how disasters affect urban development processes (Klein 2007, 2018; 
Gotham and Greenberg 2014; Gould and Lewis 2016, 2017), it is among the first to theorize 
the intersection of resilience, real estate development, design, and inequality and 
specifically focus on the broad consequences of the pre-disaster period: when the basal 
state of equilibrium is established and resilience initiatives are typically funded and 
undertaken (Colker 2020). By connecting diverse fields of study to the production of space 
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that surrounds disasters, I emphasize how distinctive elements of the production of space—
from finance to design—may react to the risk of disaster.  
These observations, coupled with numerous case studies analyzing post-disaster 
outcomes and a few analyzing thoughts about ongoing or coming disasters (Norgaard 2009, 
2011; Shtob 2019), suggest that our interactions with environmental change may have 
creative effects on landscapes and communities before the occurrence of a hazard event, as 
well as after. Moreover, these effects are likely to intensify due to climate change and 
continued development in hazard zones (O’Neill, Van Abs, and Gramling 2016), 
emphasizing the need to not only describe resilience but also to understand the 
consequences of the pursuit of resilience.  
To reiterate, the goals of this chapter are three-fold. The first goal is to rethink the 
way resilience is used in sociology and related social sciences from a materialist standpoint 
by focusing on what is created in its name. This benefits disaster scholarship by 
encouraging the avoidance of semantic arguments that have surrounded and obscured the 
meaning of resilience. The second goal emphasizes the potential and somewhat overlooked 
importance of the pre-disaster planning period on the production of disaster space and 
inequality, whether or not a disaster has occurred. The third is to develop a theoretical 
account of the production of disaster space that focuses on some distinctive qualities of 
disasters, finance, design, and planning, in order to rethink the relationship between 
resilience and the production of space (Lefebvre 1991) in disaster areas: the production of 




With numerous and often inconsistent definitions, resilience is as defined by its 
complexity as by any discrete definition. It has generated papers that ask, “what kind of 
thing is resilience?” (Anderson 2015) and whether it is a normative concept (Thorén and 
Olsson 2018). Others have discussed “the nature of resilience” both generally (Zebrowski 
2013) and in discrete contexts like urban spaces (Meerow, Newell, and Stults 2016). At 
least one effort helps to clarify “what resilience is not” (Reghezza-Zitt et al. 2012). Yet 
despite a proliferation of attempts to explain resilience, it is commonly criticized as 
buzzword or jargon that has been defined to death (Reghezza-Zitt et al. 2012; Rogers 2015; 
Dawson 2017).  
Moreover, resilience has been criticized for having been shaped by neoliberal 
approaches that, among other consequences, exploit disaster experiences in ways that 
generate or reproduce inequality (Adams 2012; Cretney 2014; Tierney 2015; Klein 2018). 
Scholars in this line of research observe that resilience efforts may privilege private market 
solutions and profits over effective aid. They may also require those affected by catastrophe 
to act as entrepreneurs, individualizing responsibility for recovery and ultimately resulting 
in housing instability and loss, community displacement, and a variety of adverse health 
effects for those unable to effectively advocate (Picou and Hudson 2010; Desmond 2012; 
Hall and Lamont 2013; Adeola and Picou 2014; Cretney 2014; Tierney 2015). In this 
section I will outline some of the definitional clashes over resilience in order to propose 
that, in the context of disasters, it is preferable to focus on material outcomes both for 
clarity and to better appreciate complex effects of resilience initiatives reflected in critiques 
like these. 
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The Resilience Question: Cutting Through the Definitional Tangle.  
Due to the number and complexity of competing interpretations of resilience, it is 
useful to begin with a brief review of a selection of major approaches, as well as 
contemporary genealogies that have traced the use of the word over time. My intention is 
to illustrate the improbability of arriving at a perfect definition and the danger associated 
with reductive definitions. In essence, the use of resilience is complicated in ways not 
captured by Holling’s (1973) definition. Recent genealogies challenge the linear 
etymology of the term that is widely accepted in the and social sciences and emphasize the 
complexity of its multiple and sometimes inconsistent forms and interpretations 
(Alexander 2013; Bourbeau 2015, 2018).  
One widely acknowledged difference in the use of the term occurs among disciplines 
and involves its subject. For example, in “strands of psychology, resilience refers to the 
capacity of an individual to adapt positively after a traumatic event” while 
“[c]riminologists define resilience as a process of positive adaptation” and “ecologists use 
resilience to describe how an ecosystem can return to a state of equilibrium and maintain 
its function after disturbance” (Bourbeau 2018:19, emphasis added; Welsh 2014). 
Engineers and architects, alternatively, may use it to refer to the capacity of a material or 
structure to withstand stress and maintain or return to form (Alexander 2013; Dawson 
2017). Yet all of these foci—the individual, the ecosystem, and built structures—are 
considered in concert in disaster resilience thinking notwithstanding their differences in 
disciplinary origin and treatment.  
Despite this diversity, there is a dominant origin story for the importation of 
resilience into the social sciences and its subsequent proliferation: “ecologists and C.S. 
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Holling initially developed the idea in the 1970s and…other disciplines…[more] recently 
jumped on the resilience bandwagon” (Bourbeau 2018:22; Anderson 2013). Holling’s 
principal innovation was to challenge and critique:  
mechanistic models of ecosystem equilibrium that dominated the Cold War era. 
These models assumed the ‘balance of nature’ (an equilibrium) to which life returns 
if left to repair itself following disruption. By contrast, Holling emphasized how 
nature absorbed and adapted to disruptions, describing resilience as ‘the capacity 
of a system to absorb and utilize or even benefit from perturbations and changes 
that attain it, and so persist without a qualitative change in the system’s structure’” 
(Dawson 2017:171, quoting in part Beatley 2009:3).  
 
This definition incorporates an evident normative flair: resilience—that ability to 
adapt and overcome the curveballs that life throws at biotic or human systems—sounds 
like a good quality (Bourbeau 2015), even though its consequences may be selectively or 
absolutely adverse (Cretney 2014; Tierney 2015). Moreover, definitions such as these tend 
to distinguish between known pre-event characteristics of a system and whether the system 
can persist or effectively reorganize post-event. Conspicuously missing from many of these 
definitions are both the adverse consequences of resilience and its systemic effects before 
a disruption or in the interstitial period between disruptions (but see Anguelovski et al. 
(2016), Dawson (2017) and Neisser and Runkle (2017)). 
Without denying the conceptual debt owed by social science to Holling’s (1973) 
ecological resilience, the term entered social science through multiple paths, belying the 
simplicity of its linear importation from ecology. This presents problems in application to 
complex social contexts. Speaking to its use in politics and governmentality, Bourbeau 
(2018:27) observes that “[a]lthough a parsimonious shortcut may…be obtained, it is gained 
at the great expense of exactitude, richness, and complexity.” Emphasizing this internal 
complexity, Welsh (2014) describes three separate strands that developed separately but in 
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conversation, including psycho-social resilience, which originated around child 
development and focused on recovery from trauma, socio-ecological resilience, which 
developed within ecology, and a third form that arose later “emphasiz[ed] the governance 
of risk and threats to the social body.” (Welsh 2014:16). In short, the use of resilience 
throughout its journey to disaster sociology has been contested and complicated.  
With this diversity of origins and uses, it is unsurprising that a perfect 
transdisciplinary definition of resilience may not exist. This, however, not render the term 
conceptually impotent. Quite the contrary, it is imbued with unique sort of power to 
motivate, create, and justify that is derived from its ubiquity as well as its significance to 
events and conversations that capture the public moment and implicate strong emotions 
(Hall and Lamont 2013; Gotham and Greenberg 2014; Anderson 2015; Colker 2020). 
Within the realm of global governance, the process of becoming resilient has “proliferated 
across multiple…domains of life…[as] the last iteration of the promise of 
security…offered as a desperate hope of survival in a world of roiling crises” (Anderson 
2015:60). This also explains why resilience often resists universal definition: “there is both 
an empirical diversity of resiliences and a diversity of the types or forms that are extracted, 
in analysis, from that empirical diversity” (Anderson 2015:60; Olsson et al. 2015).  
In turn, this clarifies why resilience serves as a boundary object through which 
different disciplines can communicate but also may suffer from the potential for abuse or 
miscommunication (Reghezza-Zitt et al. 2012; Tierney 2015). 4  Characterizations of 
resilience theories are likewise complex and variable:  
 
4 For the sake of clarity, here I use the term “boundary object” (Star and Griesemer 1989) in the manner used 
by Tierney (2015). In this formulation, she argues that resilience—like other popular socio-environmental 
concepts like sustainability—gained importance because of its potential to serve as a boundary object. This 
is because boundary objects may usefully serve as pliable concepts that invite collaboration on important and 
 31 
Some characterize resilience theories as reformatory, a normative philosophy for 
shaping change, producing active citizens, and facilitating self-securing agency, a 
dynamic process for ‘bouncing forward’ and changing to a new, sustainable 
state…while [o]thers find its deployment problematic…an ideology of constant 
adaptation attuned to the uncertainties of the neoliberal economy, where the 
resilient subject is conceived of as resilient to the extent it adapts to, rather than 
resists, the conditions of its suffering (Welsh 2014:16; Bourbeau 2015).  
 
What is generally common to applications of resilience (notwithstanding their 
diversity) is that they tend towards the descriptive: how well does some quality or element 
of a person or system resist disturbance, or recover, or bounce back to the previous state, 
or bounce forward to an improved one? An example of an influential definition of 
resilience within the social sciences of natural hazards is “the ability of a social system to 
respond and recover from disasters [that] includes those inherent conditions that allow the 
system to absorb impacts and cope with an event, as well as post-event adaptive processes 
that facilitate the ability of a social system to re-organize, change, and learn in response to 
the threat” (Cutter et al. 2008:599, emphases added; see also Cutter, Ash and Emrich 
2014).5 Descriptive cases like this use qualities and relative strengths or weaknesses of a 
place or community to describe its ability to withstand an external disturbance. Despite the 
way that these efforts often usefully highlight the importance of social variables, they often 
invoke pre-event characteristics of a place or community without due consideration of the 
 
far-reaching problems between members of disparate disciplines who may have different vocabularies and 
understandings of the world. By serving as common analytic pivot points, boundary objects allow 
communication that is less focused on definitional precision than on problem identification. She observes, 
however, that there is also a “Janus-faced” element to boundary objects, through which they can be 
manipulated to obscure power relations and potentially create inequality (Tierney 2015:1331).  
 
5 A small minority of definitions of the term include an element of preparedness, including that of the 
National Academy of Sciences (Dawson 2017). That definition, however, emphasizes many of the usual 
elements of contemporary resilience: a system’s potential for response and recovery; measurement of the 
qualities of a specified set of pre-existing conditions within that system; and a process of estimation of the 
ability of that system to react and adapt effectively based on those qualities. In short, even in these 
formulations preparedness is viewed by reference to its post-disaster effects, meaning the effectiveness of 
preparation efforts in assisting the return to the previous form, as opposed to how they change that previous 
form.    
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diversity of the effects of resilience efforts themselves on these characteristics. Presumably 
the intention is to suggest ways that resilience may be enhanced with the eventual goal of 
protecting people and property from hazard risk, but an important subject of study is 
glossed over because resilience is framed as an effect or outcome that will only be 
converted into a cause in the subject disaster. 
In short, these studies sometimes take resilience as the result of pre-defined drivers 
that are unrelated or only minimally related to disaster and omit that resilience efforts 
themselves can drive outcomes, and sometimes in unintended ways. Because resilience 
may be invoked in connection with disasters and other events that invoke strong feelings 
and appeals to public safety that require swift intervention, it may be especially prone to 
exploitation (Gotham and Greenberg 2014). Recognizing that a diversity of meanings 
attaches to resilience across multiple fields and disciplines that do not share a common 
definitional understanding—and the confusion that this may generate—also suggests that 
it may be especially ripe for manipulation and abuse. In turn, this suggests the importance 
of reimagining resilience in light of the tangible consequences of efforts made in its name.  
Contemporary Critiques of Resilience: Politics, Deletion, and Policy  
Notwithstanding the widespread adoption of resilience—or perhaps because of it—
a number of critiques have arisen that also suggest the importance of a focus on its 
formative nature. First among these is the contention that reliance on Holling’s (1973) 
ecological conception of resilience tends to obscure “questions of both political economy 
and power relations more broadly” (Cavanagh 2017:112; Fainstein 2015) because it is a 
“framework shaped by dominant societal values and hegemonic discourses” (Cretney 
2014:628). A second related concern is that the vagueness of the resilience metaphor and 
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its “malleability in science combined with a popularity among powerful private or public 
actors…[presents] the risk of (un)intentional scientific justification for particular policies, 
projects, and practices” (Olsson et al. 2015:6). Part of the “increasing concern” with the 
use of resilience in social science research involves the uncritical application of concepts 
like the adaptive cycle, the assumption of societal collapse, and the lack of adequate 
consideration of human agency within socio-environmental systems (Cretney 2014:631; 
Olsson et al. 2015).  
A third criticism is that theories of resilience have an a priori normative bias due to 
their roots in psychology, inasmuch as there exists an assumption that the shock or stress 
is inherently negative and the successful resilient reaction inherently positive (Bourbeau 
2015). While it may be safe to assume that natural disasters are inherently negative, the 
same is not true about the products and consequences of resilience as applied to people and 
landscapes. Rather, recent research indicates that resilience efforts are a mixed bag: they 
may protect people and communities, but they also may exacerbate social problems 
(Adams 2012; Gotham and Greenberg 2014; Elliott 2015; Tierney 2015; Elliott and Howell 
2017; Howell and Elliott 2019; Sovacool et al. 2019).  
A more sensitive, multi-faceted view of resilience is particularly important for at 
least two additional reasons. First, given the exacerbation of global risk (Beck 1992, 1996) 
emerging from the climate change (IPCC 2014; Angus 2016), the potential scope of 
catastrophic environmental change is increasing. This corresponds with the sociological 
perspective that disasters should not be viewed as anomalous but as a regular part of life 
(Elliott and Howell 2017). Since “danger invites rescue”6 recognizing disasters as normal 
 
6 Wagner v. International Railway Company, 232 N.Y. 176 (1921) (Benjamin Cardozo, J.) 
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suggests that disaster planning will likewise be normalized (i.e. Colker 2020). The second 
reason involves our rapidly expanding awareness that disasters may exacerbate sociospatial 
inequality in ways that may not be immediately evident. For example, a series of national 
quantitative studies has found positive correlations, on average, between: natural disasters 
and residential instability, along with associated race and class-based housing inequalities 
(Elliott 2015; Elliott and Howell 2017); natural disasters and wealth inequality, with real 
estate and real estate-dependent aid hypothesized as central to these processes (Howell and 
Elliott 2019); and natural disasters and accelerated land development, which may result in 
increased disaster risk to people and property as well as accelerated environmental 
degradation (Elliott and Clement 2017).  
While the foregoing concerns may represent a more cautious approach to resilience, 
perhaps the most blistering critical approach is largely based on observations about 
Hurricane Katrina and neoliberal relief efforts. Tierney (2015:1339, quoting in part Adams 
2012:195) describes how the disaster’s aftermath was marked by salient signs of neoliberal 
ideology, from the privatization of aid to the observation that “survivors [needed] to 
become ‘entrepreneurs’ and ‘empowered consumers’ in order to receive the assistance they 
needed to get on with their lives.” Put another way: 
Narratives that elevate resilience as a primary goal for disaster risk reduction have 
little meaning within this context…[and the claims] put forth by champions of 
sustainable development and now by resilience advocates stand in contrast with the 
on-the-ground realities not only of programs designed to enhance resilience but also 
of those that putatively integrate resilience into postdisaster recovery, which in the 
main reflect neoliberal ideals, ignore the workings of political and economic power 
and construct the residents of disaster-stricken areas not as political actors with 
rights, but as clients served by corporations for their own profit. Katrina offered us 
a vision of the future, and it is not a resilient one (Tierney 2015:1339, internal 
citations omitted).  
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Similarly, scholars in international relations have concluded that resilience “is a 
product of contemporary neoliberalism and a strategy permitting states to abdicate 
responsibility in times of crisis” (Bourbeau 2015:375; Chandler 2012; Duffield 2012). 
Bourbeau (2015:379) explores where resilience and neoliberalism meet, first by 
emphasizing a number of theses developed by scholars of politics, governance, and 
international relations. While some of these include a sanguine view of resilience as a site 
of social reformation or liberation (Duffield 2012; Chandler 2012), others see a less rosy 
picture, foregrounding dangers of entanglements between neoliberalism and resilience 
(Bourbeau 2015).  
Yet Bourbeau (2015) argues that these works, individually and collectively, make 
the mistake of conflating neoliberal projects with the idea that resilience is derivative of 
neoliberalism. In essence, he feels that viewing resilience as merely an offshoot of 
neoliberal ideology is inherently limiting, as is “the idealistic position that resilience is 
purely positive.” Instead, he proposes that “any extensive evaluation of resilience and its 
relationship to contemporary…politics must look beyond the questionable 
instrumentalization of resilience by some governments to the complex and multifaceted 
application of resilience” (Bourbeau 2015:380). Because disasters are easily exploited, 
disaster research should likewise embrace the potential for a dark side of resilience and 
eschew simplistic or derivative explanations for its consequences.   
Because of this diversity in views, it is preferable to view resilience as its own 
ideological creature that may share a nest with neoliberalism but is not necessarily its 
offspring. This allows us to appreciate the complexity of its political entanglements and 
suggests that it should be explored on the basis what it does rather than what it says. 
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Refocusing the primary resilience lens from the descriptive to the formative also allows for 
processes of formation to be examined well before the occurrence of a hazard trigger, 
expanding the temporal of scope of typical disaster analysis to the time when resilience 
planning programs may capture significant social and financial capital and also may be 
most easily altered or improved (Klein 2007, 2018; Gotham and Greenberg 2014; Tierney 
2015; Dawson 2017).   
THEORIZING THE MATERIAL OUTCOMES OF RESILIENCE PLANNING 
Tierney’s (2015) strong criticism of resilience as a feature of neoliberalism centers 
primarily on post-disaster material effects that take the form of lack of effective access to 
aid, denial of housing, and dislocation of populations and neighborhoods based on 
predatory and profit-centered responses. Her effort is joined by many other case and 
quantitative studies evidence an ongoing failure of the better angels of human nature in the 
context of provision of disaster aid notwithstanding these efforts being dressed in good 
intentions (Klein 2007, 2018; Adams 2012; Gotham and Greenberg 2014; Elliott 2015; 
Dawson 2017; Elliott and Clement 2017; Elliott and Howell 2017; Howell and Elliott 
2019).  
If resilience is so intensely studied and is presumably based in many good intentions, 
why have commentators repeatedly concluded that strategies based in resilience not only 
may not help but may actively harm? It seems that the time has come to reevaluate it from 
a political economic standpoint. Building from the foundation of prior efforts (e.g. Gotham 
and Greenberg 2014; Dawson 2017), I focus on means of capital accumulation through real 
estate development and design both pre- and post-disaster, but with a special emphasis on 
the pre-disaster period. Moreover, this approach seeks to identify some likely mechanisms 
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from resilience-based exploitation that can be identified during planning, well in advance 
of disaster. 
To illustrate this need, I use an excellent and important work in the political economy 
of disaster, Gotham and Greenberg’s (2014) Crisis Cities. Tracing the parallel experiences 
of New York City and New Orleans, they explore how iterative crises—financial, political, 
and environmental—are exploited by growth machines (Logan and Molotch 1987) and 
other politically powerful forces to create and maintain systems of local inequality and 
increasingly disadvantage marginalized communities (Gotham and Greenberg 2014). For 
example, they dedicate one chapter to the question of what happens when neoliberal, 
market-oriented goals “are the ideas ‘lying around’ for resurgent growth coalitions to apply 
to post-disaster redevelopment?” (Gotham and Greenberg 2014:135).   
Their primary focus is on how concatenated crises, including those prompted by 
disaster, result in crisis-driven urbanization. Disasters, viewed in this light, are “contingent 
events that under the proper conditions can trigger and be transformed into crises” that in 
turn drive future urban development trajectories (Gotham and Greenberg 2014:6). The 
element of concatenation directs that with repeated crises over time, “previous rounds of 
restructuring create the regulatory environment, public-private modes of governance, and 
socio-spatial inequalities that lay the ground for the crises and spatial politics of subsequent 
generations” (Gotham and Greenberg 2014:11; Biggs et al. 2011). In this vein, they use the 
term “landscapes of risk and resilience” to refer to “pre-existing socio-spatial, 
environmental, cultural, and political economic conditions that weaken or strengthen the 
ability of places to cope with or adapt to crises” (Gotham and Greenberg 2014:136). Their 
specific use of resilience “refers to the adaptive capacity of a social system and unit to 
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withstand shocks and protect against other hazards by organizing and innovating” (Gotham 
and Greenberg 2014:136). Importantly, they also emphasize how crises may justify 
projects that might be politically untenable during times of relative calm, emphasizing the 
danger of exploitation following disasters (Gotham and Greenberg 2014; Jacobsen 2016).  
Yet the outcomes of the collision between neoliberal priorities and disaster—
including the material effects, as severe as these are—are largely cabined within the context 
of post-disaster recovery and redevelopment. I do not mean to imply that they are ignorant 
of the pre-disaster period: they clearly recognize that the response to one crisis may serve 
as planning for the next. Their approach, however, tends to highlight that urban 
development trajectories are the residues of past recovery and redevelopment rather than 
pre-disaster planning. In this way their focus trends towards the responsive phase of the 
crisis experience and the trajectories that these set, without much attention to the efficacy 
of prophylactic intervention that is not triggered by a massive disaster. In essence, their use 
of resilience is (like most others in the literature) descriptive of how adaptive capacity 
exists (1) based on processes of investment and disinvestment in development projects that 
are the result of processes external to natural disaster like some historical forms of urban 
segregation or (2) are the product of post-disaster exploitation by powerful interests, 
including real estate developers. While of course many planning regimes and related 
sociospatial inequalities are the product of efforts external to disaster and resilience 
(Gotham 2000, 2002a, 2002b), analyses of inequality or segregation in urbanization should 
expand to consider the full effects of resilience planning efforts themselves.  
To be clear, I am not calling into question their methods, the factors used, or their 
overall distillation of how the exploitation of crises interacts with “race, class, and public 
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policy” to create uneven redevelopment and unjust outcomes for city dwellers (Gotham 
and Greenberg 2014:136). It may well be that in both New York City and New Orleans the 
relative lack of preparation was in fact the most salient feature of political economic 
analysis of the lead-up to these disasters (Freudenburg et al. 2009). Rather, I am arguing 
that efforts like this—as useful as they are—would benefit from the explicit integration of 
the political economic choices that justify themselves on the basis of resilience in light of 
actual or perceived hazard risk. In short, with expanded interest in resilience there need not 
have been a crisis for disaster exploitation to develop. These choices may affect 
neighborhoods and communities in advance of a disaster, regardless of whether that 
community has experienced a past disaster or will experience one in the future. The 
consideration of the pre-disaster context is critical for rethinking the consequences not only 
before crises, but in the interstitial periods between crises when memories may fade and 
consideration of risk may lose public purchase. 
The Ideological Basis of Natural Hazards Resilience  
In addition, given that planners are required to contend with adverse events with 
which we have no practical precedent (such as the long-term effects of climate change 
(IPCC 2014)), it is becoming increasingly important to consider resilience as its own entity 
that motivates decisions based upon the logic of protection from the “environment.” 
Resilience initiatives developed in this vein may justify might not neatly conform to the 
contours of the neoliberal critique of resilience (Cretney 2014; Tierney 2015; Fainstein 
2015; Andresen 2019). While resilience initiatives may certainly bear hallmarks of 
neoliberalism, in this section I argue that in order to understand the political economic 
implications of resilience, it should be viewed as its own conceptual entity.  
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In furtherance of this goal, it may be helpful to consider resilience as its own brand 
of ideology with its own logic. As with resilience, debates about “ideology” spanning many 
decades have failed to reach a single synthetic definition (Hall 1986; Hamilton 1987; 
Larrain 1991; Freeden 2007). This may be because ideology “is buffeted by the winds of 
academic fashion, reflecting not only substantive foci of interest but reigning 
methodologies” (Freeden 2007:2). One response to this confusion is to adopt an action-
oriented view of ideology that accepts not a single, universal ideology (though accepting, 
of course, that one may be dominant or hegemonic in any particular time and place) but 
multiple, contestable, and differentiable ideologies that co-exist as “the building blocks and 
clusters of meaning which shape political worlds” (Freeden 2007:13). These may be traced 
from their outcomes in addition to (or in place of) the words or speeches in which they are 
presented. This “generous view” of ideology incorporates systems of both power and 
emotion that are expressed as “political thought [that] is not only embedded in texts and 
speech but in behavior, routines, and practices; and the political thinking discernible 
through the latter may often be closer to the pulse of a society” (Freeden 2007:18).  
In other words, although much has been learned through the study of the discourses 
of resilience, seeing what resilience creates in a material sense may tell us more about it as 
an ideology or logic than how proponents of resilience brand their efforts. It is reasonable 
to assume that this would be amplified in systems where powerful interests may push 
ideological talking points while simultaneously obscuring the practice or consequences of 
that ideology. Allowing resilience to follow this flexible, impact-focused view of ideology 
presents the opportunity to circumvent definitional conflicts and to focus on the political 
economic logic and content of proposed interventions.   
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Applying this view, resilience may be viewed as a socio-environmental ideology 
that has political implications but is distinguishable from neoliberalism, which is a political 
ideology that may have socio-environmental implications. This is not to deny the 
significant cross-pollination and the socio-environmental service to neoliberalism that is 
performed by resilience (Gotham and Greenberg 2014; Cretney 2014; Fainstein 2015; 
Tierney 2015; Andresen 2019). Rather, it is to suggest that resilience serves as an ideology 
or logic that may be manipulated and exploited with consequential material results in ways 
that may or may not reflect neoliberal expectations (Freeden 2007).  
For example, while it is clear that many resilience programs reflect neoliberal 
standard operating procedure, at times they may not. Tierney (2015:1334) is careful to note 
that while neoliberalism is not monolithic, it is still “possible to pinpoint key aspects of 
neoliberal social, political, and economic arrangements” in the context of resilience and 
disaster. Among the key elements of neoliberalism that she identifies include an emphasis 
on economic growth, deregulation and market-based controls, a relocation of trust from 
state power to market power, and privatization along with the development of public-
private partnerships. Others have similarly identified governmental austerity as a key 
element of neoliberalism in urban politics. This includes how fiscal crises may be exploited 
to “roll back the frontiers of the state” from social welfare regulation and centralized 
responses to risk, devolving responsibility to localities and individuals who may be ill 
prepared (Peck 2012:629).  
Yet many actual and suggested disaster-planning projects involve both massive 
public expenditures at the federal and state level and regulation of the free market through, 
among other means, building and land use codes (Gotham and Greenberg 2014; Dawson 
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2017; Colker 2020; Davis and Ryan 2020). While these efforts bear certain hallmarks of 
neoliberalism and may achieve neoliberal-friendly ends like private capital accumulation 
with minimal concern for inequality, they do not conform to key elements such as 
governmental austerity, devolution of control to localities and individuals, or anti-
regulation. Understanding resilience as its own form of ideological project that may or may 
not perfectly map the contours of neoliberalism helps us to understand the distinctive logic 
through which it may promote sociospatial inequality. This represents an additional benefit 
of a materialist, outcome-based approach that features centrally in the production of 
disaster space: as we come to grips with greater risk (Beck 1992, 1996; IPCC 2014) the 
ways that we counter those risks deserve their own attention. 
The Material Approach: Lefebvre, Urban Design, and the Production of Disaster Space. 
How, then, may we conceptualize a socio-environmental ideology like resilience 
through its formative effect, with a particular eye towards effects that arise in the pre-
disaster period? Moreover, where might we look for promising explanations for the 
development of inequality in disaster zones? One key comes from The Production of 
Space, in which Lefebvre (1991) theorized the growth of urban spaces in a way that exposes 
the “ideological underpinnings of [the] organization” of our built environment (Summers 
and Howell 2019:1088). Space, in this formulation, is both socially produced and 
productive of social life in its image. Landscapes develop in ways that reflect particular 
political economic systems and the built environment, rather than representing a neutral 
backdrop, plays a role in maintaining and reproducing systems and structures of power 
(Lefebvre 1991, 2003). Yet the ideological commitments that direct Lefebvre’s (1991:9) 
“science of space” may be less than explicit, concealing the political use of knowledge with 
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“an ideology designed to conceal that use.” Within this Lefebvrian framework careful 
attention must be paid to ideologies of space, particularly those formed at the intersection 
of emergent knowledge like that of climate change. Resilience—justified by public safety 
in changing times—may be such an ideology.   
Another key likely lies within real estate development, both because of its size and 
political importance and because of its close relationship with the practice of building. 
Lefebvre (1991) observed that real estate constitutes a second circuit of capital in which 
“the channeling of money, the construction of housing, the development of space, 
financing, and speculation in land constitute a second means of acquiring wealth that is 
relatively independent of the ‘first’ circuit, industrial production” (Gottdeiner 1993:132). 
Yet even with this understanding of the motivation to produce space, why is space 
produced in a particular form? One explanation is the triple of representations of space, 
representational space, and spatial practice: the interlocking physical, mental, and social 
dimensions that align the use and organization of space with systems of social relations 
(Lefebvre 1991; Gottdeiner 1993; Helmuth 2019).  
Yet it would be a mistake to focus solely on these and ignore the individuals and 
industries involved in the production of space. Lefebvre (1991:9) employs the triple of 
architecture, urbanism, and planning to denote how practice of the production of space—
what he terms “projects concerned with space”—actually occurs.7 Part of the mission of 
 
7 This is distinct from “spatial projects” inasmuch as the term “projects concerned with space” veers closer 
to the mechanics of how space is produced, as opposed to its political or ideological basis (though it certainly 
folds these into the analysis). Spatial projects refer to “the formative movement” of social relations into space 
such that “social life forms its spatial milieu in ways that are productive for it.” In other words, the spatial 
project is “the dialectic between space and social relations itself” that inscribes political power upon space 
(Madden 2014:480). Projects concerned with space, alternatively, are presented by Lefebvre (1991) as a way 
of imagining the future even while stymied by the present mode of production, and is applied specifically to 
architects, planners, and designers. In this way it better reflects the restrictions on creative imagination 
imposed by a political economic system than spatial projects: while spatial projects emphasize creation, 
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The Production of Space is to demystify the processes by which finance, planning, design, 
and architecture are organized to construct landscapes and the built environment. In so 
doing Lefebvre (1991) argues that ostensibly politically neutral aesthetic processes are in 
fact motivated and organized by the needs of well-organized and powerful interests. In this 
way elements of planning and design—like building codes and land use plans—may be 
identified as the mechanisms through which political economic priority comes into spatial 
being. One immediate benefit of the application of the production of space to the material 
consequences of resilience initiatives is the ability to identify these mechanisms and their 
underlying logic (Lefebvre 1991, 2003).  
While spatial projects are by definition political, the analysis of projects concerned 
with space goes a step further, examining the interplay between power structures and the 
mechanics of the activities of those professionally involved. At the same time, Lefebvre 
(Lefebvre 1991:64, 2003) proposes, presumably as part of his larger project to reimagine 
cities as sites of human agency and improvement (Swyngedouw and Heynen 2004) the 
analytical reunification of the three levels of architecture, urbanism, and planning. Rather 
than the agents of design being “isolated by existing spatial practice,” in a manner that 
obscures the true social relationships of urban development, he emphasizes how power is 
expressed even in the day-to-day details of spatial production. 
For all that architectural projects have a seeming objectivity, for all that the 
producers of space may occasionally have the best intentions in the world, the fact 
is that volumes are invariably dealt with in a way that refers the space in question 
back to the land, to a land that is still privately (and privatively) owned; built-up 
space is thus emancipated from the land in appearance only….This 
relationship…is both a practice and an ideology: an ideology whose practitioners 
are unaware that their activity is of an ideological nature, even though their every 
 
projects concerned with space are concerned with the means of creation (Lefebvre 1991). In this use, and my 
use of the term “projects of disaster space,” the implication is the existence of a dual dialectical focus between 
political power, space, and the development of space by specially trained human beings.  
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gesture makes this fact concrete. The supposed solutions of the planners thus 
impose the constraints of exchangeability on everyday life, while presenting them 
as both natural (or normal) and technical requirements—and often also as moral 
necessities….And this in turn implies a repressive ideology in social practice—
and vice versa, so that each masks the other. Spatial interchangeability inevitably 
brings a powerful tendency towards quantification in its train, a tendency which 
naturally extends outwards into the surroundings of the housing itself into those 
areas variously represented as the environment, transitional spaces, means of 
access, facilities, and so on….Quantification in this context is technical in 
appearance, financial in reality, and moral in essence. (Lefebvre 1991:338-339). 
 
The central axis of Lefebvre’s (1991) argument is that the way that space is produced 
through ideology permeates all levels and scales of practical human interaction with the 
built environment. This production may be extravagant or mundane, and it may be explicit 
or shrouded in inaccurate justification. Promoters of disaster readiness may describe a 
technically grounded project as an ideologically neutral moral necessity (i.e. protection 
from a coming disaster), when it is financial in reality and primarily serves capital 
accumulation. The production of disaster space adds an element of catastrophe, expectation 
of catastrophe, and moral motivation for public safety to the mix, distinguishing these types 
of choices from regular civic policy. 
Reading resilience into the production of disaster space also requires elaboration of 
Lefebvre’s (1991) notion of how social space is converted to abstract space. Social space 
denotes space that is lived in and valued for its use by the general public, whereas abstract 
space represents space that is commodified and used for the development of exchange 
value by elites. The production of space involves choices about the conversion of social 
space to abstract space given political economic context and priorities (Lefebvre 1991, 
2003; Danyluk 2019). Rather than a singular “elite,” however, the different levels of 
production of space exist within a hierarchy of professional power in which each 
component experiences distinctive pressures and motivations. To the three agents of 
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design, planning, and architecture, Lefebvre (1991, 2003) prophetically added the agent of 
finance. Based on his guidance about the interrelationships between these levels, in the 
sections that follow I will consider a few examples of how different agents may be 
influenced by political economic context and resilience, including critical perspectives 
from the field of design.8 This opens up a forum to consider how resilience projects may 
be accomplished by a variety of actors working within a political economic context: the 
production of disaster space. It also allows for the consequences of these projects to be 
measured and their underlying logic analyzed. 
Scale 1: Integration of Real Estate Development, Governance, and Accumulation.  
We begin with the world of real estate finance: the site of the conflict between 
financial reality and moral essence. As anticipated by Lefevbre (1991) the second circuit 
of capital is thriving and has significant implications for the experience of resilience and 
the production of disaster space. Yet the sheer scale may have been astonishing to him. 
“Global real estate is now worth $217 trillion, thirty-six times the amount of gold ever 
mined” (Stein 2019:3) and more than ten times the 2018 Gross Domestic Product of the 
United States (Bureau of Economic Analysis 2019). In fact, in the context of preparation 
for disasters Elliott and Clement (2017:853) report that “federal hazard programs and 
private insurance markets…now underwrite more than $64 trillion in built property values 
across the United States—roughly 3.5 times the nation’s [then] current gross domestic 
product.”  
 
8 Disasters may provide a frame for reflection and refraction of existing social practices, amplifying their 
signal and salience (Birkland 1996; Tierney 2007). Therefore, an additional benefit to the study of resilience 
in the natural disaster context may be the opportunity to not only better understand disasters, but also the 
forces behind uneven development in times of relative calm. A secondary goal of this effort is to introduce 
concepts of real estate development and finance that may gain analytical importance as climate change 
becomes more accepted and feared. 
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On a global or national scale, these capital valuation figures reflect what Stein 
(2019:7), an experienced urban planner, refers to as the “real estate state,” or “the political 
formation in which real estate capital has inordinate influence over the shape of our cities 
and the lives we lead.” As a consequence of the magnitude and importance of real estate to 
municipalities and other political units, the state may work at the behest of the needs of 
real estate capital, focusing on real property valorization and the conversion of 
neighborhood use values to exchange values to be realized on global markets (Logan and 
Molotch 1987; Weber 2002). In addition to political pressures that may be applied by 
holders of real estate assets, local political subdivisions in the United States are often 
dependent upon property values because municipal finance often depends on ad valorem 
real estate taxes. In turn, these may inform decisions made at the intersection of the market 
and local government about the “best” uses and forms of land, and at times be directed by 
secondary circuits of global capital (Weber 2002; Pacewitz 2013; Dawson 2017). This 
contributes to instability in real estate markets that may in turn further fuel housing 
instability, displacement, and the creation of inequality (Logan and Molotch 1987; 
Desmond 2012; Stein 2019).  
Real estate as a site of contestation also reflects the treadmill of accumulation 
(Foster, Clark, and York 2011). This is an elaboration and correction of the earlier treadmill 
of production (Schnaiberg 1980; Schnaiberg and Gould 2000; Gould, Pellow, and 
Schnaiberg 2004) that uses the metaphor of an accelerating, consuming, and polluting 
treadmill to show describe the fundamental incompatibility between constant economic 
growth and maintenance of environmental quality. The treadmill of accumulation moves 
the conversation—and the powerful treadmill metaphor—beyond the earlier focus on 
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industrial production and into the realm of the second circuit of real estate capital. Foster, 
Clark, and York (2011, 202-203), emphasizing this distinction, argue that “capital, by its 
nature, is self-expanding value,” and consequently the treadmill of production exhibits a 
“tendency to underestimate the role of accumulation as the ‘juggernaut’ of capital, along 
with the crisis tendencies it generates” (Weber 2002).  
Therefore, the dangers of capital that needs a home and the speculative investment 
that follows may be a fertile source of motivation about the production of disaster space: a  
“follow the money” approach to resilience. The specific dangers presented by the forces 
behind capital accumulation and the co-option of the state by capital interests reflect 
Gotham’s (2009) description of the development of securitization as a way to render real 
estate liquid. He argued that due to market desires and ad hoc regulatory reforms illiquid 
real estate was converted to tradable securities through securitization. This was intended to 
free capital that would otherwise be tied up for extended periods of spatial fixity: a 
condition where immobile real estate interests (i.e. real estate itself or mortgages) tended 
not to be sold or transferred, nor otherwise converted to surplus value that could be swiftly 
reinvested to continue the cycle of accumulation. At the same time, the homogenization 
and pooling of distinctive real estate holdings into securities reduced financial risk for 
investors (Gotham 2009). 
The twin goals of accelerated capital accumulation through real estate conversion 
and risk reduction likewise appear in the production of disaster space. On a fundamental 
level disaster events may involve the unwanted turnover of real estate through destruction 
and may put inhabitants in a position of being forced to sell because they cannot afford 
repairs (Klein 2007, 2018). The pre-disaster planning process may also cause real estate 
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turnover through application of land use and building codes (Anguelovski et al. 2016), 
gentrification (Gould and Lewis 2018a), voluntary managed retreat (Koslov 2016), official 
abandonment of at-risk areas (Flavelle and Mazzei 2019), or requirements that incentivize 
the strengthening or replacement of existing structures (Colker 2020; Davis and Ryan 
2020; Ambrosio et al. 2020). Real estate therefore should be viewed as a central mode of 
accumulation of capital for wealthy interests, an important site of municipal finance and 
the municipal fisc, and importantly one that may be catalyzed by disasters (or planning for 
disasters) into a more liquid form that better serves the needs of capital. Moreover, because 
it is an important factor in the generation of familial and intergenerational wealth it may 
also factors centrally in the production of disaster inequality (Gotham 2000, 2002a, 2002b; 
Lipsitz 2011; Howell and Elliott 2019).  
What else can be learned about resilience, specifically, from these observations 
about real estate development and the increasingly intermixed role of the state and private 
capital? First is that resilience is mediated through real estate and projects of disaster space 
are likely subject to similar forces that otherwise influence land use and planning but with 
a distinctive twist. Considering the massive scale of real estate investment and its public-
private entanglements, the ideology and logic of resilience likely serves development 
pressures in ways that may be justified by innocent-sounding public safety rationales. 
Second, through resilience the form of space may be exploited or weaponized, leading to 
adverse post-disaster consequences as well as adverse consequences before disaster 
(Anguelovski et al. 2016). Building on observations about the effects of post-disaster 
resilience gentrification in major cities (Gould and Lewis 2018a) the focus should also 
interrogate the effects of a multitude of disaster preparedness plans (see, e.g., Colker 2020) 
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that may affect smaller communities and may have less noisy consequences than those 
following disasters in major cities.  
Third, rather than accepting the expressed intention of resilience plans—the 
discourses surrounding resilience—it is preferable to look to their consequences as projects 
of disaster space that unfold across the disaster cycle. Finally, since the best time to engage 
with the potential adverse consequences of environmental change is before the triggering 
event, this enlivens the study of disaster by encouraging proactive research on inequality 
formation in addition than retrospective, historical research (e.g., Gotham 2000, 2002a, 
2002b; Pasciewicz 2013; Rugh, Albright, and Massey 2015). Building off of this, it is 
possible to disentangle some of the relationships that put pressure on other those occupying 
other levels of the production of disaster space.  
Scale 2: The Design and Layout of Urbanity.  
Now we enter the world of architecture and design in order to demystify some 
experiences in these fields, as well as to search for mechanisms by which the production 
of disaster space comes to life. This is partially to evidence the intrusion of political 
economic pressures on the creative process and partially to emphasize the competency of 
designers, architects, and planners to creatively speculate on future forms based on little 
more than plans: a skill that may come in handy when imagining the consequences of 
resilience plans. Some design professionals have commented on the influence of real estate 
capital in setting the parameters for their work, either through the real estate state or 
independently through market and client influences. Easterling (2014:15), an architect and 
theorist, describes the dual public-private power catalyzed into the form of space and 
infrastructure as “extrastatecraft.” Extrastatecraft connotes a parallel the system of 
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administrative authority that directs “the often-undisclosed activities outside of, in addition 
to, and sometimes even in partnership with statecraft.” She contends that “[c]ontemporary 
infrastructure is the secret weapon of the most powerful people in the world precisely 
because it orchestrates activities that remain unstated but nevertheless consequential” 
(Easterling 2014:15). Like Lefebvre (1991), she recognizes the importance of 
infrastructure in the practical expression of systems of power that goes beyond open 
legislation.  
This may help to explain a central contradiction in the planning process that reflects 
the contradiction between the expressed neoliberal preference for austerity and free market 
solutions and the costly material reality of disaster planning. Stein (2019:14) argues that 
the “nature of planning…in the United States is mercurial and contradictory….Our 
political discourse valorizes the free market in a way that makes planning seem 
unnecessary, yet the United States has always planned its urban spaces in important and 
powerful ways.” While this may be old news, these contradictory regulatory tendencies 
may be magnified or molded by anticipated impacts of disasters. Both the pre-and post-
disaster periods may be manipulated due to the serious nature of disasters, the necessity of 
infrastructural considerations, the emotional intensity that disasters produce, and their 
effects on structures of social capital (Elliott, Hite, and Devine 2009; Picou and Hudson 
2010; Adeola and Picou 2014; Anguelovski et al. 2016).  
Other critical scholars have taken note of the contradictory tendencies not only in 
planning, but also in design. For example, Boehnert (2014, 2019), a design practitioner and 
theorist, observes that design as a professional practice should ideally address human needs 
through expert professional creativity. Yet she distinguishes this prosocial mission from 
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what is created by the design industry, which uses design agencies that direct individual 
designers to work in the service of the dominant economic system (Boehnert 2014). Within 
the resilience field specifically, this runs contrary to greater integration of the “creative 
imagination,” rather than the instrumental thinking that commonly guides resilience 
initiatives (Dobraszczyk 2017:869).  
Acknowledging a number of potential benefits of the practice of design—including 
producing new ways of thinking and combining these with emergent technologies to 
develop complex socio-environmental solutions—Boehnert (2014) observes that this 
potential often goes unrealized. This is due to the institutionalization of design as a business 
in an economic system that favors profit, as well as the source of that profit: paying clients. 
The “basic impasse,” she observes, is that “design must operate according to reductive 
[economic] feedback…as opposed to the feedback from the system in which the economic 
system is situated and upon which it is dependent (the ecological system)” (Boehnert 
2014:124-25). These environmental omissions may extend to the needs of the end user, 
who may be ignored in the design process by the assumptions of the architect or planning 
agency (Kostof 1989).  
Notwithstanding the dictates of the market or of clients, critical spatial practice, like 
critical spatial theory in the vein of Lefebvre’s (2003) right to the city, tries to “generate 
questions to facilitate the process of identifying critical temporary spatialities” (Etcétera… 
2012; see also, Bhatia 2012). These efforts indicate that there is interest among creative 
workers in critical approaches based in the production of space. A materialist approach to 
resilience, projects concerned with space, and the production of disaster space that employs 
Lefebvre’s (1991) levels of professional practice could draw upon these scholars and 
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practitioners (as well as their professional imagination) for their predictions about how 
planning initiatives would come into being.  
For example, why does building things stronger often also imply building them 
bigger? What are the spatial consequences of this connection? What are the consequences 
before the feared disaster occurs? How will these mature thorough the disaster experience? 
Answering questions like these would help to avoid sociological accounts of disaster 
inequality formation that typically come years after the trigger event when there is little 
that can be done. Listening to designers and critical design theorists provides another 
promising avenue to identify elements of the production of disaster space that may have 
unintended negative effects, and also may help generate a set of new questions based on 
their professional imagination.   
THE MATERIALIST APPROACH TO RESILIENCE: AN ILLUSTRATION. 
If a material approach to resilience exists across spaces and elements of the 
production of space, from finance to design, then how may these be traced? Here, I will 
provide an example of how this new analytical method of resilience critique may play out 
in practice. The first employs one work from which I have drawn heavily for inspiration 
(Dawson 2017). Later chapters will elaborate on this using the interactions of resilience 
and municipal bond issuances, and then the experiences of residents of the lower Florida 
Keys with Hurricane Irma in 2017. My intention in each case is to illustrate the promise of 
a more materialist view of resilience and concepts that inhere within it, such as adaptive 
capacity, and to demonstrate how the materialist perspective has the capacity to expand 
analysis into new realms necessitated by climate change.   
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Extreme Cities and Suggestions for Integration 
It is perhaps unsurprising that one academic work that approximates the argument 
made in this paper at the intersection of capital, design, and disaster. Dawson’s (2017:14-
15) Extreme Cities, focuses in large part on New York, the “capital of capital,” and 
emphasizes the need to “question the extent to which free market ideology permeates 
[resilience] and the adaptation efforts deployed in [resilience’s] name.” While many works 
list a variety of resilience initiatives (e.g., Bourbeau 2015; Colker 2020), this one takes an 
in-depth and comparatively forward-looking approach to the city’s response to Hurricane 
Sandy. Dawson (2017) identifies how the political moment at the beginning of recovery 
provided a platform for development of resilience (and related concepts like adaptive 
capacity). He also outlines the contradictions that emerged out of the collision of New 
York’s newly recognized disaster risk and the city’s basal state of frenzied real estate 
development.  
For example, shortly after Hurricane Sandy, then-Mayor Bloomberg and the city 
administration rolled out multiple reports envisioning hundreds of projects and measures 
with price tags approaching $20 billion “that established New York as the most forward 
thinking city in the United States in addressing climate change in general and sea level rise 
in particular” (Dawson 2017:33). Yet “at the same time as city planners and expert 
consultants were issuing these increasingly stark warnings about climate change, the 
Bloomberg administration was spending hundreds of millions in public funds luring real 
estate developers to construct luxury apartment buildings in waterfront zones of the city” 
(Dawson 2017:33). In strong terms the mayor rejected any form of abandonment, managed 
retreat, or even gradual or partial undevelopment of the waterfront. This was even so at the 
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ceremony to release A Stronger, More Resilient New York: the city’s response to Hurricane 
Sandy. Mayor Bloomberg embodied a central contradiction of contemporary resilience by 
supporting expenditures to both resist disaster and to increase development in a known 
disaster zone. And all of this while the danger was still fresh in New Yorkers’ minds. This 
is what Dawson (2017:36) observed was the inherent dissonance between the city role as 
a “sink for ‘surplus capital’” while it is, for practical purposes, slowly sinking.  
What purpose might these resilience plans serve, and what form did they take, 
despite their contradictory relationship to city policy? Because pre-existing coastal 
development in this context was not done for resilience but seemingly in spite of it, Dawson 
(2017) argues that climate response plans like those found in New York City and other 
contradictory cities like Miami represent a form of municipal greenwashing, branding in 
the service of attracting capital, or a disaster growth machine through which public funds 
are invested and appropriated for private wealth accumulation (Logan and Molotch 1987; 
Gould and Lewis 2018a). Moreover, while some of these plans—which were developed in 
relative secret by members of a municipal management consultancy inner circle—were 
focused on decreasing the city’s carbon emissions, many were firmly focused on and 
justified by “the jargon of resilience” (Dawson 2017:153). Adopting an approach that 
focuses on the practice of architecture and design, he argues that resilience, even when 
used in a holistic sense of the city as complex system, tends to obscure its political 
elements.   
Rebuild by Design was a design competition sponsored by the Rockefeller 
Foundation and funded by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development 
focused on enhancing New York City’s storm resilience. By Dawson’s (2017) account it 
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had many laudable features, including its collaborative design and jurying process and a 
community-engaged, participatory design process. It also represented the beginning of a 
shift in the focus from post-disaster reaction to pre-disaster resilience by encouraging a 
storm-proofing network. In terms of jargon, it appears to be an ideal example of resilience 
translating to ostensibly useful practice as it makes all the right noises. Yet his review of 
one of the competition winners indicates that it leaves much to be desired from a material 
standpoint. One objection to the so-called Big U—a bridging berm that that would wrap 
around the lower Manhattan financial district like the second wall of Wall Street—was that 
it would actually increase risk on long timescales, holding back sea levels as they rose until 
eventually it was unable to do so (Dawson 2017). The parallels to the levees of New 
Orleans are more than evident.  
Another issue was that the Big U would not make the water disappear. Rather, it 
would redirect it away from wealthier areas like the financial district and towards less 
affluent communities of color (Dawson 2017). Other waterfront communities in New York 
City—including Harlem and Red Hook, a neighborhood across the river in Brooklyn where 
public housing was greatly affected by Hurricane Sandy—were not protected. Therefore, 
communities that have traditionally suffered the brunt of environmental injustice from 
industry and urban planning are once again subject to environmental injustice: a resilience-
driven case of environmental inequality formation (Pellow 2000; Liévanos and Horne 
2017; Liévanos, Greenberg, and Wishart 2018).  
With Dawson’s comprehensive account of the city’s post-Hurricane Sandy efforts 
and the plan envisioned by Rebuild by Design, how could the material approach presented 
here improve efforts like his? Without in any way disparaging this excellent book, there 
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are a few ways. First, the case of New York City and Rebuild by Design is exceptional for 
a variety of reasons, not the least of which is New York’s global status as a center of 
commerce and culture. For every New York City, there are many other areas that presently 
have resilience plans or have them under development, yet have not experienced a recent 
disaster. Second, while Rebuild by Design and its $930 million price tag, along with the 
Big U, serve as case examples of some potential pitfalls of resilience (Dawson 2017), many 
initiatives towards resilience and disaster planning are more mundane yet no less important. 
From building codes and zoning (Colker 2020) to plans of managed retreat (Koslov 2016), 
resilience planning manifests in a variety of ways. Many of these efforts will be 
consequential but it is often difficult to predict how. By tracing the tendrils of the second 
circuit of capital and interrogating the probable equity impacts of projects like these, it may 
be possible to better align protection from disasters with justice goals.   
Third, while Rebuild by Design is in many ways a preparedness project (or at least 
is billed as such), it came to exist after a major storm and whether or not it will be fully or 
partially completed remains to be seen. One key insight from this paper should be that it 
should not take a major disaster to begin thinking about the future and to begin questioning 
what form the consequences of resilience planning will take. Nor should we count on well-
intentioned efforts started after a disaster to persist in either form or intention into later 
planning.9 Instead, materialist analyses of resilience plans should begin with the plan and 
 
9 Well after writing this, near the end of editing this chapter, New York City news outlet Gothamist published 
an article describing how New York City’s “most expansive climate resiliency project” had been abruptly 
halted by the Army Corps of Engineers, ostensibly for the purpose of political retaliation. This study was 
focused on the evaluation of five types of coastal defense, including sea walls, berms, and biotic barriers 
(Offenhartz 2020). In addition to again demonstrating of the highly politicized nature of resiliency efforts—
a month before the President tweeted that New Yorkers should “get their mops and buckets ready” rather 
than depend on a seawall—this evidences the idea that reactive efforts may not progress past the planning 
phase, as this one did (Offenhartz 2020). Its interaction with the principles of neoliberalism, resilience, and 
growth machine supported accumulation is more complex, including elements of federal-state entanglement, 
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projection of its outcomes both in the present and the future. Concerns over gentrification 
and unequal, cumulative exposure to risk should be front and center, as should the potential 
effects of real estate valorization and conversion of public funds to private wealth (i.e., 
Gould and Lewis 2018a).  
This is especially important because environmental sociologists have begun to view 
disasters not as a bug but as a feature of the socio-environmental system in which we live 
(Elliott and Clement 2017). “Over the past half century, the average [U.S.] county has 
experienced multiple hazards per year” (Elliott and Howell 2017:1182, emphasis in 
original). Therefore, while the most well publicized plans of resilience may be focused on 
large disasters, it is likely that in thousands of smaller community different hazard risks—
major disasters, localized fires or wildfires, or even more surprising events like hailstorms, 
locusts, or fisheries collapse—may motivate the public imagination to take action in the 
name of resilience. It is in these thousands of discrete contexts with their unique decision-
making priorities that a view of the material outcomes of resilience takes on significant 
public importance.  
CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this paper has been to challenge and deepen our understanding of the 
term resilience. This is because it has increasingly become a dominant way of justifying 
the deployment of resources against environmental change and risk. Additionally, it is 
because research into resilience may be hampered by the definitional confusion that 
surrounds the term. By reconsidering resilience as a formative human response to modern 
 
political pressure, and arguments about austerity and public works, including the possibility of a $119 
billion—yes, billion—offshore gated seawall that is being considered partly because onshore projects may 
be unsightly (Barnard 2020).   
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environmental change, however, we can distinguish what it could be from what it is. This 
analysis may be interpreted as contributing to literatures on disaster-based gentrification 
(Gould and Lewis 2018a; Klein 2018), so-called “green” gentrification (Curran 2007; 
Quastel 2009; Checker 2011; Curran and Hamilton 2012; Kern 2015), analysis of the 
effects of structures of real estate capital on housing (Wyly et al., 2006, 2009; Gotham 
2009), or how resilience is practiced by particular groups (Graham, Debucquoy, and 
Anguelovski 2016). It adds to the scant yet important literature on the potential for 
maladaptation in resilience planning (Anguelovski et al. 2016) by promoting a prospective 
view of resilience and then theorizing mechanisms by which it develops. In a fundamental 
sense, it also reflects calls to focus on institutionally promoted social vulnerability (e.g. 
Connolly 2018) by directing attention to the effects of discrete planning initiatives and the 
longer arc of public-private cooperation.   
Moreover, my goal has been to elaborate upon recent innovations in our 
understanding of environmental change and human response (Gotham and Greenberg 
2014; Dawson 2017) by foregrounding the sociospatial effects of the anticipation of 
disaster, including which actors may be involved and why. This promises to enhance our 
understanding of disasters and urban development more generally by focusing on the logic 
of real estate capital and accumulation (Lefebvre 1991, 2003; Foster, Clark, and York 
2011; Stein 2019). By analyzing the way that capital takes shape within at-risk landscapes 
before a storm it may be possible to diagnose the mechanisms by which people and 
property are put at risk not only during a storm but before, as well as the cumulative effects 
of consequences like gentrification that may mature before or after a storm and those like 
destruction of housing that typically mature after. These effects likely include involuntary 
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housing migration, residential instability, and a wide range of social ills that follow housing 
precarity (Desmond 2012; Sullivan 2018).  
Scholarship on resilience would benefit from a sharper focus on the ways that it 
reflects the interests of a variety of social actors. This can take the form of direct 
pronouncements and policies such as those in Dawson’s (2017) description of New York 
City’s recovery from Hurricane Sandy. The exigencies of real estate development and 
finance have been demonstrated to affect post-disaster experiences (Gotham and 
Greenberg 2014; Tierney 2015; Dawson 2017) but these cases represent the tip of the 
iceberg. Events that capture public attention should be joined with the routine and 
seemingly unremarkable day to day functioning of thousands of local governments and 
others who plan, regulate, design, and build in line with their understanding of resilience, 
the ideological elements of political economy and public safety that collide in disaster 
preparedness, and local context.  
A first step to understanding the submerged portion of the iceberg is to supplement 
discursive approaches to resilience with direct analysis of their material outcomes.  This 
includes systems of finance, design and development, the co-development of the built 
environment by public and private actors, and the dependencies that systems like this 
produce (Logan and Molotch 1987; Lefebvre 1991). This requires challenging the 
assumption that resilience initiatives are a win-win proposition, even if at times they are. 
Reframing resilience as its own ideology—or at least as its own set of distinct ideological 
concepts—also helps to analytically separate it from neoliberalism. It is not my intention 
to argue that resilience is somehow immune to neoliberalism (Cretney 2014; Tierney 
2015). Instead, it is to suggest that resilience represents a semi-autonomous ideological 
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frame that often dovetails with neoliberal ways of thinking but should be studied as a 
reflection of socio-environmental systems of power and inequality in its own right.  
Finally, a materialist, outcome-based approached also encourages those are 
interested in natural hazards and other forms of risk to think more proactively, building off 
of the momentum created by retrospective appraisals of disaster and inequality to consider 
what should be done in advance. Because much of what resilience creates is focused on the 
next disaster but may be independently consequential in advance of that disaster (or if that 
disaster never occurs), it is likely that the decisions that have not yet been catalyzed into 
disaster impacts also matter. In addition to representing an underexplored component of 
resilience, these impacts represent an underexplored component of the socio-
environmental consequences of environmental change generally. Taking a material 
approach to resilience confers the advantage of nimble identification and tracing of the 









CHAPTER II. SHOCKS, STRESSES, AND MUNICIPAL BONDS: THE CASE 
OF MOODY’S, CREDIT RATINGS, AND CREATION IN THE NAME OF 
RESILIENCE.  
 
We are taking these risks very seriously….You can’t mitigate what you don’t 
understand. 
—Myriam Durand, Global Head of Assessments, Moody’s Investors Service  
(Quoted in Flavelle (2019)). 
 
INTRODUCTION. 
In July 2019, Moody’s Corporation (along with Moody’s Investor’s Service and 
other business affiliates, referred to as Moody’s) acquired a controlling interest in Four 
Twenty Seven, a company that analyzes the potential physical impacts of climate change 
(Flavelle 2019). Notwithstanding a political system featuring well-organized climate denial 
(Norgaard 2009, 2011; Dunlap and McCright 2011) this signaled that credit ratings 
agencies—of which Moody’s is one of the big three along with Standard and Poor’s (S&P) 
and Fitch Ratings (Fitch)—take the potential financial effects of climate change and 
climate-related disaster seriously. In fact, over a year before the acquisition, Moody’s U.S. 
Public Finance group issued an explanatory report—Evaluating the Impacts of Climate 
Change on US State and Local Issuers—outlining a new methodology to incorporate 
climate risk and resilience into its assessments of the creditworthiness of local governments 
(Moody’s 2017a). While they have not similarly described their methodologies, S&P and 
Fitch each appear to be following suit (Flavelle 2018; S&P 2019). While acknowledgement 
of the importance of climate change is welcome, the inclusion of resilience into this 
centralized system of credit assessment also presents cause for concern.  
This is because municipal bond finance is a critically important yet historically 
under-appreciated element of our financial system that has effects well beyond the field of 
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finance (Cantor and Packer 1995; Omstedt 2019).10  Ratings of municipal bonds—the 
rough equivalent of a personal credit score, but for local government—can encourage and 
discourage particular policy choices, with real and immediate consequences for municipal 
financial health (Hackworth 2007; Carruthers 2015). These include changes to the form 
and substance of public expenditures and resource deployment, infrastructural 
development, land use and building codes, the maintenance of property values and tax base, 
and other critical public housing and social welfare priorities (Hackworth 2007; Carruthers 
2015; Adelino, Cunha, and Ferreira 2017; Omstedt 2019; Coffee 2020). Because resilience 
planning and other responses to climate risk have been largely devolved to states and 
localities11 (Tierney 2015; Gotham and Faust 2020) and because localities do not have the 
luxury of relocation away from climate or disaster risk like individuals and corporations 
do (Painter 2020), the effects of credit ratings agencies’ consideration of municipal climate 
risk and resilience are potentially vast (Moody’s 2017a). With financialization and 
financial considerations becoming an increasingly essential part of the U.S. and global 
economies, it is important to consider how macroeconomic trends spread across thousands 
of individual sites help to set the stage for smaller-scale decisions (Carruthers and Kim 
2011).    
One reason why credit ratings can encourage particular courses of action is that 
ratings affect the value and cost of a municipality’s debt, which may be used for everything 
 
10 In fact, a 2011 review piece in Annual Review of Sociology titled “The Sociology of Finance” does not 
mention municipal bonds or municipal finance at all (Carruthers and Kim 2011).  
 
11 Municipal bonds may be issued by “any local government unit within a county,” including “counties, cities, 
townships, school districts, and special districts,” among other political and special purpose municipal 
subdivisions (Adelino, Cunha, and Ferreira 2017:3225). For the sake of simplicity, the terms “locality” and 
“municipality” are used herein to refer to collectively refer to these potential issuers.  
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from building necessary infrastructure to covering temporary operating shortfalls 
(Carruthers 2013). In short, like an individual’s credit score, a better rating means that state 
and local governments can borrow money for less: they result in lower interest rates and 
mean that debt is more affordable (Cornaggia, Cornaggia, and Israelsen 2017).12 Yet these 
ratings do not take the form of an objective probability that the debt will be repaid. Instead, 
they rely on analysts’ assessment of a variety of threats to repayment and the distillation of 
the cumulative uncertainty of these threats into ordinal categories (Cantor and Packer 
1995). The process of assigning ratings is one of commensuration, in which many types of 
uncertainty are categorized and converted to an assessment of risk on a standardized scale. 
In other words, credit ratings helped to reduce “idiosyncratic uncertainties into calculable 
risks,” domesticating them into formalized standard measures (Carruthers 2013:543; 
Carruthers and Stinchcombe 1999). 
 
12 In this way a comparison to Beck’s (1992, 1996, 2008) insurability concept may be useful. This concept 
suggests that a “real world” way of assessing risks and uncertainty that are uncontrollable, unimaginable, or 
that we otherwise cannot prepare for is whether insurance markets will offer to insure that risk or uncertainty 
(Beck 1996, 2008). Yet those with a finance background might argue that anything is insurable, if the insured 
is willing to pay enough in premiums or carve out enough in the form of deductibles and similar holdbacks. 
In this way the issue is not insurability per se, but affordability of insurance. If the premiums and deductibles 
rise so high that they are either patently unaffordable or simply not worth obtaining (in the case of the 
premium approaching the insured amount, either individually or in the aggregate across the industry) then 
the insurance might be classified as non-existent when really it is just not affordable or economical. Although 
this is more useful as a clarification than a challenge to the insurability concept, it demonstrates some of the 
differences in translating social science approaches to finance and vice versa. Similarly, the issue with 
municipal bonds is not whether they can exist with a less than stellar rating. They can and they do. The issue 
is that the higher cost might render them unaffordable to the issuer through interest rates that they may be 
unable or unwilling to pay, or through other costs necessary to make them marketable. One of these potential 
costs is known as credit enhancement, in which a bond issue is insured (in the case of insurance, through a 
“monoline” insurer) or guaranteed by a third party with a high credit rating (like a bank issuing a letter of 
credit to cover bond repayment shortfalls or default), so that bondholders may have comfort that a 
creditworthy entity is backing their right to repayment. In essence, for a fee the issuer can assume the credit 
rating of the guarantor or insurer, leading to more affordable issuance costs. Reframing Beck’s (1992, 1996, 
2008) insights about insurance as ones of affordability rather than availability allows the critical element of 
pricing to take the fore and emphasizes that while no municipality’s climate risk exposure has previously 
denied it access to credit markets, it makes that access more expensive (a de facto rather than a de jure denial). 
Because the abuse of disparities in affordability and access to credit has garnered sociological attention on 
an individual scale (Rugh, Albright, and Massey 2015), here I extend this sort of analysis to municipalities.  
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Sociologists have long recognized that “if [people] define situations as real, they are 
real in their consequences” (Thomas and Thomas 1928:572; Merton 1995). The perceived 
risk reflected in credit ratings are translated to practical reality through the affordability of 
borrowing (Cornaggia, Cornaggia, and Israelsen 2017); while they are sometimes educated 
guesses based on the ratings analysts’ professional expertise and experience (Omstedt 
2019), their effects are expressed in the real cost of credit. Mackenzie (2006) argues that 
in addition to merely reflecting the state of the “real” world, descriptive financial risk 
models create markets in their image. They may therefore alter the world that they were 
developed to describe in significant and durable ways through the pressures of the financial 
markets (Mackenzie 2006).  
Inclusion of environmental considerations in a partially subjective descriptive tool 
like credit ratings, similarly, may influence thousands of decisional processes (Hackworth 
2007; Omstedt 2019). In addition to affecting the affordability of municipal credit 
(Cornaggia, Cornaggia, and Israelsen 2017), this is because higher ratings provide greater 
financial flexibility to managers through credit access (Adelino, Cunha, and Ferreira 2017). 
In fact, a recent handbook that focuses on the benefit to municipal managers of building 
resilient infrastructure suggests that the inclusion of climate risk in credit ratings supports 
access to climate-responsive finance capital (Coffee 2020). Environmental inclusions in 
municipal bond credit ratings marry the fields of climate change studies and finance in a 
way that is not focused on green finance, but on all local government finance in the United 
States. As with resilience (see Chapter I), it is therefore useful to view municipal credit 
ratings not only from the standpoint of what they describe, but also from the standpoint of 
what they create. 
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The formative effects of credit ratings were emphasized, if by nothing else, by the 
failure of many ratings of residential and commercial mortgage backed securities, as well 
as collateralized debt obligations and other financial products, which helped to trigger the 
financial crisis of the late 2000’s (Benmelech and Dlugosz 2010; Carruthers 2013). Ratings 
attached to formerly obscure financial products had massive systemic effects on our 
economy and society when they turned out to be faulty. This is partially because of their 
perceived complexity notwithstanding that these products were attempts to pool and sell 
unremarkable things like the right to mortgage and car payments, and the unnecessary 
mystification that sometimes surrounds finance (Leyshon and Thrift 2007; Christophers 
2009, 2015; Hall 2012).  
Less recognized, however, is the importance of municipal bond credit ratings to 
cases of environmental injustice like the Flint Water Crisis. Beyond the various failures in 
water management, the racist and classist response, and the treatment of segments of the 
population as disposable, the foundational cause of the poisoning of thousands in Flint was 
the elevation of municipal financial health over the health of humans and institutional 
democracy. Specifically, the city’s draconian fiscal austerity plan and the appointment of 
a now-infamous unelected emergency manager were imposed to maintain credit ratings on 
the State of Michigan’s bonds in light of Flint’s depleted tax base and dire financial 
situation (Fasenfest 2017). Clearly, the socio-environmental implications of municipal 
bond credit ratings extend well beyond how much bonds should cost, to the realm of human 
cost.  
Yet despite the potential consequences of systemic changes to the bond rating 
industry and academic interest in the underlying processes of financialization as well as its 
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effects on space (e.g,, Krippner 2005; Fligstein and Dauter 2007; Leyshon and Thrift 2007; 
Christophers 2009, 2015; French, Leyshon, and Wainwright 2011; Martin 2011; Harvey 
2012; Hall 2013; Fligstein and Goldstein 2015; Fligstein and Roehrkasse 2016; Ouma, 
Johnson, and Bigger 2018) no study has, to my knowledge, introduced the recent socio-
environmental turn in municipal credit represented by Moody’s (2017a) methodology. 
Furthermore, no study has considered the potential consequences of this change in 
methodology on the production of space and the formation of environmental inequality 
(Lefebvre 1991; Pellow 2000, 2018; Carruthers and Kim 2011; Bigger and Millington 
2019). This is not due to lack of recognition of the importance of municipal finance. 
Omstedt (2019:3), for example, observes that urban political economists should pay 
attention to both the political effects and internal practices of the “relatively mundane 
municipal [bond] sector.” Rather, it is likely due to the recency of these changes and the 
relative infancy of the analysis of municipal bonds outside of the field of financial 
economics.  
To address this gap, this chapter has three interrelated aims. First, I introduce 
scholarship on municipal bonds and credit ratings from a variety of disciplines to acquaint 
sociologists with their broad scope and potential as drivers of socio-environmental 
inequality, including through environmental risk and resilience. Second, I outline and 
analyze Moody’s (2017a) methodology for inclusion of climate risk and resilience in their 
ratings, as well as the stated purposes of the development of this methodology. Because 
these focus primarily on the potential effects of climate change on a municipality’s ability 
to repay bonds when due, they represent a financial driver of climate resilience and 
adaptation. Third, I discuss some implications of the inclusion of resilience metrics in 
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municipal bond credit ratings of interest to environmental and urban sociologists, and 
outline a path forward using a materialist, outcome-based approach to the study of 
resilience to further develop this project.  
MUNICIPAL BONDS AND CREDIT RATINGS 
Balancing the Elements of Risk 
While credit ratings may seem unfathomably dull to many scholars, their importance 
in the financial world (Cantor and Packer 1995) and how we produce space (Lefebvre 
1991) cannot be understated. Ideally, rating agencies serve as independent analysts of 
credit risk across a variety of sectors, including corporate, local government, and sovereign 
debt. They assign ordinal categorical ratings to debt based on their analysis of the 
creditworthiness of the issuers (i.e. the original bond sellers), helping purchasers of debt 
(i.e. the bondholders) judge whether to buy those bonds and at what price (Carruthers and 
Kim 2011; Carruthers 2013). This provides an ostensibly independent estimate of the 
quality of the debt before purchase, while it is held, and when it is later marketed (Cantor 
and Packer 1995; Hackworth 2007; Omstedt 2019). A useful way to think of bonds, like 
much of the basic stuff of finance (Carruthers and Kim 2011), is that they represent a 
promise to pay a sum certain at a date certain. Their market value at any time equals their 
face value (how much they say has to be repaid), discounted for the time value of money 
(i.e. that a dollar today is worth more than a dollar tomorrow), and the risk that the 
repayment promise will be neither honored nor legally enforceable.13  The process of 
 
13 For example, imagine a bond from Blackacre City that had a face value of $100, payable one year from 
today. That bond would be sold at a price less than $100, with the difference reflecting the interest to be 
earned while holding that bond. So a bond originally sold for $95 will accrue interest of $5 over that year. 
The decision about whether to invest in this bond depends on whether the buyer thinks that the expected 
payout is a good risk: this risk profile is reflected in credit ratings. The comparatively risky Whiteacre City, 
which is known for financial mismanagement, just had a major employer leave town, and has a stagnant real 
estate market, might only receive $90 for their promise to pay $100 in a year’s time: the heightened risk of 
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commensuration—or the technological conversion of local uncertainty about the ability to 
repay to a standardized risk profile (Carruthers 2013)—reflects the need for a central 
clearinghouse for due diligence rather than each buyer facing the difficult and expensive 
task of assessment on its own (Fowles, Liu, and Mamaril 2009), with each paying its own 
transaction costs. 
Because municipal credit ratings are intended to gauge risk of default or non-
repayment, they account for a variety of factors across sectors of the economy that might 
create an economic shortfall. These include anything that materially affects the local tax 
base such as population dynamics, demographic shifts, and real estate valuation trends, as 
well as local political orientation, whether the locality is well managed, and its financial 
track record. In short, they reflect perceptions of ability and willingness to set other budget 
demands aside to pay bondholders as the locality’s promises to pay come due (Bennett and 
Wang 2019; Omstedt 2019; Rashidi, Stadelmann, and Patt 2019). Ratings analysts are 
required to take all the messy complexity of each locality that issues bonds and distill it 
down to a rating, breaking apart, analyzing, and comparing any aspects of local context 
that might impact this all-important ability to repay, then recombining them into a single 
 
non-repayment (i.e. default) means that investors will demand $10, rather than $5, for the city’s promise to 
pay them $100 in a year’s time.  
 
Returning to the Blackacre City bond, however, after its original issue, however, its market value should 
equal that face value minus the expected cost of inflation (the time value of money) and investment 
opportunity cost minus the value of the probability that Blackacre City will be unable to repay the bond. 
Assuming for the sake of simplicity that there is no inflation and no opportunity cost (as well as no transaction 
costs), if Blackacre City has a robust tax base, significant assets in a rainy day fund, and no major identified 
risks, its bonds are likely to trade at close to the $100 face value. If, on the other hand, Blackacre City is 
located on the side of a recently awakened volcano and appears unlikely to repay the bond, the original buyers 
(and those they may have previously sold to) may decide to cut their losses and sell for whatever they can 
get as they expect the chance of default to be high. While this is a dramatic example and a vast 
oversimplification, it illustrates that credit ratings attached to municipal bonds can affect the original cost of 
bond financing for local government, and also that perceptions of market risk for a particular local 
government may be traced over the life of a bond by the way it is priced: the amount of the discount from its 
face value, or its discount rate. 
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synthetic symbol. These range from Aaa for the safest bonds and Aa for a slightly more 
risky category, down to a C for the riskiest bonds, including those that are already in default 
(Omstedt 2019; Moody’s n.d.) Clearly, the occurrence of a major disaster may affect a 
municipality’s ability to fulfill its promise to pay. This may occur due to the loss of its tax 
base through depopulation, a decline in business receipts, or a decline in real estate values, 
as well as a lack of willingness to prioritize bondholders over local communities that may 
be in dire need of immediate assistance (Painter 2020). This illustrates why the inclusion 
of socio-environmental resilience in credit ratings does not represent a single factor among 
many, but a type of uncertainty that may impact a variety of elements of default risk 
(Moody’s 2017a).   
While the category system and the differences between major ratings agencies are 
too complex to outline in detail here,14 it is possible to draw analogies between these 
rankings and others that have systemic effects on the entities being ranked. These include 
the way that star-based consumer reviews like those featured on Yelp or Amazon may alter 
the organization of customer service to the way that private law school rankings have 
impacted the organization and practice of legal education (Espeland and Sauder 2007, 
2008). As with other rankings, one benefit of the study of processes through which credit 
ratings are developed is a sharpened analysis of the way that rankings affect institutional 
decision-making and priorities (Espeland and Sauder 2007, 2008). This is especially true 
in the uncharted territory of bonds’ inclusion of climate and disaster resilience because they 
potentially impact every single U.S. issuer of municipal debt for any reason, not just for 
 
14 For detailed descriptions of categories bond rating categories from the three major agencies, see Moody’s 
(n.d.), Cantor and Packer (1995), Hackworth (2007), and Omstedt (2019). For a detailed historical 
background on their development over more than a century, see Carruthers (2013, 2015).  
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climate preparation and response. Yet there is a more direct (if less commonly implicated) 
reason why municipalities may be highly motivated to listen to bond ratings agencies: legal 
and regulatory access to important elements of the market. After rank ordering bonds into 
ordinal letter grades, the grades are then grouped into two broad categories: investment 
grade for the most secure bonds with the highest ratings; and speculative for more risky 
bonds with lower ratings (Cantor and Packer 1995; Hackworth 2007; Carruthers 2013; 
Omstedt 2019). Under a variety of regulatory regimes, municipal bonds without an 
investment grade rating may be excluded from the portfolios of many large, well-financed 
investors.15   
In short, climate risk and resilience are reflected in a rank ordering system that is 
wholly focused on the ability to repay bonds, embedding socio-environmental decision-
making into the cost of doing business for localities across the United States. The pursuit 
of “budget flexibility” for municipalities, therefore, may mean that “[p]rocesses of urban 
restructuring…become embedded not only in [the reasons why] cities…seek recourse in 
 
15 To explain, many institutional investors that deal with the public are required to keep a certain proportion 
of their assets in safe yet easily liquefiable holdings like municipal bonds. Liquefiable in this sense means 
easily convertible into cash to meet the institution’s obligations as they come due, which in turn means that 
these holdings must be fungible and traded on an open and vibrant market (in short, neither real estate nor 
many private equity investments such as firm ownership qualify because they are some combination of 
unique—or at least not fungible—and difficult to sell in a pinch). Ratings help to ensure that bonds are 
fungible, providing a hopefully apples to apples comparison of creditworthiness of localities all over. The 
institutional investors that are subject to these investment rules include commercial banks (i.e. all storefront 
banks that take consumer deposits insured by the FDIC), insurance companies, and pension funds. One reason 
is that if there are banking or insurance shortfalls—including a run on the bank or a major event that leads to 
extraordinary insurance liability—these entities should be able to quickly convert a portion of their fractional 
asset reserves to cash to pay off depositors or claimants. In addition to ensuring continued viability of these 
entities so they and their customers do not have to be rescued or bailed out by the state, and to ensure pension 
fund solvency, these measures are in place to promote systemic confidence. This is because safe investment 
reserves tend to prevent a domino effect of failure, in which one company running out of cash means that 
others cannot withdraw their cash asset reserves and therefore run out, and so on (i.e. a run on one bank 
bankrupting other banks). Highly rated government-backed bonds are generally considered safe enough to 
satisfy many of these regulatory requirements (Cantor and Packer 1995; Carruthers 2013, 2015). Along with 
certain tax benefits that accrue from holding municipal bonds, this increases the attractiveness of highly rated 
municipal bonds to potential purchasers.  
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any increasingly speculative bond market, but also in the relatively mundane technicalities 
of the Moody’s ratings scorecard” (Omstedt 2019:17). Environmental uncertainty and risk, 
mediated by the needs of finance and expressed in ordinal ratings categories, may 
encourage particular paths in urban priorities, development, and design.  
There is a tension between the power of credit ratings to direct state behavior and 
the use of the judgment of private agencies and analysts to determine ratings. Contrary to 
the perception that actuarial risk assessment is quantitative and objective (Mackenzie 2006) 
the analysis of creditworthiness has been described as a mixture of art and science, 
mathematical precision and human judgment. Analysts make significant judgment calls 
based on the characteristics of an issuer, local, regional, or global trends that may impact 
its ability to repay, responses to questions posed by the analysts, and predictions about the 
future (Omstedt 2019). Notwithstanding its reliance on human judgment and conversation, 
it remains as a central private mechanism for the “disciplining of localities” that, in the 
absence of strong state regulation, is central to neoliberal thinking and governance 
(Hackworth 2007:17).  
How did a collection of private, for-profit organizations assume such a central role 
in the disciplining and regulation of municipal finance? Hackworth (2007) asserts that the 
institutional importance of credit ratings agencies results from a migration away from 
traditional lending relationships with local banks that may have a sense of local 
creditworthiness to market-based investment with a world of potential investors for whom 
local knowledge may be expensive to acquire. Additionally, it was supported by a retreat 
of the federal government from social spending that pressured localities to finance 
expenditures ranging from housing to law enforcement, as well as legal shifts that require 
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many institutional investors like banks, pension funds, and insurance companies to hold a 
certain percentage of their investments in safer assets like investment grade municipal 
bonds. In this way, credit ratings agencies may be granted the force of financial regulatory 
law by directing that only those bonds issued by localities that “play ball” with their 
assessment system may be purchased by a significant portion of the investing world, 
despite being private, for-profit companies that are subject to little public oversight 
(Carruthers 2015). Needless to say, this disciplinary function should not be taken lightly as 
credit ratings may allow or deny access to affordable credit that is often necessary for local 
governments to function (Hackworth 2007). 
In summary, the inclusion of socio-environmental resilience in ratings links 
macroeconomic processes of financialization with local decision-making, and features an 
embedded disciplinary effect that is now linked to climate change and disaster preparation. 
Importantly, the inclusion of resilience does not mean that each locality will receive a 
standalone resilience or environmental governance score that can be analyzed or debated. 
Instead, those considerations are analyzed in concert with assessments of a wide range of 
factors that impact creditworthiness, including the overall wealth of a community and the 
strength of its tax base. This suggests that inclusion of a resilience metric will not only have 
a causal effect on how municipalities decide to embrace resilience, but it presents a danger 
of injustice through the prioritization of fiscal safety over human safety, as well as through 
choices made about how to preserve a locality’s tax base.    
Credit Rating, Climate Change, and Disaster  
Yet do financial markets really care about climate risk and resilience to such a degree 
that it might impact credit access and affordability? Based on an emerging literature, it 
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appears that they do. While we live in a time of well-organized and financed climate denial 
(Norgaard 2009, 2011; Dunlap and McCright 2011), the few studies that have analyzed the 
effects of climate and disaster risk indicate that the municipal bond market believes that 
denial is bad for business. In fact, Moody’s (2019) released a research announcement that 
explained, based on an informal survey, that large cities “are increasingly adopting plans 
that detail specific projects to strengthen infrastructure and minimize disruption from 
natural disasters and long-term climate change.” Because of this cost, however, a majority 
of respondent cities were planning on issuing debt to finance climate response initiatives. 
In essence, this means that climate plans are incorporated into assessments of debt for both 
climate and non-climate purposes (Moody’s 2019).  
One explanation for this acceptance notwithstanding the political salience of denial 
is that, even to deniers, climate risk may represent just another form of uncertainty in a 
sector that deals with many uncertain risks. Painter (2020:481) observes that the climate 
denial debate may be irrelevant to the process of municipal bond pricing, as “many forms 
of risk go unrealized, yet investors require a premium for the uncertainty that accompanies 
these risks.” In other words, you can deny all you want, but in the process of 
commensuration (i.e. converting uncertainty to risk through analysis and ratings) you also 
should account for the chance that your denial may be wrong. Moreover, he finds that, even 
when controlling for credit rating, climate risk is significantly reflected in long-term 
municipal bonds for the average county to the tune of $1.7 million in annualized issuance 
costs for every one percent increase in climate risk (yet no significant relationship is found 
in short-term bond issuances) (Painter 2020).16  
 
16 Importantly, Painter (2020) reminds us that municipal bonds are useful for the analysis of climate finance 
for two reasons. First, they tend to have heterogeneous maturities, meaning that they come due on different 
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Similarly, Rashidi, Stadelman, and Patt (2019, 132) observe that the “presence of a 
link between climate policies and creditworthiness could provide a hidden financial benefit 
to cities far in excess of those policies’ cost” through municipal bond cost savings. Testing 
the truth of this idea through interviews with professionals in the municipal bond industry, 
they find that ratings analysts included climate risk in some analyses even before Moody’s 
(2017a) announced their policy change, yet that those least aware of these factors were city 
leaders themselves. One ratings agency participant in this study mentioned that they 
considered upcoming regulations as well as whether municipalities were directing funds 
towards assets that may be stranded in the future (Rashidi, Stadelman, and Patt 2019). It is 
likely that formal inclusion of these concerns in ratings agencies methodology would 
improve local familiarity with risks, as well as encourage a view towards the future. It is 
also intriguing to consider that this may prioritize anticipatory abandonment of some areas, 
or other proactive responses. On the other hand, it may be that economically depressed 
localities that have poor ratings may be subject to a kind of cumulative disadvantage 
through higher pre-disaster borrowing costs to prepare, a reduced ability to afford an 
adequate response, and a higher cost of post-disaster borrowing for immediate relief 
(Painter 2020) based on pre-disaster financial conditions.   
These findings dovetail with studies arising in the finance literature that assess 
effects of disasters on municipal bond markets. While not directly relevant to questions 
involving climate change and denial because they focus on disasters that have already 
 
schedules (i.e. some are 5 year, some 10 year, and so on). This allows for a comparison of short-term and 
long-term risk concerns by comparison of bonds from the same issuer(s) that have different maturities. 
Second, these bonds are issued by municipalities that are fixed in space. While a corporation may move a 
facility or its entire operation in response to perceived risk, municipalities have no such luxury (Painter 2020). 
In addition to providing an even playing field for the empirical analysis of how climate risk affects finance 
costs, this serves as a reminder that the only way that municipalities can mitigate their climate risk exposure 
is through actions taken within their fixed boundaries. 
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occurred, they suggest that markets reflect disaster risk and that local managers ought to 
take notice. Bennett and Wang (2019) find that bond issuances become significantly more 
costly after natural disasters, meaning that investors demand more from municipalities and 
financing costs increase. Unlike Painter’s (2020) study of climate risk, they find that in the 
disaster context these effects apply temporarily to short-term yields, rather than long term 
yields. This association exists even though municipal credit ratings are rarely downgraded 
due to disaster (Bennett and Wang 2019). They also find that there is a relationship between 
the occurrence of disaster and the structure of financing. Bond issues that occur in the wake 
of disaster feature shorter maturities, more basic structures with fewer financial bells and 
whistles, and the absence of credit enhancement such as bond insurance and bank letters 
of credit that are used to guarantee repayment (Bennett and Wang 2019). This implies that 
the increased cost of credit, and credit enhancement, after a disaster may motivate 
particular courses of action, behavioral elements that may change practice even if this 
change is never reflected in a ratings downgrade.  
Bourdeau-Brien and Kryzanowski (2019) find that local municipal bond costs spike 
after floods even after controlling for pre-existing flood risk and issuer characteristics. 
Because these increases fade quickly and are limited to areas without a history of flooding 
(i.e. a first time effect), they likewise believe that this is consistent with a behavioral 
explanation (Bourdeau-Brien and Kryzanowski 2019). Fowles, Liu, and Mamaril (2009) 
compared the cost of municipal bonds from localities in California with their earthquake 
risk. They found a relationship between earthquake risk and municipal bond cost, but 
surprisingly only for the period following Hurricane Katrina: a different kind of disaster in 
a different region of the country. The first explanation that they suggest for this surprising 
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result was that the municipal bond markets are so massively inefficient (in the financial 
economics sense, meaning information poor) that no one recognized the systemic risk of 
California earthquakes. The second was that the salience of Katrina sharpened the public 
eye to the possibility that municipalities had not prepared enough: an efficient response 
based not in environmental conditions but in a better understanding of the lack of municipal 
readiness. Katrina revealed “that existing governmental standards and preventative 
measures are inadequate to offset the underlying natural disaster risk” (Fowles, Liu, and 
Mamaril 2009:82). Either possibility suggests the importance of regular reminders of 
climate uncertainty and risk. 
Among the implications of these studies is that, notwithstanding the existence of 
climate denial, when it is time to put your money where your mouth is municipal bond 
markets tend to reflect climate risk. Yet they do so in distinctive ways based on assessed 
climate risk as opposed to the aftermath of a disaster, emphasizing the distinction between 
long-term climate effects and comparatively short-term disaster response. Importantly, 
assuming efficient markets, the recent publication of results like these should indicate to 
municipal managers that climate costs are likely to matter, regardless of individual or local 
political temperament. Another implication is that government standards and 
preparedness—or even the perception of effective preparation—may influence the cost of 
finance. Taken together, these suggest that the systemic impacts of broad climate ratings 
policy will mean that resilience and adaptation will be expressed in the cost of credit. This 
cost of credit, in turn, may motivate particular decisions and priorities that may not be 
reflected in ratings but are derived from the expectations of markets and ratings agencies.  
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Finally, it is important to reiterate that the existence of climate resilience metrics 
should not imply a categorical separation from more traditional elements of risk such as 
the existence of a durable tax base. Instead, these elements operate in concert with other 
factors and may therefore double penalize localities that can least afford it through 
increased borrowing costs or extra expenditures. For example, a coastal county with high 
rates of poverty may suffer from a reduced ability to effectively prepare for climate change 
as well as high borrowing costs. Their inability to prepare may raise borrowing costs even 
more due to questions about their future tax base. Additionally, this may add extra pressure 
to respond in a way that supplements or maintains their tax base, raising the risk of 
resilience-based gentrification (Gould and Lewis 2018a) and providing an incentive to 
engage in resilience projects that preserve their tax base rather than those focused on 
preserving community use values. 
The resilience metric may develop into environmental cumulative disadvantage for 
those localities that cannot respond ideally or quickly enough. This is partially because of 
the neoliberal emphasis on local solutions in place of federal aid (Tierney 2015), partially 
because of the reproduction of existing regional environmental inequality through financial 
market operations, and partially because those areas that are least able to respond may be 
labeled as a problem child. Yet all of these concerns focus less on the recognition of the 
climate risk and more on how climate preparedness regimes are organized and prosecuted. 
For this reason, the following section discusses the content of the Moody’s (2017a) report 
Evaluating the Impacts of Climate Change on US State and Local Issuers, analyzing its 
express motives in the context of municipal bond markets.  
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CLIMATE CHANGE AND CREDIT RISK: THE MOODY’S APPROACH 
Periodically, credit ratings agencies release reports describing elements of their 
analytical process and methodology. Preliminary evidence that large cities are developing 
and financing resilience plans (Moody’s 2019) may be a bellwether of a broader trend in 
which localities view climate risk not only as an environmental issue, but a financial one. 
Presumably in response to this enhanced appreciation of the financial implications of 
growing climate risk, Moody’s (2017a) released a report outlining how they translate 
climate risk to their assessment of state and local issuers. While a case study consisting of 
a single report from a single company usually would raise questions about applicability 
and generalizability across contexts, this is not a simple corporate report. Rather, it signals 
a significant shift in a major industry that impacts municipal finance from coast to coast, 
that exists as a virtual oligopoly, and that enjoys the force of regulatory law and economic 
consequence. Additionally, this methodology represents a way of formalizing climate risk 
across scales and in conjunction with municipal priorities and operations. Finally, it 
provides insight into how an industry that stands as a private quasi-regulator of municipal 
finance views climate risk and how their efforts may motivate particular courses of action 
by municipal regulators. For these reasons, the consequences of the procedures described 
by this report will likely influence thousands of case studies.    
Introduction to the Analysis: Four Premises About Climate Impacts and Embedding.  
The report starts off with four basic premises. First, they acknowledge that global 
climate change has been predicted to increase the frequency and severity of major climate 
events absent effective preparation. Second, they recognize that impacts will be regionally 
heterogeneous, and that their costs involve both well-known processes like sea level rise 
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and flooding, and less familiar consequences like agricultural impacts, labor and health 
impacts, and increased energy use.17 Third, they mention that local, state, and federal 
efforts to promote immediate and long-term responses “enhance resilience to the physical 
and economic impact of severe weather events” and may reduce costs (Moody’s 2017a:1). 
In addition to the express recognition of climate risk in their ratings (whether or not a bond 
issuer accepts these risks as real), these emphasize the variety of impacts on local credit 
and firmly assert that costs may be minimized through action.  
Their fourth observation identifies how these concerns are embedded in their rating 
system, meaning that climate risks are not a standalone category but something of a semi-
independent modifier of existing categories. They explain the “basis for [their] view 
of…credit resiliency to climate change” and how it fits into their existing “framework for 
evaluating the credit risk to local government issuers.” Specifically, they discuss how 
“credit risks resulting from climate change are embedded in our existing approach to 
analyzing the key credit factors in our methodologies.” This means that their “analysis of 
economic strength and diversity…captures climate-driven credit risks such as economic 
disruption, physical damage, health and public safety, and population displacement,” as 
well as access to liquidity and means of raising additional revenue to repay bonds. Running 
through each of these themes are multiple reminders that mitigation can change the credit 
impacts of climate shocks and stresses, even if they are not expected to occur until many 
years in the future (Moody’s 2017a:1, emphasis added).18 In addition to demonstrating that 
 
17 Much of the report is devoted to outlining the particularities of regional shifts, drawing primarily from 
the National Climate Assessment prepared by the US Global Change Research Program (Moody’s 2017a). 
 
18 Moody’s (2017a) is careful to identify that climate impacts may come in the form of shocks (e.g. disasters 
like hurricanes, droughts, wildfires, or floods) as well as gradual stresses that over longer intervals of time 
may impact creditworthiness (e.g. warming trends, drying trends, or ocean acidification that can affect 
agriculture and fisheries). 
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denial may be costly, this explicitly encourages the development of responsive strategies 
to ensure affordable credit.  
Translating Climate Risk to Credit Risk 1: The Basic Methodology.  
After the four premises, they outline their methodology for translating climate risk 
to credit risk. This is important because it describes the pathways through which a variety 
of risks are included in their ratings, which in turn may impact the potential cost of credit 
for municipalities and consequently direct action. In addition to population displacement 
and threats to health and safety, they identify a variety of negative credit drivers including 
“compromised crop yields, economic disruption, damage to physical infrastructure, 
increased energy demand, recovery and restoration costs, and the cost of adaptive strategies 
for prevention or impact mitigation” (i.e. resilience planning initiatives). In their view, 
these may result in “lower revenue, increased expense, impaired assets, higher liabilities 
and increased debt” (Moody’s 2017a:3). As mentioned previously, they are clear that their 
ratings methodologies “do not explicitly express climate change as a credit risk.” Instead, 
“the credit challenges that climate change poses are captured in [the] analysis of economic 
strength and diversity, capital asset management, fiscal strength and governance, among 
other credit factors.” In other words, the focus on climate risk is primarily a focus on how 
climate risk is embedded within recognized financial and governance categories, rather 
than a stand-alone.   
Critically, they assert that “local governments that face a higher risk of climate 
shocks are specifically asked…during the rating process about their preparedness…and 
their activities in respect of adapting to climate trends” (Moody’s 2017a:9). This imposes 
an affirmative obligation on high-risk municipalities to have an answer ready, but leaves 
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open the question of whether wealthier communities would be considered vulnerable to a 
shock. Resource-poor communities in at-risk areas may therefore asked to develop action 
plans that are not required of more affluent neighboring communities, because more 
affluent communities have other pots of money upon which to draw in the event of a 
disaster. In short, unique obligations may be imposed on poor communities in at-risk 
regions of the country through embedding of environmental risk. This also suggests that 
municipal financial managers should expect questions about ongoing or planned efforts to 
build credit resiliency to climate change that depend not only on their climate risk but on 
their pre-existing credit risk. This may motivate development of these types of programs, 
and in particular forms molded to the interests and concerns of rating agency analysts and 
their methodologies. In short, this combined approach suggests a list of privileged elements 
of socio-environmental vulnerability focused on repayment ability, which may in turn 
focus attention on things like real estate exchange values that support the local tax base 
(Logan and Molotch 1987). 
Translating Climate Risk to Credit Risk 2: Factors and Processes of Embedding.  
Later, Moody’s (2017a) provides detailed guidance to industry professionals about 
their view of priority climate credit risks arising from climate trends and shocks, and how 
these are embedded in their existing ratings factors. It is important to remember that these 
are developed from a balance-sheet approach to municipal credit: how each may translate 
into lower tax revenues, increased expenses and other liabilities, and loss of assets. While 
disasters have social and environmental justice implications, Moody’s (2017a) focus is 
how these translate to the ability of a city to pay its bills. For example, they describe their 
credit downgrade of some of New Orleans’ bonds after Hurricane Katrina as being due to 
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the “unprecedented disruption to the city’s economy and revenue…as well as concerns 
over the city’s ability to fund ongoing operations” (Moody’s 2017a:10). In this vein, their 
first factor is disruption to economic output due to loss of property and assets, supply chain 
disruptions, and long term increased cost of recovery such as rebuilding, adopting 
adaptation measures, and increased insurance costs. These factors are joined by physical 
damage, issues of health and public safety, and population displacement. Each of these can 
impact credit, but in different ways.  
Usefully, after describing these factors generally, they then give some examples of 
how they fit within the specific weighted categories that are used to assess local 
government general obligation bonds.19 The four categories they use are: (1) Economy/Tax 
Base, which is weighted at 30% of the evaluation and includes tax base size, full value per 
capita, and wealth expressed in median family income as proxies for the local revenue base; 
(2) Finances, which is weighted at 30% and includes investment fund and cash balance 
levels and trends as a proxy for financial flexibility; (3) Management, which is weighted 
at 20% and includes the locality’s institutional framework and operating history; and (4) 
Debt/Pension, which is weighted at 20% and employs the ratio of present debt to full value 
and revenue, as well as the ratio of future pension liabilities to full value and revenue 
(similarly to how home mortgages may have restrictions on how much additional debt the 
 
19 A general obligation bond is usually considered the safest form of municipal bond investment. This is 
because “general obligation” indicates that the bond may be paid by resort to the general tax receipts that are 
collected by a municipality. This resort to the taxation power of government is what gives them their safe 
reputation and also means that the overall fiscal health of the issuing agency matters for repayment and credit 
risk. The other major category of municipal bond is referred to as a revenue bond. These are typically used 
to finance things that make money, and are repaid out of the revenue generated by the thing financed. An 
example might be a toll road that is built with funds from a bond issue and that pays off bondholders based 
on tolls collected (but usually not from other sources, unless there is a guarantee or other mechanism that is 
triggered by default). Because of this, revenue bonds require a more complex analysis model that takes into 
account the economic viability of the project itself, as well as an analysis of the issuer and any project 
guarantors.   
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borrower may incur) (Moody’s 2017a). Based on the descriptions in each category it is 
possible to identify areas of primary concern.  
Within the Economy/Tax Base category, Moody’s (2017a) describes how climate 
shocks may impact issuers with less diverse economies to a greater extent than others, 
because climate shocks may reduce the issuer’s tax revenue base. This is especially true 
for those with economies concentrated in climate-susceptible sectors and those without the 
ability to increase taxes due to limitations on legal tax rate (e.g., Martin and Beck 2017, 
2018). In other words, one key to this analysis is fiscal flexibility, both in terms of 
economic output and the local tax rate (Moody’s 2017a). Here, the advice to a municipal 
manager may be to encourage a diverse and climate-resistant economy, to encourage 
durable sources of income such as high value, climate resistant real estate projects, to 
increase overall median family wealth as a hedge against future tax losses, and to engage 
in preventative austerity to save money and keep space between the actual tax rate and the 
maximum allowed by law or political ability.  
Similarly, in the Finances category the key is what may challenge fiscal flexibility 
in the event of a climate shock, such as unanticipated emergency response cost combined 
with the loss of revenue. These are balanced against the overall financial health of the 
municipality and whether it has recourse to a rainy-day fund (Moody’s 2017a). Here, the 
advice may be to set aside funds or obtain insurance to help cover or offset these costs and 
develop ongoing liquidity, to improve or develop climate-resistant infrastructure to manage 
potential unanticipated costs, to remove development or people from risky areas to limit 
future emergency costs, or paradoxically to limit resilience and adaptation strategies that 
have costs yet that will not be reflected in future balance sheet health. 
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In the Management category, the climate factors at play involve the possibility that 
a climate shock will create impediments to the effective management of municipal budget, 
disrupting the municipality’s business as usual operating history. The advice here may be 
to develop effective contingency plans for emergency management, financial management, 
and the potential for loss of personnel and resources in the wake of a disaster. This may 
translate to external contracting for consultants and others who can help to establish a 
strong track record and suggest an ability to support critical functions through disaster. In 
turn, this may impose additional costs that different localities may be differentially able to 
bear. 
Finally, in the Debt/Pensions category they note that municipalities with significant 
existing obligations to pay may be less able to incur additional debt for emergency repair 
or replacement of infrastructure or assets without disrupting the balance between total debt 
and liability and expected revenues (Moody’s 2017a). The takeaway from this category 
may be to manage existing debt by engaging in preventative austerity (including, 
paradoxically, by foregoing or deferring maintenance) or by paying down existing debt. 
Another may be to stop offering employee pensions. Wealth matters here, as well, as 
wealthier localities with recourse to a deeper tax base may have the ability to engage in 
projects without incurring significant debt or may be better able to retire old debt to 
maintain balance. They may also be better able to satisfy pension obligations and offer 
existing employees pensions, thereby gaining the ability to attract managers who may be 
perceived as better by ratings agencies and the financial industry, as well as avoiding 
consulting costs. In addition, debt and pension levels are expressed as ratios to full asset 
value and revenue. In a simple mathematical sense this means that a resource-poor 
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municipality has less flexibility in issuing new bonds (i.e. incurring new debt) than a 
wealthier community, including bonds that are for the purpose of resilience and adaptation 
projects.   
Moreover, this analysis is neither hypothetical in the disaster response context nor 
is it meant merely as a descriptive exercise. Moody’s used it after Hurricane Irma in south 
Florida to assess post-storm credit quality. They also specifically discuss how these metrics 
are intended to promote conversations with municipal management to better understand 
climate planning (Moody’s 2017a). In other words, this has been used to assess post-storm 
circumstances and is expressly intended to encourage particular course of action by 
municipal managers. Given the recognized disciplinary weight of credit ratings 
(Hackworth 2007), it is likely that these considerations will have real, material 
consequences.  
A few additional important themes may be identified from this description. As a 
prefatory note, however, it is clear that the potential consequences of including climate risk 
and resilience into municipal bonds are a mixed bag. For example, a rainy day fund may 
be a great idea. A rainy day fund that depends on taxes derived from the replacement of 
existing communities’ use values with vacation resorts’ exchange values, perhaps less so. 
The real question is how these efforts translate into practice: while it is possible to make a 
normative judgment about a system of motivation that focuses solely on the ability to repay 
debt, it is more difficult to make a normative judgment about any number of potential 
effects without an appreciation of how they are done. This opens up a world of opportunity 
at the intersection of finance and the environment that extends well beyond green efforts 
and questions about greenwashing, to the fundamental nature of how and why places are 
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developed in particular forms. In the next section I will develop a few suggestions for 
applying the study of municipal bonds.  
DISCUSSION AND A RESEARCH PLAN.  
Identifying the Changes: The Theory and Practice of Environment and Municipal Bonds.  
How could scholars usefully study the inclusion of environmental risk and resilience 
metrics in municipal bonds? Developing a research plan first involves a process of 
demystification of the presumed complexity of finance (Christophers 2009, 2015). This is 
why in this chapter I have emphasized the concepts of promises to pay, risk of non-
repayment, and affordability of credit. These concepts are what municipal bond analysis is 
all about, and emphasize the features that may motivate municipal managers without the 
use of industry jargon. All Moody’s has done is formalize the entry of climate risk into the 
world of default risk that is governed by these relatively familiar terms. Having established 
the likelihood of disciplinary and economic effects of environmental elements of municipal 
bonds on municipal management, the next step is to consider how to assess and trace these 
effects (or lack thereof).    
The inclusion of environmental risk and resilience in municipal bonds renders them 
conceptually similar to so-called green bonds, or debt issuances in which the proceeds are 
earmarked for resilience and adaptation measures (Bigger 2017; Bigger and Millington 
2019; Christophers, Bigger, and Johnson 2020). General municipal bonds potentially 
affected by this environmental turn are distinguishable because unlike green bonds they 
are intended for essentially all purposes, and because bondholders expect no premium or 
discount from their pro-environmental stance. Even still, the “stretching” framework 
developed by Christophers, Bigger, and Johnson (2020) for green bonds provides a useful 
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analytical starting point. Through this framework, they argue that the emergence of green 
bonds represents a retreat from scalar processes that individualize financial risk, reversing 
the neoliberal historical trend from “you are on your own” back towards a Keynesian 
feeling that we “are all in this together” (Christophers, Bigger, and Johnson 2020, 90). A 
broad recognition of environmental risk, a broad mandate to prepare, and the creation of 
incentives to spend for social protection implied by Moody’s (2017a) guidance seem 
consistent with this point of view, yet the difference in scope between municipal and green 
bonds cautions against drawing any conclusions by analogy. Future research should focus 
on whether the broad impact of credit ratings decisions like this similarly signals a retreat 
from assumptions about neoliberalism, or its reformation, due to climate risk.  
Of course, a preliminary question to be addressed before adapting this framework is 
whether environmental inclusions in municipal bond ratings have any effect at all. For 
example, in an insurance industry trade journal, Flavelle (2018) describes complaints from 
insurers that the rating agencies were taking insufficient steps to ensure adequate municipal 
climate credit protection. A representative of Moody’s responded to deny the claim: “If we 
look at our rating universe, a huge percentage of them are actually taking resilience 
measures. In the AA category and above [highly rated debt judged to carry low levels of 
risk], it’s like 100 percent” (Flavelle 2018). Questioning this pronouncement, the article 
then highlighted a number of localities whose debt had been highly rated either while they 
are at severe risk (like Palm Beach Florida, which is located on a barrier island) or just 
before they experienced major disasters (like Wilmington, North Carolina), as well as the 
opinions of a number of experts who were skeptical of the quality of the ratings’ climate 
inclusions. Pulling no punches, Flavelle (2018) mentions that “last November, all three 
 89 
[major credit ratings agencies] issued perfect AAA ratings to Charleston County, South 
Carolina, where flooding is so frequent that the Charleston City website includes a page 
titled ‘Why does it seem like Charleston always floods when it rains?’” 
Questions about the practical effects of ratings decisions are complicated by the 
proprietary and confidential nature of the specifics of the ratings process and because 
methodological reports such as the one described here may be privately disseminated to 
some but not all market participants prior to public release, rendering it difficult to assess 
market changes before and after a set announcement or roll-out date. Regardless of who is 
correct in this war of words between the insurance and credit ratings industries, it seems 
likely from the literature on the effects of climate risk on bond pricing (Fowles, Liu, and 
Mamaril 2009; Bennett and Wang 2019; Bourdeau-Brien and Kryzanowski 2019; Omstedt 
2019; Rashidi, Stadelmann, and Patt 2019; Painter 2020) that the public pronouncements 
and private conversations upon which the ratings system depends are likely to motivate 
particular modes of response to climate risk. Moreover, because complexities in process 
and timing may interfere with the type of quantitative analyses that seem to be preferred 
by scholars in financial economics, it appears that a creative mixed methodological 
approach would add to understanding the details of the motivations and practice of socio-
environmental municipal finance.  
Points of Intersection: Municipal Bonds and A Materialist Approach to Resilience. 
Notwithstanding questions about the details, the availability of appropriate credit for 
an affordable price provides a major incentive for municipalities to develop a climate risk 
action plan. This underscores both the importance of an anticipatory approach to the 
impacts of climate change and disaster (Anguelovski et al. 2016) while improving on 
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existing efforts by introducing a systemic approach that ventures beyond case studies. The 
materialist approach encourages a focus on broadly applicable consequences, as opposed 
to intent.  
A materialist approach to resilience (see Chapter 1) seeks to avoid the semantic 
arguments that sometimes befuddle resilience scholarship by focusing on the consequences 
of resilience initiatives. In the specific case of the inclusion of risk and resilience in 
municipal bonds, it confers a number of analytic advantages. First, it refocuses our view of 
resilience away from the descriptive sense of the term common in natural sciences and 
discursive approaches common in the social sciences (Holling 1973; Alexander 2013; 
Welsh 2014; Bourbeau 2015, 2018) to a sense of what is created in the name of resilience 
and risk reduction. Without diminishing the important contributions made by scholars in 
these fields, this better reflects the modern tendency to justify projects and initiatives with 
resilience (Colker 2020). Credit ratings serve as a vehicle through which concerns about 
risk and disaster planning are translated to costs of credit. Second, it provides an analytic 
bridge between disaster scholarship and sociospatial approaches that focus on the 
production of space (Lefebvre 1991, 2003) by connecting spatial projects with the 
financialization of climate risk. Finally, it emphasizes pre-disaster consequences of 
resilience planning, which are distinct from post-disaster approaches that describe the 
ability of a system to bounce back from disturbance (Holling 1973; Alexander 2013; Welsh 
2014; Bourbeau 2015, 2018). Taken together, these illustrate one mechanism by which the 
production of disaster space operates through financial resilience planning. In addition, 
they focus on the real-world consequences of these initiatives, including the promotion of 
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environmental awareness and inequality, which may manifest regardless of whether a 
disaster ever happens in the subject locality.       
While the intent of credit ratings is simple—what are the chances that the promise 
of payment will not be honored?—the consequences may be highly complex. Here, I 
suggest a few avenues of research focusing on the interaction of this materialist approach 
to resilience in municipal finance with elements of urban environmental sociology, 
including environmental justice, property taxation, and building codes. This is not intended 
to suggest that these are the only elements germane to this interaction nor that their 
consequences will only manifest in urban areas; because municipal bonds are a potentially 
truly systemic motivator no single element could capture all possible effects in all places. 
However, because municipal bonds are linked to both the conversion of untaxable use 
values to taxable exchange values through the use of public-private growth coalitions 
(Logan and Molotch 1987) as well as the use of infrastructural decisions to convert social 
space to abstract space that reproduces systems of power (Lefebvre 1991, 2003; Coffee 
2020), an urban analytical approach makes sense. 
Adelino, Cunha, and Ferreira (2017) show that ratings upgrades can improve a 
locality’s financial flexibility, allowing it to weather financial storms like recessions and 
also fund public and private (i.e. pass-through) initiatives. This underscores the importance 
of viewing the production of space by political elites and the involvement of public-private 
growth coalitions in financial terms, as predicted by Lefebvre (1991, 2003). Future research 
should focus, in part, on whether these potential effects will be realized, and if they are 
what form they assume in urban decision-making and landscape. It should also focus on 
the connection between global markets and local conditions, through the assessment of 
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how the climate demands of these markets may translate into local action. While 
Michigan’s emergency manager law and its consequences in Flint provide strong evidence 
that credit ratings matter enough that some will prioritize them over human health 
(Fasenfest 2017), there may be a variety of less obvious, more subtle instances in which 
the needs of public coffers direct the form of local governance.  
Critically, linking political processes to municipal bond concerns presents a point of 
departure for scholars interested in processes of environmental inequality formation and 
environmental justice (Pellow 2000, 2018). The questions of how Moody’s (2017a) 
methodology motivates municipal managers and financiers invokes the long-standing call 
to view environmental inequality formation as a complex and contested process across time 
(Pellow 2000), as well as an opportunity to rethink the role of the state’s regulatory function 
and individual dispensability in light of economic pressure (Pellow 2018; Gould and Lewis 
2018a). Pulido (2000) wrote that environmental racism can arise from millions of 
seemingly race-neutral decisions made within a racialized society. It is difficult to think of 
a single decision within finance—short of a change to federal regulatory law—that can so 
easily translate into millions of individual and ostensibly neutral decisions that in the 
aggregate may lead to unjust results.  
This is further complicated by regional and local variability that calls into question 
one-size fits all resilience and adaptation planning (Gotham and Faust 2020), especially as 
credit ratings are known to encourage synchronization and correlation of market actors 
(Carruthers 2013). The tension between a tendency towards standardization and the vast 
differences among the many thousands of affected municipalities provides an opportunity 
to employ environmental justice and financial frameworks in concert. Across scales from 
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the national to the local, it would be worthwhile to assess how the development of 
standardized socio-environmental metrics for government credit quality may reproduce 
environmental injustice or may use emergent climate concerns to develop or justify new 
sources of injustice.  
Two discrete areas of research in urban sociology that are potentially impacted 
involve property taxes and building codes, two highly local processes through which space 
is produced. Property taxes are arguably the single most important element of municipal 
financial health, are included in municipal credit ratings directly as an estimate of receipts 
to come, and also are included indirectly as an estimate of financial flexibility based on 
how much they may be increased in the future (Moody’s 2017a). Protection of property 
tax receipts may motivate infrastructural and social choices ranging from resilience 
gentrification (Gould and Lewis 2018a) to building infrastructure in such a way that the 
protection of high value real estate is prioritized (Dawson 2017).  
Because of the element of financial flexibility, property tax limitations are likewise 
highly relevant. Recent studies have found that property tax limitations may exacerbate 
racial inequality (Martin and Beck 2017) but that property tax increases due to 
gentrification do not seem to result in population displacement (Martin and Beck 2018). 
Moreover, a meta-analysis has found that property tax limitations may provide some social 
protections but at the cost of diminished state capacity to provide others (Martin 2019). 
These concerns suggest the need for inquiry into how bonds’ reliance on tax proceeds for 
repayment may motivate changes in tax policy that may encourage some priorities at the 
expense of others, as well as policies that may promote land development for the purpose 
of real estate valorization and deep tax rolls. While these studies have focused primarily 
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on property tax ceilings, it is also intriguing to consider the implications of property tax 
floors that come from the need to pay off bonds, the need to funnel a set amount of property 
tax revenues to pay existing debt or finance resilience projects, and the need to start 
thinking longer-term. Studying the relationship between municipal bonds, infrastructural 
development, and local taxation answers the call of scholars interested in “fiscal 
geographies,” or a deep and process-based appreciation of the intersection of urban 
development, finance, and taxation that occur not only during or just after a crisis, but 
during the “long trough of recovery” (Tapp and Kay 2019:575).  
A second potential topic involves building codes, zoning and land use decisions, and 
the processes through which the production of space is regulated by local government. 
Recent work by Bartram (2019a, 2019b) suggests the importance of building codes and 
standards to systemic reproduction of inequality and the promotion of real estate 
valorization by growth machines. One reason is that codes may increase costs for less 
affluent property owners and serve as a driver of gentrification. She cautions, however, that 
in practice code enforcement agents may use their judgment to protect marginalized 
individuals and communities. In this way anything that may provide motivation for 
building codes that require significant capital expenditures, or requires expensive initial 
construction, may result in both inequality formation and potential resistance from 
members of the public bureaucracy (Bartram 2019a, 2019b). In turn, this suggests the 
importance of identifying and analyzing forces that may impact infrastructural policy, 
especially when the desire for stronger structures is supplemented by the desire for greater 
tax receipts that would presumably flow from bigger, fancier, stronger, and more real estate 
development (cf. Elliott and Clement 2017).      
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Finally, the development of a resilience strategy by so many municipalities as a 
condition of obtaining inexpensive credit is consequential for a variety of other reasons. 
The first is that debt quality and municipal financial health are gauged by an external, 
private institution that seems subject to little regulatory or normative oversight (but see 
Cantor and Packer (1995) for a decidedly pre-2008 perspective that normative pressure 
should ensure accuracy in credit ratings). This creates the potential for differential debt 
pricing in areas that are likely to experience different consequences of changing climate, 
especially because mimetic isomorphism and other copycat effects may normalize certain 
decisional pathways to the derogation of others (DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Carruthers 
2013). The acceptance of resilience within the world of finance may, for example, carry 
over to discourage coastal development or increase the cost of coastal development to the 
point of exclusion and displacement of less affluent populations.  
As with other environmental justice concerns (Pellow 2000, 2018; Pulido 2000), 
there is a chance that environmental risk arising from climate change—or even the 
perception of risk—may create or reify differences between municipalities based on their 
ability to get with the established program, leading to a cumulative disadvantage for 
localities that are already in difficult financial or environmental positions. Embedding of 
environmental concerns in existing ratings categories means that these concerns 
necessarily operate in concert. Identifying and analyzing how competing concerns are 
weighed and balanced against each other presents an opportunity to predict and hopefully 
mitigate cumulative disadvantage. Moreover, it may help to foreground the need for scalar 
stretching and processes that challenge the individualization or localization of response, 
and encourage research into the potential for pro-social outcomes. Because of this, and 
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notwithstanding the dangers of environmental injustice, there may be worthwhile aspects 
of this methodology, including proactive, protective local government response to climate 
risk that might otherwise have gone unaddressed.   
CONCLUSION. 
The inclusion of discrete, described elements of climate and disaster risk into 
municipal bond credit ratings may reflect a preexisting informal tendency to consider these 
risks in municipal creditworthiness. However, it also represents a potential expansion of 
consideration of these risks by formalizing the direct financial consequences for 
municipalities that will likely be taken into account regardless of the existence of a political 
climate of denial. While bond ratings are certainly not the only motivating force, they 
provide a direct link between climate risk, increased financialization, and the material 
outcomes of resilience planning. An enhanced appreciation of climate change may have 
the positive effect of encouraging preparation. It may also encourage a view that we are all 
in this together, challenging the neoliberal individualization of climate and disaster 
response. That said, it presents cause for concern because it tends to elevate the right to 
repayment over social protections, may prioritize fiscal health over human health, and may 
manifest in a variety of unpredictable ways across all U.S. municipalities and municipal 
subdivisions.  
A number of features of these ratings may be useful to scholars interested in the 
intersection of finance, climate, the state, and justice. First is the way that climate risks are 
viewed primarily in light of the ability of each municipality to pay off its debt. This 
provides an avenue through which seemingly neutral economic decision-making may 
create inequalities, both within municipalities and between them. Second is that climate 
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risks are not standalone considerations, but are embedded in established risk categories and 
must be understood in concert with these categories. Climate risk is therefore linked to 
exogenous matters of governance, geography, labor, and inequality. In short, any element 
of municipal policy that involves taxation, expenditure, or development trajectories is in 
play. Third, links between these categories emphasize points of connection to other areas 
of social science interest, including how tax regimes and building and land use regulations 
are developed. Finally, taken together, these suggest that seemingly neutral financial 
decisions may develop into the form and substance of resilience plans in ways that may 
result in environmental injustice.  
In short, it is hard to predict how the inclusion of climate risk by Moody’s (2017a) 
and other ratings agencies will affect municipal bond markets and courses of action chosen 
by municipal managers (or chosen for them). Likewise, it is hard to predict whether these 
changes will motivate “good” or “bad” behavior, if they motivate behavior at all. What is 
clear, however, is that there is a strong likelihood that these will have some sort of systemic 
effect on municipal finance that will trickle down to municipal decision-making by 
encouraging resilience planning. Additionally, it is likely that the form of this planning will 
reflect the priorities of finance. Rather than stop the analysis with the intent of the bond 
ratings agencies—to assess how climate risk might affect the chance of bond default—a 
materialist approach to resilience emphasizes the importance of beginning the analysis of 
how this will affect the production of space before the effects may be detected. Future 
socio-environmental research should build on the materialist approach’s attention to 
structures of financialization, like municipal bonds, that are not usually assumed to be 
environmental but may have both environmental and social consequences.  
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In the first chapter I introduced the conceptual value of a revised approach to 
resilience and disaster planning, including how disaster readiness initiatives may produce 
disaster space in ways that serve the needs of capital. The second chapter introduced how 
resilience and climate adaptive planning may take shape through effects on municipal bond 
markets, providing an example of how an administrative or technical financial decision 
may have wide-reaching effects. In this chapter I continue to develop the material approach 
to resilience and disaster planning, but using an example on a more local scale, by outlining 
the experience of some residents of the lower Florida Keys with Hurricane Irma in 2017. 
My goals are: to identify mechanisms by which unequal residential displacement took 
shape in this community; to better understand how exploitation of storm trauma may 
contribute to displacement; and to identify how disaster readiness initiatives contribute to 
these problems, both in the lower Keys specifically and in ways that may be generally 
applicable to coastal communities that engage in disaster planning.  
Nearly two years after Hurricane Irma decimated many areas of the lower Florida 
Keys, Bloomberg News characterized the area’s post-disaster experience as the bellwether 
of “America’s Great Climate Exodus” (Gopal 2019). With climate change predicted to 
increase the severity of hurricane impacts (IPCC 2014; Angus 2016), sociologists have 
focused on the way that the political economic context influences planning, response, and 
recovery regimes (e.g., Tierney 2007, 2015; Gotham and Greenberg 2014; Dawson 2017). 
Important as studies like these are, however, they tend to focus on a few large scale and 
well-known disasters that impacted large cities, such as Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans 
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and Hurricane Sandy in New York City (e.g., Freudenburg et al. 2009; Adams 2012; 
Gotham and Greenberg 2014; Tierney 2015).  
They also tend to focus on the aftermath of disaster, limit their analytic purview to 
the effects of resilience and recovery initiatives in the post-disaster period, and to see pre-
existing political economic context primarily as a driver of vulnerability, occluding the 
ways that expectations of future environmental change may themselves change the political 
economic context and the disaster experience (Pais and Elliott 2008; for an exception, see 
Anguelovski et al. 2016). In this chapter I seek to address these issues using a case study 
of the lower Florida Keys’ experience with Hurricane Irma. I emphasize the generative 
power of pre-disaster resilience planning in a relatively ideal test site: a small community 
with unusually high disaster risk and an unusually long and involved history of disaster 
planning. Hurricane Irma presented the opportunity to understand how these initiatives 
interacted with political economic context in a way that reveals the mechanisms of 
sociospatial inequality formation.  
To analyze how sociospatial inequality develops, I synthesize the production of 
disaster space and the predevelopment treadmill introduced in the first chapter with 
literatures on natural hazards, trauma, and environmental justice.  I find that while trauma 
arising from the initial disaster and evacuation tends to be moderate (or at least fleeting), 
disaster-related bureaucracy and regulation combine to create severe trauma in the post-
disaster period. To be clear, I do not argue that living through a hurricane and suffering 
housing damage is not traumatic. Rather, I argue that trauma arising from the long post-
disaster tail is qualitatively distinct from, and appears to exceed, that arising earlier 
(Eyerman 2015). In turn, this severe trauma wears down local residents in the months and 
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years after a hurricane—well after most relief efforts have ended—and appears to create 
susceptibility to exploitative real estate speculation and displacement over a long time 
horizon. Additionally, this highlights the effects of multiple hazards on the ability and 
desire to stay, emphasizing that while displacement patterns are rooted in wealth 
disparities, they are not determined solely by wealth. 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
The Mechanisms: The Generative Power of Disasters and Political Economy.    
While demographics, landscapes, and systems of power can each affect disasters, 
there have been few studies on the effects of preparedness and resilience projects 
themselves both before and after disaster. Just as political economic context can change 
how disasters impact communities, preparation for disasters can change communities 
(Angeulovski et al. 2016). It may be dangerous to focus primarily on pre-disaster 
vulnerabilities and post-disaster response, without considering the effects of preparedness 
initiatives themselves. This is because disasters may be understood to ‘land’ on a pre-
determined set of infrastructural conditions and social relations rather than fundamentally 
contributing to their development. Studies such as these therefore run the risk of failing to 
capture important elements of the disaster cycle (Tierney 2007, 2015). These include the 
effects of preparedness initiatives before a disaster occurs and how the mechanics of 
processes like disaster capitalism (Klein 2007, 2018) comes to pass both before and after 
disaster (Anguelovski et al. 2016; Dawson 2017; Gould and Lewis 2018a).  
A similar danger arises from the important work that links disaster experiences to 
neoliberalism (Cretney 2014; Tierney 2015). This is the tendency to explain reactions to 
disasters and environmental change as the result of neoliberal ideology absent an 
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assessment of which elements of neoliberal ideology are at play and how they intersect 
with the specifics of disaster planning and response. While there is no denying that disaster 
response is often influenced by neoliberal priorities (Cretney 2014; Gotham and Greenberg 
2014; Tierney 2015; Dawson 2017), disasters represent special circumstances that may 
operate by their own logic. In a time of rapid environmental change, viewing disaster 
planning not as derivative but as formative—and formative in ways that employ distinctive 
ways of thinking and logic—may provide insight into the unintended (or intended but 
unspoken) consequences of disaster planning. Housing, moreover, presents a unique case 
to study how social relations of disaster are emplaced: the production of disaster space 
(Lefebvre 1991) that is formed in anticipation of disaster (Shtob 2019).  
Displacement and the Predevelopment Treadmill 
Population displacement is central to disaster analysis. While displacement and 
migration are sometimes thought to consist of unidirectional depopulation (Goodhue 
2018), organized managed retreat (Koslov 2016), or officially-sanctioned abandonment 
(O’Neill, Van Abs, and Gramling 2016; Flavelle and Mazzei 2019), other studies hint that 
climate-related migration may instead involve multi-directional churn, with displacement 
and replacement (Fussell and Elliott 2009; Curtis et al. 2015; Gould and Lewis 2017, 
2018a). Moreover, displacement due to affordability, economics, or environmental risk is 
usually neither fully compelled nor fully voluntary. Instead, it involves a complex array of 
considerations that include affordability and distance from social support structures 
(Fussell and Elliott 2009; Curtis et al. 2015).  
For those in the “middle of the volitional continuum” between forced and voluntary 
migration the “overriding point is that an acute environmental impact does not generate 
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one type of migratory response but rather many types that are organized by and through 
dynamic and highly variable combinations of individual autonomy and social structure” 
(Fussell and Elliott 2009, 382). Outside of the form that migration takes, however, there is 
the overarching question of why it occurs in the first place. This suggests that America’s 
Great Climate Exodus (Gopal 2019), while conceptually useful to frame climate change 
and disaster migration as a national concern, may obscure a variety of displacement and 
migration types.20   
In this way an analogy to green gentrification is useful. Green gentrification occurs 
due to the development of environmental amenities in urban areas. In addition to 
environmental improvement, however, these initiatives “draw in wealthier groups of 
residents and push out lower-income residents” (Gould and Lewis 2017:23). While simple 
and ostensibly local in its basic form, green gentrification results from the actions of 
investors and speculators who “appropriate[e] the economic values of an environmental 
resource by one class from another” (Gould and Lewis 2017:25). Real estate markets and 
those operating within them, therefore, can serve to structure differential race- and class-
based access to environmental resources through economic incentives as basic as 
affordability.  
Gould and Lewis (2017:35) argue that in urban spaces green gentrification of this 
type may manifest through the logic of the treadmill of production; specifically, they argue 
that “green growth coalitions operate along the logic of an urban greening treadmill.” As 
 
20 As described in the Preface, the uneven damage patterns reported by Xian et al. (2018) to mobile homes in 
Big Pine Key (moderate) and its neighbor to the north Marathon Key (extensive) imply that there may have 
been displacement within the lower Keys in addition to out-migration to the mainland. This, along with 
numerous participant accounts that outline movement among the islands, suggests that population dynamics 
in the lower Keys were more complex than may be implied by the term “exodus.”  
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the treadmill accelerates due to the concerted efforts of both real estate investors and others 
interested in maintaining growth, environmental amenities are reserved for the more 
affluent while environmental harms are pushed down towards less affluent and otherwise 
marginalized people and communities (Gould and Lewis 2017). The green veneer of this 
treadmill obscures the inequality that accelerating and intensifying real estate growth 
promotes, as well as its primary focus on capital accumulation (Foster, Clark, and York 
2011; Gould and Lewis 2018a).  
The mechanics of the operation of the urban greening treadmill and its constituent 
coalitions are based on the logic of the urban growth machine (Logan and Molotch 1987; 
Gould and Lewis 2017). Growth machine theory emphasizes the centrality of real estate 
development and investment within a complex of urban development and redevelopment, 
illustrating how growth coalitions comprised of government, elites, business interests, and 
others like labor interests seeking to ensure employment, work together to promote 
constant urban development and growth (Logan and Molotch 1987). This “model argues 
that developers lobby and otherwise manipulate municipal government to make public 
investments that will raise property values, thus generating profits for themselves with the 
consequence of displacement of local populations” (Gould and Lewis 2017:35).  
Pais and Elliott (2008) developed an outlet for growth machine specifically keyed 
to the disaster context. They summarize the importance of this innovation—the recovery 
machine—to the sociological study of disaster by arguing that:    
Inserting this perspective into disaster studies moves us beyond the simple 
recognition that some groups are more vulnerable to environmental hazards than 
others to illuminate how this vulnerability is generated by ongoing and unequal 
struggles over local development. In turn, it also raises the question of how these 
struggles change after a major disaster hits, as competing interests respond to 
opportunities created by the damage, displacement and rebuilding that ensues, that 
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is, as the local growth machine transforms into a recovery machine (Pais and Elliott 
2008:1419, emphasis added). 
 
As with other scholarship, this account reflects the dominant binary distinction between 
vulnerabilities developed from pre-disaster conditions (outside of preparedness and 
resilience initiatives) and those that develop during post-disaster recovery. That is, they 
accept that pre-existing struggles over uneven land development can prime patterns of 
vulnerability and argue that after a disaster the growth machine opportunistically mutates 
to take advantage of destruction (Pais and Elliott 2008). They do not, however, explicitly 
address how struggles over local development may be influenced by resilience and 
preparedness measures.   
Others have made similar conceptual arguments about exploitation in post-disaster 
contexts that come closer to a resilience-based approach. Gotham and Greenberg 
(2014:133) describe the development of a number of growth coalitions after Hurricane 
Sandy in New York that they term “‘recovery’ growth coalitions” while Gould and Lewis 
(2016:148) use the term “redevelopment treadmill” to depict an analog of green 
gentrification that occurs when urban redevelopment continues through a disaster. In each 
case, the activities of the growth machine or coalition often results in environmental 
amenities being appropriated for their cash value (Gould and Lewis 2016). This is because 
environmental amenities support the quick and profitable sale of properties and encourage 
a culture of flipping, rendering the sometimes-illiquid real estate market more liquid and 
more prone to speculation. This speculation can lead to the displacement of residents due 
to restricted rental markets and increased housing costs.21 
 
21 Resilience gentrification itself has been described in New York City. Building on the ideas underlying 
green gentrification and the urban growth machine, it argues that a “structural mitigation approach” focused 
on strengthening homes and infrastructure has the capacity to create gentrification due to the desirability of 
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As much as policy interventions may be required to ensure that inequality does not 
arise during disaster recovery, these policies may also promote inequality. In the context 
of the eastern Caribbean island of Barbuda, which arguably suffered the worst impacts of 
Hurricane Irma and inarguably suffered significant population displacement, Gould and 
Lewis (2018b) demonstrate the disaster capitalism—the opportunistic development of 
tourism on the island due to the confluence of neoliberal ideology and political economic 
pressure—led to a policy preference for tourism over local recovery that was dressed in the 
clothes of public aid. There, “Hurricane Irma made it possible to recast development geared 
towards serving non-Barbudans as a humanitarian effort to rebuild and improve” (Gould 
and Lewis 2018b:151).  
As such, global developers teamed up with the national government to lead a 
‘green’ recovery. But these actors are renewing the island to attract wealthy 
outsiders, not the displaced. In this way, the disaster and subsequent evacuation 
cleared the way for the global green growth machine to create green gentrification 
on the island and shift power from local, place-based control to extra-local, capital 
based control and decision-making (Gould and Lewis 2018b:152). 
 
These valuable efforts to identify sources of disaster-based displacement and link 
them to established traditions in environmental and urban sociology, however, also suggest 
a need to better integrate a more holistic time scale to disaster-focused research. They tend 
to analyze the recovery to the exclusion of the planning period. In some ways this makes 
sense: disasters tend to illuminate latent social conditions and focus public attention 
(Birkland 1996; Tierney 2007); and examples abound of post-disaster opportunism when 
people are most desperate (Tierney 2007, 2015; Pais and Elliott 2008; Gould and Lewis 
 
protected waterfront property and the costs associated with protective projects (Gould and Lewis 2018a). 
This paper builds on this type of research to develop a more concise understanding of some of the mechanisms 
by which the disaster analog of green gentrification may come to pass, extending it beyond the realm of 
housing costs to include elements of trauma, bureaucracy, and administrative stress.  
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2016; Klein 2018). What they omit, however, are the ways that disaster preparedness and 
resilience regimes themselves may create displacement that occurs in anticipation of a 
hazard. Building upon the redevelopment treadmill and initial forays into resilience 
gentrification (Anguelovski et al. 2016; Gould and Lewis 2016, 2018a), I call this the 
predevelopment treadmill.  
Coupled with post-disaster explanations of opportunism such as the recovery growth 
machine and the redevelopment treadmill, through the predevelopment treadmill I seek to 
describe the mechanisms of the production of disaster space. That is, to emphasize the 
material effects of disaster that are created by resilience and other planning initiatives both 
before and after the occurrence of a hazard event. The production of space is an ongoing 
sociospatial project (Lefebvre 1991) that in disaster zones is punctuated by moments of 
environmental shock and destruction (in addition to the ongoing impacts of slower-moving 
environmental stress). According to Lefebvre (1991, 2003) space is produced by social 
structures, priorities, and inequalities. In turn, the form of space helps to structure the 
reproduction of social systems, including inequalities. While Lefebvre used the term 
“social space” to refer to spaces of lived, practical experience, the term abstract space “is 
constituted by the intersection of knowledge and power [as]…the hierarchical space that is 
pertinent to those who wish to control social organization, such as political rulers, 
economic interests, and planners” (Gottdeiner 1993:131; Lefebvre 1991). It is within this 
abstract space that social use value of land and real estate is replaced by exchange value, 
and within the space that buildings are constructed in ways that (re)produce inequality 
(Logan and Molotch 1987; Lefebvre 1991).  
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Of course, the construction of these spaces—and how the production of space is 
practiced—is actually accomplished by humans based on their mental images and more 
formal conceptions of space. These are dependent upon the material and cognitive 
substance of discrete historical moments (Lefebvre 1991; Gottdeiner 1993). In this way the 
Lefebvrian approach to the co-production of space and society joins political economic 
imperatives with how we feel about space, the world, and each other. Space is valued for a 
variety of reasons, including how its form reflects meaningful aspects of place, including 
relationships with among people, society, and landscapes (Greider and Garkovich 1994; 
Gieryn 2000). Moreover, Lefebvre (1991) is explicit about the variety of actors across 
levels of society that influence the precise form of built environments, from designers and 
architects, to owners, to planners, to financiers. Yet he is clear that even those who believe 
that spatial design is an individual aesthetic project are beholden to systems of power 
(Lefebvre 1991, 2003). Put simply, in this view the production of space is primarily a 
political economic project, but one that is integrated with the emotional content and 
meaning of our built environment.   
While the spaces that are designed and built within a disaster zone are subject to 
many of the same political economic forces as spaces elsewhere, they are distinctive 
because of the risk of periodic external destruction. Eventually, the bad star from which 
the term disaster (dis + astro) derives (Freudenburg 1997) will rise again. Thus the 
elements of social control typical of abstract space found in disaster zones may involve the 
criteria of construction and reconstruction itself, promoted by the tendency of disasters to 
invite repair and replacement. For those who wish to convert the built environment and its 
attendant social organization to financial gain, however, this risk may be viewed less as a 
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liability and more as an opportunity. This is precisely how disaster capitalism—intentional 
or unintentional opportunism that exploits the adverse conditions or fear surrounding 
disaster (Klein 2007, 2018)—comes to exist.  
The production of disaster space, therefore, may inhere an independent logic of 
environmental stress and shock avoidance. This is similar to the urban greening treadmill 
in that it operates at all times (i.e. both before and after a disaster event) through initiatives 
ostensibly focused on environmental improvement that in fact result in conversion of 
public readiness and resilience funds to private wealth accumulation. It differs, however, 
both because it has an independent and traumatic point of catalysis and because its guiding 
logic and discourses—whether sincere or disingenuous—are less focused on protection of 
the environment and more focused on protection from the environment (bearing in mind, 
of course, that climate change and development in disaster areas are human, not natural, 
accomplishments).  
In this way it can justify a different set and sort of infrastructural improvements than 
are typically associated with green gentrification, including the wholesale reimagining of 
what is appropriate housing. While like resilience gentrification it certainly involves an 
assessment of the effects of structural mitigation approaches and real estate capital 
accumulation (Gould and Lewis 2018a), it also admits others forms of disaster planning as 
well as considerations of mental landscapes. Additionally, disasters themselves can clear 
pre-existing structures without an assignment of blame to any culpable human. When 
nature operates the bulldozer, the consequences that flow from the destruction can likewise 
seem natural, even if the resulting disaster space is produced by the logic of abstract space 
(Lefebvre 1991).  
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In this way the predevelopment treadmill is similar to approaches that focus on the 
cumulative effects of concatenated crises (e.g. Gotham and Greenberg 2014) but adds to 
these through an explicit focus on disaster expectation in addition to disaster response. In 
other words, there is no requirement of a crisis to get the ball rolling: disaster space may 
be produced based only on anticipation of a future event. With the number of resilience 
programs (and their funding) rapidly expanding due to recognition of the dangers of climate 
change (Colker 2020), financial market acceptance of the existence of climate risk even in 
the face of intransigence or denial at some levels of government (Omstedt 2019), and 
economic estimates that every dollar spent on infrastructural preparedness in the form of 
model building codes saves eleven dollars over time (Colker 2020), pre-event initiatives 
are of the moment. So are critical approaches to preparedness and planning that analyze 
whether their golden reputation is fully deserved.  
I recognize that this critical approach tends to interfere with a point of hope that may 
be useful to those who have suffered a disaster, yet it operates in a tradition known for this 
sort of thing. “Even within the academy” Gould, Pellow, and Schnaiberg (2004:312) wrote 
over 15 years ago, “the treadmill model is more often critiqued as ‘depressing’ than 
inaccurate, reflecting the model’s utility in debunking environmental myths surrounding 
nonstructural paths to socioecologically sustainable development trajectories.” One of 
these myths may be the belief in the win-win nature of resilience and preparedness 
measures (e.g., Colker 2020), even (and perhaps especially) if they do not account for the 
potential for the reproduction of inequality. Yet interrogation of this type of myth also 
provides an opportunity: since many municipal resilience efforts are in their early stages 
and there are incentives for municipalities to get on board (e.g., Moody’s 2017, 2019; 
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Omstedt 2019), it may be instructive to build considerations of inequality into early 
planning regimes.  
Collective and Cultural Trauma, Housing, and Mental States 
One way to assess the relative success of disaster planning is through the avoidance 
of collective or cultural trauma in recovery. This implies a focus on the aftermath of 
disaster, as well as its pre-disaster roots (Erickson 1991, 1994). Collective trauma is 
distinguishable from individual trauma because rather than a “blow to the psyche” it 
derives from “a blow to the basic tissues of social life that damages the bonds attaching 
people together and impairs the prevailing sense of communality” (Erickson 1991:459-
460).22 While individual trauma may result from exposure to the devastation of disaster, 
collective or cultural trauma may develop from the loss of a sense of community or official 
support, and critically may impact even those who did not experience the disaster firsthand 
but were subjected to its aftermath (Erickson 1991, 1994; Eyerman 2015).  
For example, as observed by Eyerman (2015) about the devastatingly ineffective 
federal response to Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans: “[T]he hurricane in itself did not 
cause cultural trauma; what did was the failure of those charged with collective 
responsibility, the upholders of the covenant, to act accordingly” (Eyerman 2015:7). In 
order to best appreciate the development of trauma, it is therefore important to focus on the 
aftermath and official response: what happens in the months and years after a disaster that 
catalyzes the possibly unavoidable to the avoidable. Importantly, its focus on response 
 
22 Although it is subtle difference, collective trauma results from the destruction of communal bonds and 
community, whereas cultural trauma results from an offense to a sense of identity within a community. In 
the case of a hurricane collective trauma may result from dislocation or destruction of community resources, 
whereas cultural trauma may develop from a failure in response that causes people to question the assumption 
that their society values them sufficiently to provide aid in their time of need (Alexander and Breese 2011; 
Eyerman 2015). For present purposes, however, they are used in tandem to represent the traumatic effects of 
failures in disaster response and recovery, as opposed to the trauma of experiencing a disaster itself.   
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requires identification of conditions in the pre-disaster period that have post-disaster 
consequences. Notwithstanding its roots in the constructionist cultural sociology of 
emotion (Alexander and Breese 2011; Eyerman 2015), trauma involves both emotional and 
material content. Erickson (1991, 1994), in his appraisal of the Buffalo Creek disaster, and 
Eyerman (2015), in his appraisal of the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, certainly would 
recognize that during these events emotional trauma resulted from material, political 
economic forces and helped to set the stage for post-event repression and resistance. 
Moreover, because space and social relations influence each other (Lefebvre 1991) and 
trauma is derived from failures in institutional response (Eyerman 2015), it is reasonable 
to expect that trauma both results from, and contributes to, the production of disaster space.  
Disasters, Inequality Formation, and Housing.   
Having elevated the importance of the full sweep of the disaster cycle to the political 
economic development of disaster space, and having introduced trauma as a potential 
mechanism of the production of space, I turn to the question of the effects of disasters on 
the development of housing and residential inequality. There is considerable evidence from 
quantitative national studies that disasters influence the production of space and inequality. 
Landscape development, unequal accumulation of wealth, and residential instability all are 
associated with disasters, on average (Elliott 2015; Elliott and Clement 2017; Elliott and 
Howell 2017; Howell and Elliott 2019). Yet the mechanisms of inequality production 
suggested by these national studies have not been adequately explored. This is unfortunate, 
in part because of the severe consequences of displacement and housing loss by legal or 
extra-legal mechanisms, especially among already-marginalized communities (Desmond 
2012; Sullivan 2018). Some of their findings, including that some privileged groups 
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actually gain wealth on average after disaster (Howell and Elliott 2019), hint that 
fundamental questions remain about the relationship between disaster and inequality 
formation (Pellow 2000; Pellow 2018).   
Beyond the well-established proposition that disaster response may lead to 
opportunism and inequality (Klein 2007, 2018; Tierney 2007, 2015) questions likewise 
remain about how disaster preparedness and relief efforts fuel these processes. 
Environmental inequality formation departs from earlier understandings of environmental 
inequality and justice by encouraging a process-based socio-historical view that opened a 
forum for the analysis of legislative, bureaucratic, and development practice over time 
(Pellow 2000). In this way it dovetails nicely with the perspective that concatenated 
disasters may have a cumulative effect over time on political economic systems and 
landscapes (Gotham and Greenberg 2014; Dawson 2017).  
Critical environmental justice studies represents a more recent evolution of the study 
of environmental inequality formation, partially because it represents a vision of a more 
just future as well as a way to document past injustice (Pellow 2018). It encourages analysis 
of environmental injustice and inequality across spatial and temporal scales and promotes 
a reevaluation of the role of the state in their development, questioning the assumption that 
the state is necessarily an environmental justice ally (Pellow 2018). Finally, it focuses on 
the concept of indispensability, arguing that all beings, regardless of race, class, or other 
identities or group affiliations, are “indispensible to our collective futures” (Pellow 
2018:26). Rather than an embrace of anachronistic functionalism, indispensability in 
Pellow’s (2018) view involves a right to inclusion and environmental protection that is 
 113 
independent of whether a person or group is deemed “useful” to society or those holding 
power.   
Displacement, even that which occurs in the middle of the volitional continuum 
(Fussell and Elliott 2008), is implicated in each approach to environmental justice. First, 
disaster-based displacement threatens the notion of individual and community 
indispensability because it involves a relocation that is not fully voluntary in most cases. 
Second, it dovetails with critical analysis of state action, including any seemingly neutral 
or pro-social action that threaten to work injustice or create inequality in the long run, 
because it also implies (at the very least) that insufficient support was provided by the state. 
Third, it focuses not only on the production and development of space, but also on temporal 
contexts stretching from the distant past to the future (Pellow 2000, 2018). Folding in the 
idea that collective disaster trauma may result from disappointed expectations about 
recovery rather than from the storm experience itself (Eyerman 2015), this view 
emphasizes the importance of thinking across time and space, and supports reconsideration 
of a variety of programs from an environmental justice perspective, including state-
sponsored and private resilience and preparedness initiatives.  
METHODS 
In order to understand the intersection between the production of disaster space, 
political economy, disaster trauma, and housing injustice, I draw upon my experience with 
real estate law and regulation as well as theory developed within environmental and urban 
sociology. Using the lower Florida Keys as a case study (Yin 1994, 2003) I analyze how 
repeated disasters and crises influenced the development of the local built environment, 
and how legal and design elements of the built environment mediated residents’ experience 
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with Hurricane Irma. My data collection strategy was inspired by both contemporary 
grounded theory (i.e. Charmaz 2006) as well as elements of Burawoy’s (1998) extended 
case study method that focus on theoretical reevaluation and reconstruction over time.  
The central element of this data stream was twenty-two in-depth interviews 
conducted between 2018 and 2019 with residents of a variety of six separate islands in the 
lower Florida Keys ranging from Key West to the southwest to Big Pine Key to the 
northeast. Every participant lived in the Keys prior to Hurricane Irma and at the time of 
their interview had lived in the Keys between five and 48 years. The participant pool 
featured members who were retired, actively working, year round residents, seasonal 
residents (or “snowbirds”), at least seven who were dispossessed from their house for more 
than a year and a half, three who no longer lived in the Keys because of Irma, and a few 
others who at the time of our conversation were still considering leaving. The participant 
pool was evenly split between men and women, with ages ranging from 31 to 87 with a 
mean of 56 and a median of 54.5.  
Housing experiences in this group also varied significantly; while everyone reported 
being affected by Irma in some way, some only suffered superficial damage to their 
residence while others returned to find complete destruction. With one exception these 
interviews were all an hour or more, with some exceeding two hours. The questions were 
open-ended and intentionally vague in many cases, which allowed participants to answer 
them as generally or specifically as they desired. This allowed them to provide their own 
definitions for concepts as diverse as their community or communities, environmental 
change, and expectations for the future. In this way it tested salience of ideas and concepts 
and promoted ideational and thematic development, allowing participants to highlight 
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issues and stories that they felt were most relevant, rather than limiting its scope to a 
predefined list of research topics.  
One result of this is that many participants chose to frame their responses in the form 
of pre-Irma and post-Irma observations, experiences, and opinions. This lent support to the 
idea that Irma served as a catalytic moment, in which a variety of social and environmental 
contexts changed. Another important result of open-ended and vague questions is a central 
pivot in research topic, from one focused on the material roots of displacement to one that 
also embraced mental health and trauma, as well as their relationship to housing, building 
codes, bureaucracy, and insurance.  
Participants were initially recruited through community service organizations and 
snowball sampling. From the outset, I suspected that the relationships between housing and 
population displacement would be the primary sociologically interesting issue and much 
of the interviews focused on these topics. Being conscious of the somewhat unique 
relationships that Keys residents have with place, I also asked a variety of questions about 
meanings of place in order to understand the potential effects of displacement. The 
interviews were transcribed in full and coded by the author. During the coding process 
attention was paid to the development of coding categories, as well as general content of 
each category and stories that might represent potential outliers. While originally about 14 
coding categories were contemplated, by the end of the coding and recoding process 20 
often-overlapping categories were established.  
To be clear, I doubt that these codes represent a full inventory of every factor that is 
play at this community, or every opinion held by local residents. Moreover, it would be 
absurd to presume that a study focused on the relatively unique environment of the lower 
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Florida Keys would inventory every concern held by the diverse array of communities that 
are presently preparing for hurricanes and other climate related disasters. As Burawoy 
(1998, 17) writes, “most communities are so riven by conflicts that it is impossible to 
navigate them to everyone’s satisfaction no matter how careful the observer.” However, by 
using the case study method and drawing on a variety of data sources, I have taken a broad-
spectrum approach that captures a variety of thematic elements relevant to local recovery. 
Additional details about data sources, as well as methodological concerns and choices, are 
presented in Appendix A.  
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
After a brief discussion of place in the lower Keys and how that informed participant 
opinion, this section proceeds in a series of parts. First, I outline some of the many instances 
of Irma related trauma reported by study participants, ordering them chronologically to 
emphasize that more significant cases of trauma originate not with the storm but with the 
management of its aftermath (Eyerman 2015). Importantly, in this section I illustrate the 
linkages between trauma and housing. This broadens the approach to collective and cultural 
disaster trauma from their non-materialist roots (i.e. Eyerman 2015; Erickson 1991, 1994) 
to identify points of connection with political economy and environmental justice.  
I then build upon this foundation to argue that, in addition to the well-known 
displacement that occurs immediately after a storm, there may be a brand of displacement 
that occurs over long timeframes as local residents are worn down by bureaucratic 
disappointment. Over time and with cumulative storm experiences, this suggests a new 
model of displacement in which less affluent community members experience a death by 
a thousand cuts, while wealthier people can pay for convenience as they build back bigger. 
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In turn, this convinces some dedicated community members to leave their community and 
for others creates significant questions about whether they would be willing to suffer 
through another recovery. From trauma, this form of class-related cumulative disadvantage 
arises partially as uneven development and partially as overdevelopment.  
This is followed by a discussion of the ongoing process of real estate speculation 
that is believed to have accelerated following Hurricane Irma, intensifying building 
development overall and especially that serving tourism and temporary rentals. This 
connects local issues to real estate speculation and capital, and illustrates that seemingly 
neutral investment decisions may, in the aggregate, contribute both directly to displacement 
through housing costs but also less directly by changing associations with place and 
community. While disaster trauma is independently worthy of study, here the focus pivots 
to how real estate speculation is believed to be a source of trauma and may benefit from 
trauma. By connecting political economy and emotion, I identify how long-term trauma 
can serve real estate investment to the detriment of less affluent community members.   
Finally, I present two discrete examples of housing regulation and bureaucracy: the 
50% Rule, which is part of a complex of hurricane-resistant building codes; and the Rate 
of Growth Ordinance (ROGO), which seeks to limit growth to ensure effective evacuation 
of the islands in the event of a hurricane. These emphasize not only the centrality of 
bureaucracy and housing to disaster trauma, disruptive real estate speculation, and potential 
displacement, but also the centrality of contributions of rules and regulations specifically 
focused on hurricane preparedness, resilience, and public safety. This is not to imply that 
support exists among participants for a laissez faire housing free for all, without building 
codes or enforcement. Unsurprisingly, people who have seen a hurricane the size and 
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strength of Irma up close tend to strongly support the strengthening of housing stock and 
effective evacuation plans.  
Participants were less enthusiastic, however, about the effects of institutional 
resilience bureaucracies on their community: the practice of these rules was the issue, 
rather than the wisdom of the rules themselves. This suggests that the production of disaster 
space engenders multiple competing demands that, in this case at least, must fretfully 
coexist under the logic of resilience and public safety. They may also result from laws 
passed years or even decades before. On the other hand, it also provides opportunities for 
the reform of resilience and preparation regimes that recognize both physical and social 
climate and disaster risks. Inequality formation in recovery and redevelopment, therefore, 
has roots in pre-disaster planning that naturally flow from both past storm experiences and 
concerns for future storms: this “predevelopment treadmill” drives the production of 
disaster space, which in turn primes class-based housing inequality.  
The Lower Florida Keys: Place and Precarity.  
Before turning to the specific effects of Hurricane Irma, it may be useful to frame a 
few details of participants relationships to place, as well as overriding concerns about 
threats to place derived from real estate development that predated the storm but seemed 
to have intensified afterwards. Participants nearly universally liked their birth or—much 
more often—adopted home in the lower Keys. Most participants reported that they had 
been attracted to the Keys due to some combination of sun, ocean, and recreational 
activities. An extremely common story among participants is that they came to the Keys 
on vacation, fell in love with its unique amenities and environment, and then decided to 
move down.  
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Participants also cited the cost of living and inconvenience as the trade-offs for living 
in the Keys. The Keys are expensive and are becoming increasingly so. This is symbolized 
by the number of local “and bartenders” I encountered: the teacher and bartender; the 
librarian and bartender; the consultant and bartender; and so on. Second jobs and side 
hustles seem to be the norm for younger working people, and even some retirees reported 
taking on extra work as an income supplement to make ends meet in their golden years. 
Many make the connection between this trade-off, real estate investment, and community 
changes. In the words of Jennifer, 23  who reported moonlighting as a bartender to 
supplement the income she receives from her full-time consultant job:  
[The Keys are] changing. It’ll be interesting to watch. Real estate is being snapped 
up at exorbitant prices. So we’re losing some of that small town feel here. 
Especially the last couple of years and even more so since the hurricane last year. 
A lot of people that have lived here for generations are getting pushed out because 
they can’t afford to be here any longer….I mean, it’s being developed so quickly. 
More hotels, more condos, more second homes or third or fourth or fifth homes, in 
all of the lower Keys—or probably all the Florida Keys—but especially the lower 
Keys, that I think in another 10 years, there will have been some sort of major shift. 
There’s no workforce anymore. People here have to work two or three jobs. So I 
think that that’s already starting have a major impact.  
 
Most participants reported strong satisfaction with their community. It was nearly 
universally described as laid back and very often described as featuring people who were 
friendly, caring, and willing to lend a hand. Many participants analogized the Keys—or 
more specifically the island or area where they lived—to a small town. Yet this was 
countenanced by concerns about long-term trends of development, as well as the 
conversion from a small town residential model to a tourism and vacation rental economy 
that detracts from neighborliness and a sense of community. This was sometimes likened 
 
23  All participant names used herein are pseudonyms. In addition, some identifying information is 
intentionally vague to prevent identification in the small-community context.  
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to urbanization. Because most participants—including the few who were more positive 
about the effects of continued and rapid development—also recognized that tourism was 
the economic engine of the Keys, members of these communities seem to be presented 
with a sort of Hobson’s choice: accept tourism and its attendant development or risk losing 
the businesses and jobs upon which the community relies. 
In the words of Diane, a retired businesswoman and snowbird who split her time 
between a home up north and one in the Keys: 
[The] most important things [in local history] are bad things that happen. They’re 
mostly the tourist development. And it’s just too fast and too much and too much 
money. And I guess that happens in every coastal community. We once had a home 
[up north] and it’s the same thing: the little cottages and the farms get bought up by 
people with more money than they knew what to do with and…because your taxes 
went up so high, you can’t keep your farm and you sell out to somebody that builds 
a McMansion that they live in two weeks out of the year and…the whole 
character…changed…..And of course after the hurricane that’s worse [and it’s] just 
overall overpopulated way too much, way too soon and now with the destruction 
and the opportunities for more development I think it’s going to get worse. 
 
Part of Diane’s dismay about these changes seemed to be related to her strong sense 
of community: her house was completely destroyed by the storm and she appreciated the 
sense of community she discovered thereafter, with neighbors stepping up to help as she 
tried to rebuild. Like Jennifer, she expresses the pervasive fear of change and its local 
impacts. This includes the common theme of concern about whether the Keys and its 
housing stock can sustain the workforce necessary to provide public and private services: 
I’m afraid that it is going to be more occupied by more developers and more the 
people that are only interested in making money off what is dumped there and not 
providing homes. For the people that actually live there, they’re not going to have 
any service community left because you know, even 10 years ago, people couldn’t 
afford to, to work and live there, and now their rental homes are gone, and the trailer 
parks were low income. I mean, whoever thinks $1,500 a month is low-income 
rental when they pay eight bucks an hour. What is wrong with these people? 
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While these tensions over housing, cost, and the changes that they might occasion 
were common to long-term residents as well as new arrivals, the ongoing battle over what 
the character of the Keys extends beyond housing. Rather, a conflict over the basic sense 
that the lower Keys is a laid-back and tolerant yet hard-working place where elements of 
its uniqueness are cherished is exemplified by the so-called “chicken war.” Karen, a retiree 
who has lived in the Keys for over four decades (almost all of her adult life), describes it 
as follows:  
Well there’s wild Caribbean fowl around town—I mean we have them in the Winn 
Dixie [supermarket] parking lot too—but somebody was like we need to get rid of 
these chickens. And the locals were like, ‘Who are you to come in our town and 
tell us what to get rid of? We like our chickens.’ And so I guess they were hiring 
somebody with traps to trap them. And somebody was going around at night, locals, 
and they were, I don’t know if they were breaking the traps but they were setting 
the chickens free. 
 
George, a young father who was born in the Keys and is now raising a family there 
while working in fishing, elaborated on the depth of feelings about the chicken war: “there 
was lots of death threats.” Mary, an entrepreneur, mother, and local volunteer helped to 
explain that, like many local disputes, the chicken war was not about chickens per se but 
about community transition and conversion, as well as resistance: “I think it was symbolic 
almost, like you people…come in here and all this stuff you’re doing, who are you?”  
In short, according to this pool of participants two accounts of the Keys exist in 
tension: the more egalitarian version in which its amenities are considered sufficiently 
worthwhile to justify inconvenience and expense; and a more exclusive version in which 
tourist resorts, vacation rentals, and expensive second homes exist for a wealthy, transient 
population that expects sanitized comfort. In turn, this provokes concerns about both 
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community and the availability of a workforce to provide those comforts to others for 
wages that may be inadequate to provide for their own comfort locally.  
To be clear, a minority of participants disagreed. They saw tourism development as 
the natural and beneficial outcome of the growth trajectory of the Keys. Janet, who worked 
in real estate and was active in both the local Chamber of Commerce and the Tourism 
Development Council (TDC), explained her view:  
Yes they were trying to do a lot, mainly tourism…The TDC back then, they were 
trying to do a lot of tourism, to draw tourism, to keep the Keys stable financially. 
Because it is truly the tourism [that] pretty much runs the economy there and 
without the tourists coming it’s a domino effect….If they don’t have the tourists 
they don’t have the people to run the restaurants and stores and shops and if we 
don’t have that, then the people have to leave because they can’t get good 
jobs….The majority of my sales came from people who were tourists just like we 
[were originally], we came, we loved it, we couldn’t live without it and I sold the 
majority of my homes to the same people: they came, they loved it, they just had to 
have it, so the tourism was extremely important to me too for that reason. 
 
That Janet lost her home to Irma underscores the complexity of the relationships that 
participants had with tourism and development. While it is safe to say that most people 
expressed concerns about the accelerating rate of development as well as the type of 
intensive development they believe was occurring, many of these same people either came 
to the Keys as tourists or were wholly or partially dependent on tourism for their 
livelihoods. The key to the analysis is that it is less about whether tourism should continue 
and more about how tourism manifests in terms of cost of living and housing and how 
symbolic battles about tourism reflect the greater political economic context of the “who 
are the Keys for?” This sense of precarity that had existed for at least a decade was 
intensified due to Hurricane Irma, as the process of place conversion went into overdrive.  
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The Trauma Machine: the Storm Aftermath, Housing, and Rebuilding.   
All participants spoke about the trauma experienced during and after the storm, 
either personally or by reference to others. In nearly every case it was related to housing, 
bureaucracy, and the stress of rebuilding. Yet there was a qualitative difference between 
the trauma connected to the storm and the immediate aftermath, and the more severe trauma 
reported later. The causes of trauma in these periods also morphed from the storm’s 
destruction to the long grind of dealing with administrative bureaucracy.  
Stage 1: Evacuation, the Storm, and First Returns.  
The first discrete moment of stress described by many participants arose as Irma 
approached, things began to shut down, and the evacuation order was issued. Many 
participants recounted their struggle finding a place to go. The difficulties of trying to 
evacuate much of the state of Florida were on display. One parent reported driving the 
family north and being unable to find toilet paper at a rest stop until they reached the 
Washington, D.C. area. This emphasizes the incredible inconvenience of evacuation, but 
the ways that these stories were told was generally jovial. There seemed to be little 
continuing trauma from the process of evacuation itself. Many participants admitted that 
hurricanes were just part of life if you live in the Keys and, inconvenience notwithstanding, 
there was little attendant trauma absent extenuating circumstances.   
The experience of watching the storm approach did result in some psychological 
effects. In response to a general question about the source of feelings of future local 
uncertainty one participant who evacuated and returned to significant damage to their 
house said:  
[The sense of uncertainty] definitely has to do with Irma. Status is gun shy now. 
Right? Like if you notice when you walked in, I had the Weather Channel on and I 
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didn’t have it on for you, but I first thing I do when I wake up in the mornings is 
put the Weather Channel on like this, you with the car with the phobia,24 like I have 
that too like when my cell phone goes off [for the] notification [of] radar I run to it. 
I want to know which direction the rain’s coming from….It’s kind of like a tiny 
phobia I have…. 
 
This feeling was related to the uncertainty inherent in storm prediction, which was 
magnified due to the uncertainty about where the storm would land. Another participant 
commented on the spaghetti models that are often used to visualize likely hurricane paths: 
from a diffuse sense of risk that this visualization method promotes, her Irma experience 
now prompts a fear that one of the many computer-modeled lines could be headed for her. 
Others reported understandable hyper-attention to the Keys during the evacuation, in which 
they were transfixed by satellite maps, news reports, and any other sort of available 
information to understand what they might be coming back to.  
Yet like the continuing heightened attention or phobia reported by a few, most 
accounts of the storm itself or the process of evacuation were factual in nature and to the 
extent they involved stress this tended to focus on more mundane issues like the desire to 
not impose as a long-term houseguest or finding fuel or lodging on the road. This is not to 
say that these decisions were easy, but there was a significantly more positive attitude in 
how they were described compared to the stories that came later. For long-term residents, 
part of this seems related to past experiences with Hurricanes Georges and Wilma, which 
were much milder in effect than Irma and cultivated a hopeful sense that Irma would be 
more inconvenience than tragedy.25  
 
24 The author has a driving phobia and has not driven a car for years. This was discussed before the interview. 
  
25 Yet a different take on evacuation was reported among those with the longest range of experiential 
knowledge in the Keys. One participant reported that her husband had considered staying through the storm, 
a choice she vehemently opposed. A friend asked if he worked with the Bubbas, a colloquial term for 
members of multi-generational Keys-resident families that reflects something of the old boys club character 
of local governance. He did, and the friend advised her not to worry: they would set him straight. After 
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There was no lived precedent for the scale of destruction that participants 
encountered when they returned, and the tone of themes related to rebuilding turned 
quickly from jovial. Accounts of the moment of return and the aftermath become especially 
ominous in connection with mental health and well-being. As one participant who suffered 
minimal damage to his own residence but helped others with cleanup expressed: 
Before the hurricane, I was pretty much happy all the time. [The Keys were] 
uplifting and laid back and comfortable. I will tell you that since the hurricane it 
had a profound effect on my psyche….I’m a member of Alcoholics Anonymous. 
I’ve been sober for [many decades]. And right after the hurricane, I went to 
meetings twice a day for six weeks. Now, in normal time…I only go to AA 
meetings once or twice a week. But right after the hurricane, I needed structure in 
my life and I needed a place to go and be able to talk to people and commiserate 
and cry. Because it was utterly depressing. It was awful here for about six weeks. 
Right after the storm, and slowly but surely, we’ve been able to come out of that 
and turn this place around. The getting the trash out of here was a big deal. It took 
almost 120 days to get the majority of the debris that was torn down by the storm. 
They still have not cleaned out all of our canals… 
 
Much of the debris that was piled up to 15 feet high on the roadsides consisted of 
the remnants of people’s houses: a tangible reminder of the destruction was scattered across 
the landscape. Other participants commented on the filth and debris, both on land and in 
local waterways that before the storm had been a cherished part of the life. For example, 
one participant who away when the storm hit and whose house was largely spared serious 
damage recounted his drive down from the mainland about ten days after Irma: 
Driving down the Keys, [my] stomach just rolled over every mile. Seeing all the 
stuff that was laying beside the road, torn down houses, I saw more houses and stuff 
than I’ve ever seen before because all the trees were down. It was just a 




returning from work with the Bubbas he had changed his mind based on their advice and stories. They 
departed for the mainland shortly thereafter, emphasizing how lived experience with past storms can affect 
present experiences through the local vernacular of disaster. 
 126 
From these accounts it is evident that even those who got lucky suffered a sort of 
shock based on the destruction around them and a sense of empathy for those worse off. 
For those who suffered significant housing damage accounts of the weeks and months 
immediately after the storm were focused more explicitly on housing and habitation. One 
homeowner in his 60’s who lived in a camper outside of his house while repairing and 
cleaning up reported the formation of “Irma zombies” due to the overwhelming nature of 
what they encountered in his neighborhood upon return, and the realization of the long 
term, overwhelming nature of the path to recovery:  
Just the work that we put in right after the hurricane…cleaning up. I mean, it was 
just seven to seven, 12 hours a day and just working straight in the heat, and it was 
hot. It was just…people just kind of described…you hear people call it…Irma 
zombies, you’re an Irma zombie because you’re just kind of just don’t know what 
to do. I mean there was just so much stuff to do that we couldn’t do it all. 
 
Another homeowner who returned to find her house destroyed summarized the 
experience in a way that demonstrates some of the difference between learning of the loss 
of a house, the moment it is witnessed firsthand, and the process of grappling with the work 
to come.  
[Her partner] says that was the biggest thing for him with the loss of our house was 
because it had so many memories in it. And now they’re gone….I would have to 
say that it was a lot more devastating to either one of us than we expected. I think 
when we drove down, it’s like okay, so we lost the house. We’ll just build another 
one. You know, it’s still going to be where we go. But then when we actually got 
there and you’re in the midst of this mess it’s just like, oh, wow, and all the little 
things begin to sink in….I’m not sure I can put my finger on [it]. It’s just, for an 
analogy, and I don’t know if you’ve ever been there or not, but you talk and you 
read and you hear about the Vietnam Wall. But when you go stand there, there’s a 
physical reaction that you just do not expect. You don’t expect that big black cloud 
of depression to come over you. And, and I think this was a similar thing, there was 
like a physiological reaction to the whole devastation that we did not anticipate, or 
at least I did not. 
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Elaborating on the experience and the depth of feelings encountered upon return, she was 
also clear that this sort of effect while grappling with the enormity of the disaster aftermath 
was not unique to her, nor was her reaction the worst among her neighbors:  
There was a lot of depression….There was a lady on our street who actually had to 
be institutionalized…. [Two neighbors] went to her house to check on her and she’s 
just pacing up and down the floor, just pacing. And with this naked stare in her face 
saying, ‘I don’t know what I’m doing. I don’t know what I’m doing. I don’t know 
where I am. I don’t know what.’ And they ended up—her family was not around—
and they ended up taking her to Key West to the hospital and getting her admitted 
to a psychiatric unit. And this was all a result, all the result of Irma. That was just 
more than she [could] cope with on her own: the decision making on what do I do 
next? 
 
Stories of immediate post-disaster sadness, however, are typically mixed with praise 
for volunteer efforts and a sense of deep appreciation for the many charitable organizations 
and individuals who came to help. Accounts of the period immediately after the storm 
indicate a time that was hard and bewildering, but also inhered a sense of hope that 
moderated the feeling of trauma. What is most important about these accounts is that they 
provide a root for the later development of housing trauma: a backdrop upon which the 
long-term trajectory of collective trauma was already developing, and upon which cultural 
trauma would later manifest. 
Stage 2: The Frustration of Recovery and Rebuilding Sink In.   
In the first stage of hurricane experience—learning of the storm, evacuation for 
some and taking refuge for others, and the initial return—a few general themes reveal 
themselves. The first is that these are not emotionally neutral occurrences, and that personal 
housing experiences relate to the way people experienced the event. Based on common 
knowledge about disasters and other shocks, this should be wholly unsurprising. The next 
stage—grappling with an extended reality of disaster that persists long after government 
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and private relief has expired—sees the intensification of visceral reactions (i.e., Eyerman 
2015; Erickson 1991). Critically, the centrality of housing to these accounts strengthens as 
time wears on.  
As participants moved beyond the initial shock they began to identify culprits, 
including local government, banking and insurance entities, and various opportunists who 
they believe preyed on their economic and emotional vulnerability. This is in stark contrast 
to how participants tended to reflect on the official emergency response. Beyond small 
complaints about things like the long wait before they were allowed to return home, 
participants generally praised first responders who they understood had worked in less than 
ideal conditions. In short, it is important to read the accounts that follow not as the result 
of a blanket belief that government is worthless or as a condemnation of government 
workers or efforts, but rather pointed and detailed criticism of specific governmental 
practices that hindered recovery and caused trauma.  
The central thematic element at the intersection of housing and trauma was 
disappointed long-term expectations of recovery. This often reflected a mismatch between 
the expected time and effort of recovery, and what it actually entailed. For many it was 
driven by the magnitude of the storm at first, but after a while this changed: it was no longer 
the storm but institutional decisions made about their housing. The gradual conversion—
and the effects of people feeling like they were facing cleanup and repair on their own—is 
illustrated by this quote by a participant who began by noting his short-lived sense of relief 
when aerial photos of his island were finally were released.  
I looked down and there was a roof [on my house] and I said well there’s something 
to come back to, and we were pretty excited to say, take a pressure washer, we’ll 
wash out the house, we’ll chuck the sheet rock and get started. But then when we 
walk in the house and inside the house were things that were my neighbors’, that’s 
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when I was like wow, this is too much. I thought we’d just clean it up in a week or 
two. And I was pretty positive about the attitude but when you work ten days and 
you’re only six feet in the door. And it was hot. Brutal….And you realized as you 
drove back and forth around town that everybody was all messed up in some way. 
It was pretty rough. It certainly, instantly went to depression after about four weeks, 
and then I think now looking back on it I think everybody on Big Pine has PTSD. 
I know I do….It’s so frustrating that there’s so many suicides happening, there’s a 
lot. 
 
Like the description of the Irma zombies, this underscores how the initial hopefulness of 
recovery turned to bewildered resignation over time.  
Many participants recognized the mismatch between the expected and actual 
recovery times. For example, while describing the stress experienced by many who were 
returning to no place to live, no job or income, and possibly a fractured community, one 
participant commented about the three-month aid timeframe.  
Well, they knew they were coming back to nothing, right? And not only that, the 
worst part of it is for some reason, when you’re in a disaster, their limit is three 
months, right? They give you three months of help, and then they think we’re out 
of here. So everybody left, the churches left, the Salvation Army was out of here. 
They were here for the most intense part, which was just coming back in. But after 
three months, they felt there. Everybody left. The tents went down. Everything went 
out of here. 
 
This feeling of abandonment included a feeling of being ignored and preyed upon. 
Participants bristled at they felt was a preference for the Key West tourism industry over 
the needs of residential areas, including a much faster cleanup response. Many complained 
about being treated as a spectacle as they tried to piece their lives and property back 
together, and one participant complained that scrappers from the mainland would root 
through their belongings, taking what they wanted and making a mess that residents would 
have to clean up or face fines. As the extent of the aftermath and recovery exceeded 
expectations, resentment about the involvement of the outside world began to grow. 
Cultural trauma was forming.  
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One participant gave this description of her neighborhood a little over three months 
after the hurricane made landfall, the same time that others notes that the aid organizations 
were departing. Like the others, it emphasizes the sense of despondency that can arise when 
the assumption is that things are back to normal when they are not.   
[I feel] sad that everything…happened like it did. Sad not only for us but a lot of 
other people who lost everything, who had no insurance whatsoever so they had 
nowhere to go. No money. No RV to stay in. There were people living in tents, 
people living in their cars. At Christmas, and this is really sad it makes me tear up 
every time, but there were people right around the corner from where we lived, 
living in tents, there were a bunch of appliances on the road that were ruined and 
they smelled horrible because like all [the] appliances…there was food left in them 
[and] we didn’t have power for three weeks. And the little kids were Santa Claus 
age and they went out and decorated the appliances so Santa Claus could find 
them…because they were in tents they didn’t think he would find them because the 
house was gone. It’s really sad, my first thought sometimes of all of that. 
 
Stage 3: The Long Slog Through Bureaucracy: Cumulative Trauma and Housing.  
Why did trauma develop in this way among this group of participants? First, of 
course, is the exhausting reality of being displaced from home. Among this participant pool 
were many people who used or borrowed campers for temporary shelter, some who stayed 
with friends for an extended period, some who moved away, and many who were still 
experiencing housing uncertainty two years after Irma. Many of those who found a way to 
stay in the area and rebuild lived in substandard housing. One participant reported during 
our phone interview a year after Irma that he could see through the front and back walls of 
his house: he called this his air conditioning. This forced many people into temporary, 
trying, or illegal circumstances: another participant described his illegally parked trailer 
that lacked potable water or a working toilet as the one you get when FEMA rejects your 
request. He also feared that the county would discover and evict him, at which point he 
would likely have to leave the area. Time is fundamental here, as frustration developed 
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from delay after delay. Those who were displaced or living in a damaged structure 
commonly reported the traumatic effects of delays in the process of rebuilding and 
obtaining housing. There were a variety of reasons cited for these delays, each of which 
was sufficiently common among participants to suggest that a complex of interrelated and 
identifiable sources of frustration, disappointment, and fear arose well after the storm.  
The first and most commonly cited theme involved frustration with local 
government; specifically with building codes and inspections. Recent scholarship has 
argued that building codes tend to be associated with higher housing costs, and it has been 
suggested that in the non-disaster context that “building code violations are likely to burden 
and punish poor homeowners who cannot afford the required repairs and to hurt poor 
renters who cannot afford the higher rental prices charged by landlords who pass on the 
costs” (Bartram 2019a:942). The literature likewise suggests that the aggregate impact of 
building code enforcement tends to support the interests of growth machine to the detriment 
of those less financially able to quickly remediate issues (Bartram 2019a, 2019b).  
For some in the lower Keys a new, hurricane-resistant building code foreclosed the 
opportunity to rebuild. This is because the owner of a destroyed mobile or modest home 
must rebuild to the new code. For example, ground level homes must be elevated and this 
requires either making a soil mound or more commonly reinforced concrete stilts. For less 
affluent people without insurance this may be impossible. Moreover, even for those with 
insurance, the cost may significantly exceed the amount of available proceeds because 
those are keyed to the value of the destroyed home, or might be unavailable because of 
delays in the insurance adjustment process.  
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Building codes and disaster have co-evolved throughout western history: “building 
codes, as a general rule, followed disastrous fires, becoming more refined with each one” 
(Davis and Ryan 2020:212). From a fire in ancient Rome in 4 AD to responses to the 
transgressions of Mrs. O’Leary’s infamous cow in the Chicago fire in 1871 and beyond, 
the model by which space may legally be produced is forged in the fire of disaster (Davis 
and Ryan 2020). Each of these disaster-responsive building code updates and innovations 
refined the ways that buildings were designed, constructed, and used, even in times of 
relative calm. Building codes therefore represent an element of the production of disaster 
space that regulate sociospatial trends both before and after disaster, demonstrating their 
reactive creation and formative nature.  
Coupled with the pre-Irma antipathy towards county building code enforcement 
related by a number of participants due to what they view as overreach, there was an 
overwhelming sense that the manner of permitting and code enforcement after Irma was 
the central factor that exacerbated post-storm trauma. Compared to the studies of building 
code enforcement that Bartram (2019a, 2019b) conducted in Chicago absent a disaster, 
given the scope of destruction in the lower Keys, permitting—which bestows the right to 
legally rebuild—gained special significance. To illustrate the many stories that laid the 
cause of mental health issues at the feet of county bureaucracy, one participant related his 
astonishment at a well-known story of a murder-suicide.  
What you found that’s strange in the Keys was, everyone was, we’re in the Keys 
we’re happy people, easy go lucky kind of personality down here and everyone 
takes everything in stride. People live down here without air conditioning and 
they’re thrilled. They don’t go ‘woe is me.’ They go ‘look at me, I’m living the 
dream.’ And for them to pull the trigger, is stunning. And the people who did it, 
you’re like what the heck, they were doing good and on their way back to rebuilding 
and yeah, just got a new job and he killed his wife and himself. Holy crap. 
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When asked what might have contributed to this situation, he offered this long and 
detailed statement outlining the tenor of local bureaucracy, its associated inconveniences, 
and the dire consequences for those who are the least able to self-finance a recovery effort.   
I have an answer, personally for me it was permitting and [the county]. I lay it all 
on the desk of [the county]. Oh, absolutely. They have made it so difficult to 
rebuild, incredibly monumental incompetence in the [county] building department. 
Not by the inspectors, but the people who run the department are incredibly 
incompetent. And you have make seven trips up here, just to turn in an application, 
and each time you go you get told a totally different thing, that’s a 45 minute drive, 
and some people have to work five days a week so they only get one shot at going 
up there. And then they get told if you didn’t record this at the records office and 
we got to got to the records office and the records office says we don’t need a copy 
of that, we need a copy of the other thing, and they send you back to them and they 
tell you sorry I meant to tell you this one, and then you gotta go back to the records 
office, back and forth, back and forth….  
 
And there’s a lot of people that went to a meeting with the county when they came 
out and said they were going to hold a permit meeting: the…suicide, murder-suicide 
if you call it that. [County officials] came to Big Pine and said we’re going to hold 
a meeting where you can come, get some help, get moving quicker. And we’re all 
excited about 250, 300 people showed up to this thing at a church. And the first 
thing all they did was, spout about…here’s the seven tables you need to go to, here’s 
the one where if you’ve done illegal work, you can turn yourself in, here’s the table 
where if you’ve got a permit, but…it’s being reviewed you can talk to them about 
it, here’s a table where if you want to fill out a permit we can help you fill out one. 
Of course, you know, 75 people in line for a four-hour process. You’re not going 
to get it done in the next two hours. And the one guy who went to that meeting, felt 
hopeless and he went home and his wife had facial pain, from muscle spasms, 
special, some kind of disease, and she said I quit, and he said I quit, and shot her, 
and he shot the dog, and he killed himself. 
 
While this is one of the more stunning and saddening accounts, this thematic concern 
was common among those with severe housing damage and recognized by many others 
who did not. Participant accounts like this were supported by media reports that the area’s 
already remarkably high suicide rate doubled in the first half of 2018 (e.g., Klinenger 
2018). In fact, a nursing professor and suicide expert who is quoted by Klinenger (2018) 
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remarks that after a disaster there is a honeymoon period in which the community comes 
together, but thereafter mental health issues begin to arise.   
This participant, like others, is careful to not lay blame at the feet of any individual, 
instead focusing on the system through which decisions were made and the runaround that 
it created. Overall, most participants were charitable with individual public employees, 
even when they described personally frustrating interactions and systemic bureaucratic 
issues. Close to the surface of these accounts lies the tacit understanding that many of these 
frustrations do not apply to those with the means to hire someone to deal with the 
paperwork and other administrative requirements, especially if this is a second home and 
they have another place to live in the meanwhile. Many participants explained that it is 
wise to hire private insurance adjusters, building inspectors, or contractors who would deal 
with the county for a premium, assuming you have the means to do so.  
For the rest, the requirement to conform to new building codes is similar to an 
observation made by Tierney (2015) on the connections between neoliberal ideologies and 
discourses of disaster relief and resilience in Hurricane Katrina. She argues, based in part 
on the work of Adams (2012) and Gotham (2015), that survivors were required to take an 
entrepreneurial approach to disaster relief, advocating for themselves as if they were 
consumer advocates in order to be considered “worthy” of relief efforts and aid that should 
be focused on helping all victims. While these examples of the neoliberal “privatization of 
recovery efforts” expose many flaws in the disaster recovery system that can lead to 
inequality (Tierney 2015:1338), opinions on bureaucracy in the lower Keys reveal another 
force that may likewise suborn the creation and reproduction of inequality.  
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I call this the requirement of “coming to the bureaucracy,” which is less overtly 
entrepreneurial and less dependent on public-private partnerships than Tierney (2015) 
describes. Rather, it requires that individuals either hire professionals or operate as skilled 
bureaucrats, deftly navigating time-consuming, complicated, and frustrating administrative 
requirements that may have existed pre-disaster but only mature into their most trying form 
through disaster. The consequence for failure is homelessness or worse. This reflects the 
break—in this context—with some elements of contemporary neoliberalism like anti-
regulatory tendencies and small government. Alternatively, it may reflect the long-term 
consequences of austerity such as underfunding and deferment of social programs (Peck 
2012), along with a rule structure that rewards wealth (Tierney 2015). Some participants 
alleged intentionality in how permitting and code enforcement took place after Irma. They 
argued that the slow pace was intended to let houses rot so they would be easier to condemn 
and demolish, or that through these codes the county was expressing a preference for more 
substantial, and expensive, structures. 
Intriguingly, participants almost universally expressed support for building back 
stronger, even while they decried the uneven nature of building code impacts. It is 
understandable that disaster experience would lead people to support solid construction, 
even though they appreciate the injustice that may result from a combination of building 
codes and bureaucracy. Yet the process of county permitting—the imposition of a 
bureaucratic structure—was a central factor in the development of collective and cultural 
trauma: the sense of the failure of those in positions of authority to uphold the covenant to 
protect the public (Eyerman 2015). People felt abandoned or, even worse, that there were 
active efforts to get rid of them by making a bad situation unbearable. In any case, they felt 
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dispensable (Pellow 2018). A perverse element of this is that some of rules that contributed 
to bureaucratic post-disaster trauma and inequality—like building codes—were 
specifically formulated to improve the disaster experience.  
Notwithstanding variations in adoption and enforcement cultures among officials 
tasked with building code compliance, at least one modern infrastructural analysis of the 
intersection between resilience building codes emphasizes their public safety function and 
encourages the use of incentives rather than penalties (Davis and Ryan 2020). Following 
this path may have allowed a more productive and helpful interaction with code 
enforcement in the near term after Irma. This is especially important because of the risk of 
mold and the continued effects of exposure to the elements if repairs are not prosecuted 
quickly. Taking this a step further, it may be worthwhile to extend the public safety window 
to many months after disaster rather than just the moment of impact, as well as to pivot 
from an adversarial permitting relationship to one that specifically considers housing 
inequality formation (Pellow 2000; Bartam 2019a, 2019b).26  
 
26 This reflects what one prominent legal geographer refers to as “precariousness in property law,” meaning 
“the work that [real] property does in structuring asymmetric relations of vulnerability and privilege” 
(Blomley 2020:5). This provides a potentially fruitful opportunity to link the geography of property 
ownership and its relationships—legal and otherwise—that help to structure our relationships with property 
and each other. It also emphasizes the universality of vulnerability and that all interests in property, including 
ownership, may quickly turn precarious due to a momentary social or financial crisis (Blomley 2020). In the 
case of disaster zones, reflections on the precarity of property should also include socio-environmental crises 
and the legal structures in place to contend with these, even in advance of an event. Another intriguing 
possibility for reform involves what the National Institute of Standards and Technology refers to as 
immediate occupancy building (Sattar et al. 2018). While this is a technological design approach that tends 
not to specifically integrate questions of inequality to any great extent, immediate occupancy building codes 
would partially shift the focus of codes to whether a building would have continued functionality after a 
disaster. This is particularly important due to the relationships between long-term displacement (even if it 
turns out to be temporary) and trauma, but would benefit from a more explicit focus on assisting marginalized 
or otherwise vulnerable segments of the population. It would also reflect a widely held opinion among 
participants that having more local people on the ground immediately after a disaster would assist with the 
recovery process.   
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While I will outline two specific elements of building codes and permitting—known 
as the 50% Rule and the Rate of Growth Ordinance (ROGO)—later, there are other ways 
that institutional impediments to recovery led to trauma. While participants typically were 
pleased with private, charitable efforts to assist, the same cannot be said about their 
interactions with insurers, financial institutions that held mortgages, and official or quasi-
official organizations that were tasked with providing post-storm assistance. As hinted at 
previously, insurance factored into this equation, as did interactions with holders of 
mortgages, as well as assistance from FEMA. While each of these was cited less frequently 
than bureaucracy, they were fairly common and often thematically connected with trauma 
and displacement. 
The first theme that arose within these fields was a complaint that FEMA and other 
official sources of aid offered, in the words of one participant, an “a false sense of security, 
a false sense of hope.” Many participants related stories of waiting in the heat outside 
FEMA tents to apply for aid from it and other government agencies, faced with a litany of 
frustrations including: insufficiently trained aid workers; temporary housing being issued 
in a haphazard fashion or at great distance; and eventual assistance falling far short of what 
was promised and needed. Some participants considered the process of applying for aid a 
waste of time and said that if they experienced a future hurricane they would not bother 
even if they qualified. Importantly, these interactions stretched well beyond the immediate 
aid period, with many participants reporting protracted fights that resulted in denial or 
paltry amounts of aid. 
With respect to insurance and mortgage holders, many participants cited delays and 
lack of communication between insurance and financial institutions as an additional source 
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of delay and frustration that was exacerbated by their living circumstances. The process of 
haggling, the denial of claims, and the time it took to resolve issues each became a central 
source of frustration for some of those who suffered the worst damage. For many residents, 
repairs could not begin without insurance and mortgage bank approval so they became 
symbols of traumatic inertia. These frustrations also include the inability to find licensed 
contractors who were available and able to work. Delays in insurance adjustment and 
payment meant that those who could afford to self-finance repairs were first in line for 
contractors. Those who depended on insurance often waited months and in some cases 
more than a year to simply find a contractor who would return their calls, even after any 
insurance issues had been resolved.  
Some participants related how they had to prosecute repairs themselves—if they had 
relevant construction and building skills—or undertake extraordinary steps to obtain help 
given the lack of contractors and laborers. One participant went so far as to provide living 
space in her home for a local homeless man who happened to have needed building skills. 
Along with advertisements for law firms seeking clients who had suffered hurricane 
damage (presumably to sue insurers), billboards and smaller signs reminding the public 
that unlicensed contracting is a felony in Florida were ubiquitous after Irma. While there 
are many good reasons for contractor licensing including minimizing predatory behavior, 
they also contributed to the difficulties in finding necessary help. Another complicating 
factor for those with mortgages is that insurance proceeds were sometimes held by their 
financial institution until they demonstrated proof of repair (i.e. progress payments), adding 
additional time and headaches, and again giving contractors reason to prioritize those who 
could pay with cash in hand.  
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In total, the process that ground down homeowners started with the need to rebuild 
to the new, hurricane-resistant code. For some, that was end of the road: they were simply 
unable to repair based on a lack of funds and insurance. For others who struggled to rebuild, 
the bureaucracy was exacerbated by the need to obtain the insurance proceeds necessary to 
purchase materials or pay contractors, the need to satisfy the requirements of the mortgage 
bank, and the need for a contractor who would do the work in many cases on credit while 
competing with others who could offer cash in hand. This added additional steps, expense, 
and delay to the process of recovery; the disappointment of this process and its seeming 
absurdity led to one participant opining that “all insurance is a scam.”  
Some participants who suffered minor damage reported little friction with their 
insurance company and seemed pleased, while a few reported tactics to avoid contact with 
insurance such as not filing minor claims or hiring private adjusters. Another reminded me 
that it is nearly impossible to insure a mobile home for much, reflecting what Sullivan 
(2018) describes as a special state of precarity for manufactured home residents. This is 
because mobile homes are often treated under the law as personal property like 
automobiles, as opposed to real estate, and consequently are subject to different financing 
and insurance regimes (Sullivan 2018). Accordingly, there are portions of the population 
for which insurance that is adequate to rebuild to the new code is simply unavailable. 
According to residents, many others whose homes were paid off chose not to insure due to 
cost. Although opinions about the insurance and mortgage process differed among 
participants, it is clear that they combined with bureaucracy to develop an uneven terrain 
of recovery. While multi-faceted, this runaround is fundamentally an administrative 
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mismatch between what is required to rebuild and recover, and what is available to rebuild 
and recover. 
There also was a general recognition among many participants that renters may have 
had a worse time in certain ways, notwithstanding that they did not have to deal with many 
of the frustrations that homeowners did. More to the point, this worse time was due to the 
same reason that they did not have to deal with these frustrations: because of their more 
precarious relationship to their residences (Blomley 2020; Desmond 2012) some renters 
returned to nothing and had no property-based reason to stay. For those who did return, a 
few stories offered by participants discussed issues with landlords. These include a landlord 
who used the storm as an excuse to throw the participant’s friend’s belongings on the street, 
and the story of a renter participant who described how her landlord over-promised and 
under-performed, leaving her family in extended limbo before they finally decided to seek 
alternative housing. Even assuming the best intentions—that this was the result of the 
landlord falling victim to the same disappointed post-storm expectations as other 
homeowners—these examples illustrate the special precarity that applies to renters, 
whether they fall victim to intentional misdeeds or the simple misunderstanding of 
landlords who find themselves in their own bewildering circumstance.  
These themes represent a variety of factors that foster displacement in the immediate 
sense, may promote displacement over the months and years following storm, and caused 
participants to question whether they would have it in them to stay through another 
hurricane and recovery. This is an important element that few disaster studies capture: that 
exhausting, disappointing, and unfulfilling recoveries may fracture the desire to stay during 
the rebuilding process. Like metal that has been fatigued by twisting in the wind, these 
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fractures may only mature into a break with the arrival of the next severe gust. Having 
lived through the stress of one recovery, some participants explained that they may give up 
the next time rather than experience it again. This suggests that the study of disaster 
displacement may benefit from a long-term view that considers trends across multiple 
events in addition to linking them to other local sociospatial processes. It also suggests that 
the onerous rules and regulations put in place of expectation of disaster may serve the 
purposes of real estate investors and speculators to the detriment of existing residents.  
Connections to Capital: Speculation, Investment, and Displacement. 
Complex Displacement and Speculative Investment.   
It should come as little surprise that hurricanes and their aftermaths are traumatic. 
What may be surprising is that in the context of the lower Keys the cumulative effect of a 
complex of administrative, bureaucratic, and financial elements seemed to drive trauma to 
a greater extent than the experience of the storm. While participants expressed some 
reservations and fear that developed from the storm itself—and every participant said that 
they would follow the next evacuation order—it was the grinding weeks, months, and in 
some cases years of cleanup, uncertainty, rebuilding, and precarity that morphed into the 
greatest sense of trauma.  
In this section, I will build upon these observations to explore how these delays and 
their human cost may be related to real estate speculation and circuits of capital, and how 
together these lead to displacement through a combination of increased cost of living and 
decreased will (or ability) to stay. This thematic element was originally developed in 
interviews: it was described or alluded to by many participants, especially those whose 
residences suffered the most damage. Triangulating their accounts with legal and media 
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research—particularly into county explanatory documents, local newspapers, and 
conversations with local experts—I develop some of the roots of longer term displacement 
that illustrate how post-storm trauma may both be the result of, and support, the interests 
of speculative investment.    
The model of displacement observed in the lower Keys deserves some attention. A 
couple of participants were forced to leave the Keys, many more were still unsettled nearly 
two years after Irma, and at least half of the participants had been displaced from their 
residence for many months after the storm. This suggests that rather than a linear “great 
climate migration” model that is visualized as a linear process of migration out of the area, 
the post-Irma experience is better understood as out-migration, in-migration, and a 
significant but underexplored process of migration within the area: local population churn 
(Fussell and Elliott 2009; Curtis et al. 2015; Gould and Lewis 2017, 2018a). It also suggests 
that population dynamics and housing dynamics are closely related: housing precarity and 
instability may result in the undercounting of the number of people actually displaced as 
people find shelter with friends and relatives, live in temporary trailers or campers, or in 
tents or outdoors.  
These observations help to explain the wildly different estimates produced by 
University of Florida demographers that were widely quoted in the media (i.e. Associated 
Press 2018; Goodhue 2018; Rayer and Wang 2018) and participants. When asked what she 
thought about the estimate of a population loss between 3-4% suggested by these reports, 
long-time Big Pine Key resident Sarah simply responded “Lies. Yeah. I think that’s a lie. 
Now when they’re talking about Key West, 4% maybe.” The demographers were 
measuring population loss from the county as a whole, including more affluent and less 
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damaged areas, and evidently did not account for replacement.27 Although the study did 
differentiate between some incorporated towns and their population loss, local media 
reported no specific estimates for Big Pine, Cudjoe, and the other hardest hit areas (e.g., 
O’Hara 2018). What participants seemed to be observing were shifts in the composition of 
their communities in real time. This includes people in substandard housing or no housing 
at all, people who moved elsewhere in the Keys, people who left the Keys, and the many 
new people who moved in to replace them.  
Taking their diverse observations in total, the teachers who I purposively sampled 
to help with the question of localized displacement supported these conclusions. With no 
statistical data available and strong variation in estimates of population loss among from 
academic sources, local media, and participants, I thought that educators could provide 
insight into what had happened to local working families, or at least those with school age 
children. Moreover, media reports suggested that that overall enrollment in local schools 
had dropped, but that that drop was concentrated in Key West and Stock Island, which 
suffered relatively mild Irma impacts compared to the areas hardest hit up the island chain 
(O’Hara 2018). These puzzling results, coupled with observations of the teachers about 
their class composition tend to support the idea of complex migration and churn. 
Unfortunately, they raise more questions than they answer.28 In the words of an elementary 
school teacher, when asked if her school had lost students after Irma: 
It was funny. We didn’t notice a lot of [that], and I was thinking about this 
earlier…we kept getting students. And so in my mind, with us not being able to 
 
27 This is not to suggest that 4% population loss due to a natural disaster is minor in any way. To put it in 
perspective, one study (Meléndez and Hinojosa 2017) estimated that the first-year population loss in Puerto 
Rico due to Hurricane Maria would be between 2% and 4% overall.  
 
28 An additional line of inquiry, about the intersection of paid care work and disaster, also arose during my 
interviews with educators. While this is not included in this chapter for the sake of parsimony, some 
preliminary observations are included in Appendix B.  
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find a place ourselves to afford I kept thinking, where are these people living? Why 
are they moving here after we just went through a hurricane like, where are they 
finding a place to live? Right? So I personally noticed a slight influx. But it was 
like [the] new parents [had] a much higher income level. So I don’t know if they 
just could afford to buy in and bought but I personally noticed an influx and I said, 
I remember thinking more than once, I was so frustrated where are they living? 
How are they finding a place to live? 
 
Her observations are telling: she noticed people coming in from out of state 
immediately after the hurricane, and they tended to be in a higher income bracket. Another 
teacher estimated that she lost about 15% of her students for the school year after Irma but 
the next year about half of those who had left had returned. In short, the results overall hint 
at a series of population flows within the Keys that occurred between islands and in stages 
over time. One of these may have been a flow out of Key West and Stock Island, which 
suffered milder storm impacts but already had the highest housing costs. More affluent 
people from these areas may have moved up the Keys to previously affordable areas, 
displacing less affluent people in a process akin to neighborhood gentrification within a 
city. Another flow may have been people moving in from the mainland. While available 
information is too thin to hypothesize any concrete typology for post-Irma migration, it is 
intriguing to consider from the whole of the collected data and reports that there may be a 
classed patterns of out-migration, in-migration, and internal migration that would not be 
captured by county-level or even city-level statistics. The participant statement that official 
estimates of migration were “lies” may be an offshoot of a generalized sense of frustration 
that arises from a mismatch between experiential units of analysis and those used by 
academics.  
Whatever their precise form, displacement and cost of living in the lower Keys 
reflect an overall development trajectory towards wealth and tourism that seemed to 
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intensify after a hurricane. Much like the 1935 hurricane and the New Deal response quite 
literally paved the way for automobile traffic by destroying the railroad causeway to Key 
West, the 2017 hurricane and the official response seem to many to have set the course for 
reconfiguration and intensification of land use. Yet in some ways this course was set 
decades before the storm by preparedness and resilience initiatives. These include a change 
to the building codes colloquially called the 50% Rule, which says that if your property is 
more than 50% damaged (by value and repair cost) for any reason (disaster, house fire, 
termites, or otherwise), you must rebuild to the new hurricane resistant code. They also 
include a development limitation called the Rate of Growth Ordinance, which was passed 
decades before Hurricane Irma to limit development to ensure a safe evacuation of the 
islands.   
Each of these was developed well in advance of Hurricane Irma for the purpose of 
ensuring public safety through what I would describe as the production of disaster space. 
The production of space that is regulated by these rules occurs within the planning phase 
and the consequences may be felt both before and after disaster and tend to encourage 
capital intensification and accumulation. They also have their distinctive logic: in addition 
to have an independent public safety justification, they rely on the logic of protection from 
nature rather than protection of nature.29 They also reveal how the production of disaster 
space may deviate from key assumptions about the operation of neoliberal markets and the 
state, such as limited public regulation and market-based solutions (Peck 2012). Because 
they certainly conform to some other assumptions of the neoliberal ideological frame—
 
29 Moreover, if building codes and building limitations may be analogized to a property tax that increases 
private cost for some public benefit (i.e. public protection from extreme events), they may connect with 
scholarship on how property taxes sometimes operate as drivers of sociospatial inequality (i.e. Martin 2019; 
Tapp and Kay 2019). 
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notably the preference for market-based property valuation after a storm, an acceptance of 
a globalized approach to capital, and imposition of requirements that only the wealthy may 
be able to satisfy (Tierney 2015)—it does not represent a full break from neoliberalism but 
rather a modification that may be necessary to understand the disaster experience across 
time.  
“Geography and Money”: Mechanisms of Speculation and Displacement.    
A substantial majority of participants expressed concerns about the intensification 
of development after Irma, the loss of affordable housing (or in the local parlance 
“workforce housing”), and the impact of speculative investment on each. While the 
specifics of population displacement may be somewhat unclear, there was broad general 
agreement that it was occurring and about its roots: real estate speculation that preyed on 
the precarity and trauma of the process of rebuilding and recovery and priced out residents. 
After discussing the loss of working professionals from the area, one participant described 
the mechanism by which housing is removed from the market.   
And…that’s the workforce housing shortage is, [when they] leave someone buys 
up the lot no matter what the condition of the house is. They just pay whatever price 
it is. They’ll come in from Brazil and buy six of them, they don’t care. They’re just 
trying to get money out of Brazil and buy it in America. So now that lot is no longer 
rentable or buildable, and…you can’t live there. So the number of homes that 
people can compete for, to live in, is getting smaller and the prices are going up 
because of supply and demand. When there’s a shortage the prices go up. So now 
you have vacationers coming down, who want to come down for six months and 
they rent the house for six months and pay four grand a month. The local person 
wants to rent it for $1,800 and can’t afford it. So now they have to leave. 
 
Other participants reflected this sentiment in a variety of ways, including how it has 
accelerated since Irma. In the words of a different participant: 
Now I think just like I said, I wish they had better control over the 
overdevelopment….I mean, growth is not a bad thing. You have to have growth, 
but a good pace would be better. I think that the hurricane itself, like I said, has 
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opened the way for opportunists. There are a lot of people that are manipulating the 
system to work in their favor. 
 
The battle over development also manifests in perceptions of official involvement. 
Each of the accounts related here reflects the continued concern over local development 
trajectories that began well before Irma and acknowledges that the hurricane opened the 
door to a different kind and intensity of opportunism. Similarly, other accounts link the 
overall frustration with the county and a perceived preference for large-scale tourism and 
resort development with the long-term processes of displacement. In the words of one 
participant who had suffered a complete loss of her home and business but was trying to 
start over and rebuild in the Keys nearly two years after Irma: 
Well, I’ve seen the continued proliferation of bad money winning out with 
development. You know, you can buy your way through things. I’ve seen it on my 
own street, and I’ve seen it, it’s very public, a lot of times [when it happens to 
others] it’s just like…you know, move on, nothing happens. I have been at the 
mercy of the other end of it where…government goes for the low hanging fruit. 
Well, they got to do something and my…those people over there…they’re easy 
pickings over there. Let’s see what they got going on their property.  
 
Others used this frame of reference as a way to explain the difference in recovery 
for those in different socioeconomic situations. A different participant who had lost her 
home and business and was still in the process of rebuilding nearly two years later 
described this comparison.  
A lot of them were able to use the extra money that they had while we were waiting 
for insurance monies to rebuild our homes. And they were able to get to the 
contractors first because they had cash where we were still waiting for our 
settlements and it kind of, you started watching these houses come up and rise from 
the ashes and you’re still sitting in shit. 
 
When asked for the reason for skyrocketing prices, she agreed that it was because of 
speculation, which helped to explain why there were no bargain properties available when 
she checked shortly after Irma, notwithstanding the number of people that had departed 
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and the terrifying nature of the hurricane. Overall, the gist was that outside speculators 
were buying every lot they could for inflated prices and they, along with wealthy locals, 
were able to overcome housing issues less stressfully than the average pre-Irma resident. 
Another participant who had also lost her home—this time a rental residence—and had to 
live with friends after the storm for nearly a year put it this way:  
Housing became ridiculous. People were ending leases just to take advantage of 
[that] fact…and they were doubling rent almost. So it made it impossible to afford 
anything. I mean, for us to rent a house it was, the minimum was $3,000. More than 
one whole paycheck for me…but they did it to everybody. So…that was really 
frustrating. Or people were trying to sell homes…as is for $300,000 and half the 
house is missing. I mean, because there was nowhere to live like, you know, so just 
to see people trying to take advantage of that situation. 
 
Importantly, in this description “half the house is missing” implies that the house is 
so damaged that in addition to the lot price, using the property for housing would require 
demolition and removal of the remaining half, and then construction of a wholly new 
building that is in compliance with the new building code. This is an expensive and time-
consuming process, and one that is likely beyond the means of many working-class 
residents. Although she mentioned supply and demand as a precipitating factor 
immediately after the storm, when asked who she thought was trying to take advantage, 
she offered that it was likely that seasonal residents and possibly local realtors were to 
blame.   
Many participants drew connections between this speculative conversion, the long-
term pressures on those who wanted to rebuild, and mental trauma. One participant who 
was concerned with the loss of her community and the long-term mental health effects 
chalked these up to the pressures of the real estate market.  
There was some help. But it was…a very fearful thing when you don’t know if 
somebody is going to all of a sudden take your property away from you. You know, 
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we live very simply down here and most of the people were…retirement age. You 
just keep going.  A lot of it seems to me that there are a lot of situations could have 
been reconstructed very easily without too much money and it seemed like they 
were coming in with…people thinking that they were going to get some financial 
help from the different agencies, but instead they condemned things. Instead of 
saying, ‘well, this is really not as bad…maybe we could give you a little 
money’….Instead of that it was ‘off with their heads’…and that’s when people 
started to get really mentally sick from it. 
 
She also was careful to trace the route of changes that she has seen and expects in 
the area to broader socio-political trends that were catalyzed be the storm: 
It’s all the politics. It’s always that way. I think that the commissioners, previous 
commissioners felt that this was going to be an area for the very rich, that they were 
going to make this scenario for the very rich….But they were not interested in 
preserving it, they were interested in making money with it. And I’ve sat through a 
lot of county commission meetings….There’s no housing for people, then we have 
no idea what’s going to happen to the community until they have affordable 
housing. And the community is made up of people who are only temporarily here 
for short times…second and third homes. I live in an area…that’s all working class 
and it was saved in the storm. It wasn’t hit as badly as Big Pine and those houses. 
If…somebody owned the house there, the price of my house probably doubled in 
value in through a tragedy. 
 
Whether or not the county commissioners or other local officials have these designs 
on the area is, of course, unknown to anyone but them. But the impacts of various efforts 
were summarized by one participant when asked about what led to differences in disaster 
experience: “geography and money.” Pressures on housing got so bad that while I was in 
the Keys a primary topic of conversation—perhaps the primary topic of conversation—
was the fear that after Hurricane Irma there were not enough workers to provide public 
services and work in tourism. What might be known as affordable housing elsewhere is, in 
this area, usually referred to as workforce housing.  
Discussions of affordable or workforce housing very often turned to the problem of 
keeping workers in the Keys, rather than having to bus down resort workers from the 
mainland or simply doing without. The overwhelming use of the term workforce housing 
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in many participant interviews, as well as in the media and government communications, 
suggests a certain working class precarity: that rather than being indispensable (Pellow 
2018) less affluent inhabitants of the Keys are expected to serve some broader economic 
purpose in order to stay. Recognition of the lack of affordable housing due to cost of living 
and the resulting labor shortage illustrates another dominant theme in the lower Keys. This 
is the concern that the amenities presented by the area may, through cost of living and 
environmental degradation, threaten the long-term residential viability of the area. 
Hurricanes are commonly recognized as contributors to the conversion of housing 
into a form that the workforce simply cannot afford on prevailing wages, even for relatively 
well-paid professionals like civil servants. They also contribute to the development of 
trauma that over the course of one storm, or many, may encourage the less affluent to leave. 
Yet hurricane preparedness initiatives typically do not foreground this class-based 
consequence of disaster. In fact, in some cases they appear to accomplish the opposite as 
they incentivize land use intensification, liquidity, and speculation. Two of these that exist 
for the purpose of disaster preparedness are the 50% Rule and the Rate of Growth 
Ordinance. 
Example 1: The 50% Rule.  
The 50% Rule is the colloquial term for a feared regulation that requires that 
buildings that are substantially damaged must be brought into compliance with new 
hurricane resistant building codes, including elevating the structure to a height specified 
by its location on flood maps. While old buildings are grandfathered and do not have to be 
renovated to the new code, this changes if they are substantially damaged. Substantially 
damaged means, at the risk of oversimplification, that repair costs would exceed 50% of 
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the market value of the structure before the damage occurred. Beyond its topography and 
weather, one of the more unique things about the Keys is that a significant portion of the 
population seems familiar with the minutiae of building codes and regulations. Everyone 
knows the 50% Rule.  
While the county independently had adopted this rule as part of its building and 
permitting code, in its published communications officials are careful to state that its 
purpose is to ensure future flood insurance in the area from the National Flood Insurance 
Program (NFIP) (Monroe County n.d.b). This indicates two things: first, although the 
county is often derided as the source of this rule because it is the forward facing 
enforcement entity, the rule is actually derived from NFIP and FEMA and accordingly may 
broadly apply to coastal hurricane zones; and second, that over time it is likely that more 
coastal areas will fall under this or similar rules due to the effects of climate change and 
because more counties and localities are taking disaster planning seriously. Also, that the 
county is taking the portion of the NFIP that requires flood improvements seriously would 
normally be considered a positive sign, especially given historical difficulties in obtaining 
local compliance with the portion of the NFIP meant to scale back at-risk development in 
flood zones (Adler et al. 2019).  
As previously mentioned, the 50% Rule can be especially destructive to those living 
in ground level homes, especially mobile homes. Sullivan (2018) describes how in many 
cases “mobile” homes are a misnomer. This is because mobile homes deteriorate over time 
and older homes may be impossible to move without breaking apart. Additionally, it is 
because homeowners may not have the many thousands of dollars necessary to move the 
structure by flatbed truck. While in many cases residents own the home itself, they often 
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rent the pad on which it sits. When a mobile home park closes, for example, relocation may 
be impossible due to issues of structural integrity and affordability. Residents may 
therefore lose their homes and all that was invested in them based on a decision of the 
mobile home park owner (Sullivan 2018).  
Participants described a similar process for mobile or modest ground level homes 
that were damaged in Irma. Because of their limited value and the high cost of construction 
after the storm due to lack of licensed contractors, limited availability of construction 
workers, and a high cost of materials, it is easy for the cost of repair to exceed half the low 
market value of these homes. This can trigger the 50% Rule. Yet building to the new code 
may be impossible for those without insurance or substantial savings. Even for those with 
insurance, the funds may be wholly insufficient to rebuild because insurance is keyed to 
the value of the damaged or destroyed home and reconstruction has to take the form 
dictated by the new building code.  
There were many stories of this process forcing the working class inhabitants of 
these homes to sell their lot for whatever they could get due to the financial inability to 
rebuild, which primed the pump for speculative interests to buy any sort of buildable lot 
for development into vacation or tourism rentals, or second or third homes. Built into this 
element of the building code, therefore, is a system that promotes population displacement 
and an intensification of construction in a hurricane zone. Moreover, there seems to be little 
way to insure over this problem. To be clear, while the effects of the 50% Rule usually 
apply to more modest houses, this is not always the case. One participant, a successful 
entrepreneur who lived in an enviable home adjacent to the water, reported that she was 
forced to leave the Keys after her house fell under the 50% Rule and her insurance refused 
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to pay the full rebuilding cost. Part of the issue, she reported, was the cumulative effects of 
fighting and struggling to hold on through disappointment after disappointment: when the 
insufficient insurance check arrived after over a year of struggle it was the final straw. She 
could have continued fighting but reported being too worn down.  
What develops from this is likely a contributing factor both to local displacement 
and to environmental degradation: loving the lower Keys’ communities and environment 
to death by creating a system that indirectly incentivizes the replacement of modest, 
affordable structures for residential use with more expensive structures for vacation use. 
This illustrates a mechanism by which the production of disaster space reflects systems of 
power and hierarchy through disaster preparedness. It does so by using the logic of 
protection from nature and suggests one element of why development may accelerate after 
disaster (Elliott and Clement 2017). Moreover, because this is a local rule based in 
compliance with NFIP regulations and standards, it could conceivably apply to any 
coastline with flooding risk. In addition to the beginning of America’s Great Climate 
Exodus (Gopal 2019), the use of this rule in the Keys may be a test case that will soon 
apply elsewhere. Although hurricanes might cause unusual levels of concentrated damage, 
it is also important to remember that the hurricane resistant building codes and the 50% 
Rule apply to any new construction or repairs arising for any reason. So while their effects 
may be most visible in the aftermath of a hurricane, the impacts of the code on affordable 
housing operate both before and after storms.  
Example 2: The Rate of Growth Ordinance.  
The Rate of Growth Ordinance (ROGO) traces its lineage to a statute passed in 1972 
to limit development in the Florida Keys, and informed the 1986 Monroe County 
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Comprehensive Plan (Monroe County n.d.a). A limitation of building rights—ROGO 
rights are required to build new residential or tourist structures—its purpose is to restrict 
population growth to ensure timely hurricane evacuation. Its allocation formula uses a 
complicated system of tiers with their own structure, as well as a scoring system that 
accounts for land dedicated to the county, aggregation of plots, and donation of funds to 
retire existing development rights (each of these is intended to reduce overall development 
pressure). The county admits that approval for one of the limited allocations may take 
years, and its internal structure indicates that it may prioritize those with the means to buy 
multiple plots for aggregation or dedication, or to donate cash (Monroe County n.d.a).  
Based on a number of participant interviews and a historical review of local media 
and Florida law, an important but overlooked element of the ROGO system became 
apparent. Like the 50% Rule, it may provides incentives for the conversion of affordable 
housing to expensive housing and resort development, and this may be exacerbated by 
hurricanes. This is because the ROGO development rights attach to plots of land but are 
also tradable, meaning that the owner of a plot can sell them to another owner and then 
they attach to the purchaser’s choice of land. This means that rights that are attached to 
affordable housing may be sold for resort development. In the words of a Big Pine resident: 
In the past there was housing, more housing available to the lower class. And that 
lower class also…work the Winn Dixie [supermarket] and you know, places like 
that…that needed…low-income jobs and so they supplied those. Like the trailer 
park, the Sea Horse on Big Pine Key, which…three years ago now, three and a half 
years ago it was destroyed, which was basically about 150 trailers which was 
affordable housing that were destroyed there. They came in with a with a bulldozer 
and bulldozed all the trailers down and people either got given a bus ticket to get 
out of the Keys [or] some of them were really relocated. And…these development 
rights went to a condo that they were building in Stock Island [just outside of Key 
West]. So, you know, those type of things keep happening where…these low-
income transient rentals’ [ROGO rights] are being bought up and moved. And 
hence, housing…was lost for the lower class. And then Irma basically took it to 
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another level because a lot of these again, a lot of these other trailers had enough 
damage that they could not be repaired and they would have to be replaced by a 
single family residence….So that’s…out of the price range for many of these 
people. 
 
The combined effect of the ROGO system and the 50% Rule therefore results in a 
conversion of the availability of working class housing to more expensive forms, even 
though technically the ROGO statute does address affordable housing at least conceptually. 
It also represents the conversion, to a degree, of the ability to remain post-disaster into 
tradable real estate investment. While this process did not begin with Irma, it is believed to 
have accelerated after. It also reflects concerns about the bureaucratic grind that residents 
had to endure. If unrepaired, a significantly damaged structure and its lot might be 
condemned and condemnation threatens a loss of the property’s ROGO. One retired 
homeowner who two years after Irma was still trying to rebuild described the fear of losing 
ROGO rights:  
Well, there were seven separate documents that she had to have notarized in order 
to apply for a permit to tear the house down. We spent days traveling back and 
forth…getting you know documents notarized and going to the county and at one 
point, there was a special thing that you had to file that if you didn’t file it, as a 
possibility you could lose your ROGO points. So that when it came time…to get a 
building permit you couldn’t get one because you had no ROGO points. To rebuild 
a house that was already there. Well, we did it right. We do have our ROGO points 
we can rebuild but…getting the building permits is going to be another nightmare. 
 
The ROGO system represents another well-meaning regulation that was enacted for 
the purpose of hurricane safety. The popular and economic appeal of these sorts of rules is 
emphasized, if by nothing else, than by the fact that the entire participant pool—even those 
most critical of the official response and were most conscious of the development of 
environmental inequality—supported official intervention to help ensure public safety in 
this disaster zone. Yet like building codes, the 50% Rule, and the related bureaucratic 
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morass, the ROGO system also has the potential to impact the existence of workforce 
housing, even though its original motivation had little to say about housing policy beyond 
limiting development.  
Moreover, the lower Keys are peppered with so-called unbuildable lots: plots of land 
that do not have ROGO rights attached. A recent article in the Miami Herald (Goodhue 
2019) describes how the state of Florida is preparing to be sued in 2023 as the issuance of 
new ROGOs is phased out in the Keys. The logic of the expected lawsuits is that the 
unavailability of new ROGOs essentially renders these plots permanently unbuildable, and 
owners of these plots are expected to claim a regulatory taking (a type of eminent domain) 
(Goodhue 2019). Although there is no guarantee that the moratorium on ROGO rights will 
actually occur, this dispute suggests that the effects of ROGO restrictions may get worse 
in the future as the only way to get one will be to buy it from a property owner.  
CONCLUSION 
This chapter represents a new way of examining the relationships between disaster 
and housing. After a disaster, cultural trauma develops over long timeframes from failures 
of bureaucracy and disaster planning regulations to serve community needs. Over time, 
this wears down elements of the population, rendering the community more susceptible to 
real estate speculation and opportunism. In turn, over long timescales this suggests that 
disaster experiences may have an additive effect on population displacement, as those who 
have lived through the trials of one recovery may avoid the next. Yet we should not 
conclude that concerns about affordable housing are completely missing from the lower 
Keys, or that the county and its public servants do not care.  
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Recovery, after all is said and done, continues. In January 2020, the State of Florida 
awarded $38 million to improve a desalination and sewage plant damaged by Irma, which 
is part of $84 million set aside for continued Irma recovery (Filosa 2020). Concurrently, 
however, for the first time Monroe County acknowledged that there would be part of the 
lower Keys that they could not protect from climate change due to infrastructural cost 
(Flavelle and Mazzei 2019). This is distinct from managed retreat (Koslov 2016), in which 
a community decides to abandon their area and recruits government to assist and finance 
the process. Here, they simply indicated that it would not be economical to raise certain 
roads serving small areas (Flavelle and Mazzei 2019).  
Attention has also remained focused on the subject of workforce housing. In 2018 
contractors broke ground for a new 208-unit affordable housing complex just outside of 
Key West, for the express purpose of maintaining the local workforce (Wadlow 2018a, 
2018b; Florida Housing Finance Corporation 2018). Although it may appear to be an 
attempt to alleviate post-Irma housing pressures, it was in the works before Irma and its 
affordable rental structure is far more focused on the middle class than working class 
communities. Only five percent of units are reserved for those making less than 28% of the 
local median income (extremely low income, presently $23,900 annually for a family of 
four). Announced rental maximums for these 12 lowest income units are $621 per month, 
rent for many of the remaining 200 units rises to a maximum of $2,983 per month for a 
three-bedroom apartment (Monroe County 2019). Affordable is, after all, a relative term.30  
 
30 This workforce housing that replaces lost affordable houses hints of functional usefulness—providing for 
a workforce to maintain services—that at odds with contemporary understanding of indispensability (Pellow 
2018). In the present day, when recognition of “essential” workers is deepening due to COVID-19, it is 
intriguing to consider that in the lower Keys the need for affordable housing is often couched in the usefulness 
of individuals to the economic system. Moreover, these elements taken together support the challenge 
presented by critical environmental justice studies to critically examine the role of the state, even when its 
purpose is disaster safety (Pellow 2000, 2018).  
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The production of disaster space factors heavily in both the present need for 
workforce housing and the conversion from truly low-cost mobile homes to comparatively 
expensive affordable housing. Elements of the building code such as the 50% Rule that are 
responsive to hurricane design concerns essentially remove low income housing from the 
market when a hurricane hits, leading to speculation and consequent inequality. Likewise, 
the Rate of Growth Ordinance was passed in anticipation of a future hurricane, and 
similarly it provides an incentive to remove truly affordable housing from the market. 
Taken together, these and other socio-legal structures like enforcement regimes tend to 
enforce an exclusive vision of the lower Keys, in which only those with sufficient wealth 
to withstand a hurricane will remain (along with those needed to provide services).  
This vision takes shape, however, through structural pressures imposed upon design 
and construction for hurricane preparedness, illustrating how the predevelopment treadmill 
can inform the production of disaster space and inequality. Although in different ways, 
each of these mechanisms promotes the development of bigger, fancier, more expensive 
structures to house the wealthy or serve as vacation or investment properties. Whether or 
not this is intentional, they each contribute to the mental exhaustion and trauma cited by 
many participants that in turn provides opportunities for additional predatory speculation. 
These may become worse when public risk governance regimes like building codes mix 
with private risk governance regimes like insurance and mortgage covenants. Poorly 
executed, these bureaucracies foment collective and cultural trauma (Erickson 1991; 
Eyerman 2015). By so doing, they support the intensification of development in a way that 
might be predicted by those familiar with green gentrification (Gould and Lewis 2016, 
2018a), yet for somewhat different reasons.  
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Where they are similar is that the creation of environmental amenities may lead to 
real estate speculation, valorization that drives out less affluent communities, and 
environmental inequality (Gould and Lewis 2016, 2018a). Where they differ is that the 
logic of predevelopment treadmill emplaces laws and structures before a disaster that, 
without adequate consideration of their social effects, may exacerbate inequality both 
before and after a disaster. Paradoxically, attempts to protect communities from the 
perceived aggression of nature instead subject them to the economic antagonism of real 
estate development. Additionally, while some of these measures reflect neoliberal ideology 
and priorities, they also differ in their internal logic in some key ways, including the 
imposition of regulation on private land use and market restrictions on land. The 
predevelopment treadmill and the production of disaster space do not fit neatly in the box 
of neoliberal ideology, even if they bear certain hallmarks of neoliberalism and achieve 
neoliberal-acceptable purposes like capital accumulation and consolidation.  
Moreover, housing seems to be deeply linked to the emotional experience of 
disaster. Illouz (2007:5) describes the “contours of what [she] calls emotional capitalism,” 
or “a culture in which emotional and economic discourses and practices mutually shape 
each other, thus producing…a broad, sweeping movement in which affect is made an 
essential aspect of economic behavior and in which emotional life follows the logic of 
economic relations and exchange.” It is in this spirit that the connection between emotional 
trauma and speculative capital is drawn. I hope that this connection provides opportunities 
for reform in the future.   
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APPENDIX A: NOTES ON METHODS 
 
This annex is intended to outline a number of methodological choices made in the 
development of research in the lower Florida Keys. This is for two reasons. First, I hope to 
preserve some of my experiences with this project in writing in a way that is typically not 
possible in a journal article or standard dissertation chapter. Second, because ethical 
disaster research has been increasingly recognized as a valuable goal worthy of 
independent study (Gaillard and Peek 2019) these observations may inform a responsive 
piece about the practical issues related to ethical disaster research, particularly in contexts 
where funding is limited.  
Partially because of the recent, useful trend to view individual disasters and recovery 
as part of processes of concatenated, iterative events (Gotham and Greenberg 2014; 
Dawson 2017), I felt that a case study approach was appropriate overall (Yin 1994, 2003). 
This is because “case studies are appropriate when ‘how’ or ‘why’ questions are being 
proposed, when the investigator has little control over events, and when the focus is a 
contemporary phenomenon within some real life context” (Yin 1994:1). The focus on 
“how” and “why” emphasizes the utility of case studies to understand complex, contingent 
events where the “boundaries between phenomena and context are not clearly evident” 
(Yin 1994:13). By their nature, these tend to involve a variety of plausible yet contested 
explanations. Because disasters are almost by definition contingent events that result when 
a natural hazard matures in proximity to people, and because they are often stunningly 
complex collisions of social and environmental systems, the case study approach makes 
sense.  
 161 
Data collection and analysis was guided by three elements of case study inquiry. 
First, case studies like this “cope with the technically distinctive situation in which there 
will be many more variables of interest than data points.” Second, because of this diversity 
of potential data points it requires “multiple sources of evidence, with data needing to 
converge in a triangulating fashion.” Third, while the goal is to challenge and possibly 
reconfigure existing theory, the case study method “benefits from the prior development 
of theoretical propositions to guide data collection and analysis” (Yin 1994:13). 
Additionally, this approach deviates from the thick description approach preferred in more 
formal ethnography, developing data collection for the purpose of something akin to an 
“analytic highlight reel approach” to participant’s meaning making that “isolate[s] thematic 
highlights from the data” (Brekhus 2007:453).  
As the nexus among disaster, housing, collective or cultural trauma, and population 
displacement emerged from early interviews, I began to purposively recruit local teachers. 
This was for two related reasons. First, although a University of Florida study of population 
displacement from the Keys estimated population loss of around 3-4% (Associated Press 
2018; Goodhue 2018; Rayer and Wang 2018), participants reported the out-migration of 
far higher proportions of their communities after the storm. The central demographic study 
that was conducted after the storm included a number of methodological choices that hinted 
that it might have underestimated population loss for the lower Keys and especially those 
islands that suffered the greatest damage like Big Pine. These include estimating the island 
chain as a whole as well as lumping all of the unincorporated areas together, which included 
less affected areas nearer to the mainland. Additionally, they did not account for 
complementary out-migration and in-migration, or the replacement of people with different 
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people (Associated Press 2018; Goodhue 2018; Rayer and Wang 2018). By this time, as 
well, a focus on the particular stresses faced by working families had also become clear. 
Due to the need for some proxy for demographic information on this subset of the lower 
Keys, I suspected that teachers could provide insight because from their professional 
vantage point and observations about changes in enrollment that might reflect changes in 
local communities.   
Second, teachers are in a unique position of providing both education and care for 
students, as well as for their own social and family circles. I believed that their awareness 
of the collective circumstances of many working families could help me to both ground 
truth the expressed experiences of my overall participant pool and open up new avenues of 
thematic development. By the end of data collection this resulted in the recruitment of 
seven professional educators, each of whom had also been personally impacted by 
Hurricane Irma in some way.  
Supplementing these formal interviews were a number of other data collection 
strategies that occurred on-site in the Keys during my visits there, as well as remotely using 
online resources. These efforts were intended to elaborate upon and better understand 
topics and concepts that were discovered in interviews. As a result, I could triangulate 
various data sources to better identify and describe thematic elements as they were 
discovered. For example, as various elements of local law and administrative procedure 
were revealed in interviews and through research on media sources, I researched the 
applicable laws and regulations to ensure that participant impressions were correct. 
Correcting for the use of lay terminology, in this community I generally found a highly 
accurate appreciation of the details of development and building rules, including complex 
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or obscure elements. I doubt this is especially common among communities in other parts 
of the country, so I was initially hesitant to accept accounts as true without independent 
verification. Because they were aware that I am a both a lawyer and researcher, some 
participants told me during interviews that I should look up the details in order to ensure 
that the details of their accounts were correct.  
Another path was research into local newspapers, first accomplished in the Monroe 
County Library’s hurricane files, which cover hurricanes dating from the turn of the 
twentieth century. A second source was in the offices of the local newspaper on Big Pine 
Key, in which I copied and reviewed every article on housing dating back to 2014 (when 
their online version was suspended), as well as a variety of other media sources. The 
archives of this newspaper echo the disaster risk in this community: they are bundled in 
plastic wrap high in the rafters to protect against storm surge.  
I also conducted a review of neighborhoods on foot or bicycle, checking street by 
street and lot by lot for notable evidence of hurricane damage or displacement, such as 
permit bags (the county requires all building permits to be on site and they are typically 
kept in a plastic bag that is visible on the front of the house), a hole in the building or other 
apparent damage, the metal roofs required by the new housing code that are a recognized 
symbol of rebuilding, empty mobile home pads that indicate the obliteration of a mobile 
home, and for sale signs. In order to avoid the appearance of being a real estate vulture or 
code enforcement agent, I avoided a clipboard and spoke quietly into a small microphone 
on headphones tied around my neck, dictating notes on what block I was on, house numbers 
where visible, and signs of Irma. For lack of a better way to say this, my goal was to look 
like a lost tourist enjoying a Keys morning. These efforts allowed me to gain an 
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appreciation of qualitative elements of real estate development, and moreover to 
experience how hot and inhospitable it must have been when people returned after Irma.  
One example involves a traditionally working class neighborhood on Big Pine Key 
known as the Avenues, that was reputed to have suffered the worst of Irma as it is located 
on the windward side of the island directly in Irma’s path. Riding down the streets around 
the coastline a pattern began to emerge. Relatively solid, recently constructed poured 
concrete or stilt homes occupied areas a few blocks from the water. As I approached the 
water there would be a block featuring some existing single-family homes mixed with 
many empty mobile home pads. At water’s edge, these gave way to a few enormous seaside 
mansions, some with forbidding gates.  
Observing these spatial damage patterns firsthand served two primary purposes. 
First, they provided a secondary source of data that combined with participant stories to 
provide a more robust appreciation of what happened. Much like how witness statements 
may provide better information about a crime scene when coupled with photographs, my 
understanding of the content of participant accounts benefitted from being on the ground 
and seeing the locations that they described firsthand. In the Avenues, it implies that mobile 
home pads were developed earliest in the most desirable areas near the water, which gave 
way to more robust homes as development moved inland over time, with the exception of 
the most desirable properties that have water access and oceanfront views. Concentrations 
of mobile homes in parks are towards the center of the island: because many of these are 
on higher ground this may have resulted in statistical analysis of the island overall that may 
have underemphasized the damage to mobile homes in this specific neighborhood through 
ecological fallacy (i.e. Xian et al. 2018). A preliminary review of public real estate 
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documents has lent some support to this suggestion, although formal statistical analysis has 
not yet been conducted. Second, it emphasized the gravitas of what happened. Every time 
I muttered “empty mobile pad” into my microphone it was a reminder that at one point in 
the recent past that may have been someone’s home. 
Importantly, I also had a number of off the record conversations with local notables, 
including activists, first responders, politicians, journalists, business owners, and 
volunteers. These happened in a variety of places including over dinner, in county 
administrative offices, clearing Irma debris out of a mangrove swamp, in various offices 
around town, sitting around a table at the cheapest hotel in Keys West, and while replacing 
a hydraulic line on a piece of heavy equipment. While all of these individuals were more 
than willing to offer their opinions, some were hesitant to do so on the record, either 
expressly or impliedly when they changed the subject or failed to respond to my more 
formal requests for an interview.  
I strongly suspect that this was partially the result of the small town feel of the lower 
Keys, in which everyone tends to know everyone and notable local figures may be hesitant 
to speak on the record about issues as locally contentious as Hurricane Irma and housing. 
One participant related that since moving to the area she has to be careful whom she talks 
about in public spaces like the supermarket because it is likely that someone who knows 
them may overhear. The local grapevine is so well known it has its own name: the Coconut 
Telegraph, based on the Jimmy Buffett song of the same name. Another possible reason is 
the reasonable reluctance of people to revisit what may have been the worst day of their 
lives. For many, Hurricane Irma was traumatic and it is understandable why those who 
experienced it firsthand might not want to relive it. A third and final reason was that some 
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participants expressed a sort of hurricane fatigue, or a generalized sense of frustration with 
the exploitation of survivors by governmental agencies, other sources of charitable aid that 
they felt did not live up to their lofty promises, scrappers who they watched picking over 
their ruined belongings for metal while not helping in relief efforts, and real estate vultures 
and opportunists. After hearing these stories, I did not want to contribute to this sense of 
frustration, nor did I desire to become the subject of such stories in the future.  
If potential participants seemed hesitant to sit for an interview I did not push or pry, 
nor did I ask again save for a short follow-up email. This follows recent entreaties to 
foreground ethical practice in post-disaster studies due to the past use of insensitive data 
collection methods, imposition of research questions considered irrelevant locally, leaking 
of premature “expert” opinions, and other examples of poor behavior by researchers 
working with disaster survivors (Gaillard and Peek 2019). Moreover, while trauma was not 
originally contemplated as a central feature of this study, interview responses later directed 
its inclusion as a primary thematic category. The study of trauma, while identified as the 
feature of post-disaster experience that is sometimes considered most locally relevant also 
may require special care (Gaillard and Peek 2019). The emotional content of my interviews 
was palpable, with three participants crying (two out of sadness over loss, one out of 
appreciation for those who came to help) and many more requiring moments to collect 
themselves before continuing.  
Notwithstanding that I was disappointed in many cases that I could not include what 
I learned in these informal conversations as data in this study, they still served as 
opportunities to listen to and obtain feedback on my thinking from a wider group while 
honoring the wishes of those who for whatever reason were reluctant to formally 
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participate. These conversations therefore served an important purpose as I periodically 
checked my work, and no serious discrepancies were revealed between those who agreed 
to participate in the study and those who declined. This comports with the spirit of reflexive 
and iterative co-development of data encouraged by proponents of grounded theory (i.e. 
Charmaz 2006) and the extended case method (i.e. Burawoy 1998).  
In addition to requiring ethical data collection, qualitative case studies about 
complex socio-environmental issues may generate questions about how much data is 
enough. Rather than try to isolate every factor germane to housing, displacement, and later 
trauma to judge sampling adequacy, I relied on a type of theoretical saturation known as 
thematic saturation (Hyde 2003; Bowen 2008; Saunders et al. 2018). Orthodox theoretical 
saturation refers to the “point [in the data collection process] at which no new insights are 
obtained, no new themes are identified, and no new issues arise regarding a category of 
data” (Bowen 2008:140; Strauss and Corbin 1990). It is focused less on sample size and 
more on sampling adequacy, and recommends careful and directed purposive sampling, 
multiple forms of data gathering, and triangulation among these data sources. “Sampling 
adequacy…is evidenced by saturation and replication, meaning that sufficient data to 
account for all aspects of the phenomenon have been obtained” (Bowen 2008:141, internal 
citations omitted). In the case of theme saturation, it “means that no new data are added 
because that category has been adequately explained” (Hyde 2003:48).  
Of course, the goal of perfectly complete data collection about an ongoing 
experience is likely impossible: some participants related stories that were still developing, 
as well as expectations for the future. At the very least, however, this method requires that 
analyses account for participants who remain in unsettled circumstances at the time of 
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interview rather than assuming stasis. In turn, this requires sensitivity to the fact that 
processes of recovery, rebuilding, and trauma development may take a surprisingly long 
time. Ideally, these processes would be captured chronologically with attention to how 
stages of recovery play out in different contexts, as I have tried to do here. 
Near the end of the interview and visit process felt I was not learning much that was 
new in each thematic category: a strong sign of thematic saturation and sampling adequacy. 
In fact, I sensed in many of the later interviews that I could accurately predict responses to 
later questions based solely on a participant’s description of what happened to their house 
during Irma and its aftermath. Rather than being an indicator that these interviews were a 
waste of time, this familiarity proved useful. I was able to quickly identify outliers and to 
explore what conditions or circumstances led to these experiences and opinions being so 
different from the rest. In addition to promoting sampling adequacy, open-ended and in 
many cases long interviews provided a forum to explain differences in experience. 
For example, in one case a participant recounted a mind-bogglingly easy post-Irma 
experience with housing reconstruction, given the level of damage her home experienced. 
Although she initially attributed this to a positive outlook on life and that she was a well-
organized and powerful self-advocate (each of which seemed likely to be true), 
reconsideration of the question revealed a unique cascade of circumstances. These included 
that by coincidence her street was one of the first on which electricity was restored, that 
her house had no mortgage because it had been a gift from a family member, that because 
there was no mortgage a laborious step in the insurance claims process was removed, that 
she chose to immediately settle and not litigate with her insurance company even though 
she suspected their offer was a lowball (avoiding what Picou et al. (2004) and Freudenburg 
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(1997) might suggest is the central element of community corrosion after disaster), that 
due to the likelihood of a quick insurance turnaround she found a contractor who was 
willing to work on credit, and that because she found a contractor within days of the storm 
she beat the rush that led to delays of over a year in finding contractors for other people.  
Perhaps most critically, however, a relative had a sort of local first responder status 
and was therefore able to return to their house two days after the storm to open it up and 
dry it out, preventing the occurrence of mold that was so common elsewhere. In other 
words, what might be chalked up to an individual fulfilling the role of effective self-
advocate due to matters of personality and personal organization—what Tierney (2015) 
might call the disaster survivor playing the role of neoliberal subject—upon deeper 
examination revealed that it was at least partially the result of material circumstances and 
a sort of housing-based privilege. Important for the question of saturation was that while 
meeting with his participant I strongly suspected that there were unique circumstances at 
play well before they were revealed later in the interview. 
As a final note, special ethical considerations may be at play in disaster research, 
especially in the context of open-ended projects where the research agenda may shift over 
time (i.e., Charmaz 2006). In the lower Florida Keys I had little expectation that my 
research would eventually focus on trauma, notwithstanding that disasters are often 
traumatic. As the focus shifted from the political economy of housing in disasters to how 
political economic interests intersect with trauma, I felt that special ethical attention should 
be paid to participant accounts that describe severe trauma or mental illness. Due to the 
depth of emotion and the sensitive subject matter in those sections I use a bare minimum 
of identifying information about some participants, focusing only on the relations between 
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these stories, housing, and housing-related concerns. Part of this was removing references 
to employment or other elements of their story, and omitting cross-references to other 
quotations from that participant that may include potentially revealing information about 
their identity. While this choice may result in a loss of some detail for readers, I felt it was 
sufficiently important to make.  
Finally, in these contexts I felt a change in how I triangulated data was necessary. 
Besides taking people at their word about personal accounts of mental illness, I decided to 
not investigate the many stories of suicide I heard. Instead, I trusted that people would not 
lie about this important element of their own experience and relied on media accounts to 
establish that the spike in the suicide rate reported by participants was true (e.g., Klinenger 
2018). I was unsure for some time whether the murder-suicide reported by many 
participants was a single occurrence, multiple occurrences, or whether it was indicative of 
a change in local suicide rate overall, but I felt that it would be inappropriate to reveal other 
participant accounts of this event or dig deeper by purposive sampling. The tension 
between sensitive, ethical research and holistic research was eventually resolved through 
media accounts, but it is worth remembering that a search for “perfect” data in these 
contexts may be misguided. In other contexts, like those related to legal or housing issues, 
I tried to revisit whether a participant’s impression was correct by consulting legal guides 
or asking later questions about the process of, for example, obtaining building codes. In 
the context of many accounts of mental illness that would be insensitive at best. Especially 
in contexts like small towns where people tend to know each other’s business, special care 
should be taken in discussions about disaster mental illness so as to not reveal information 
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about participants to each other, nor to reveal each other’s impressions about sensitive, 
personal issues.    
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APPENDIX B: PAID CARE WORK AND DISASTERS. 
 
There is another cumulative element of disaster that also might not be captured by 
many disaster research approaches: the cumulative effects of professional care work and 
the personal impacts of a storm. Originally, I employed purposive sampling of teachers to 
try to learn more about patterns of population displacement and other effects of Hurricane 
Irma on local communities. However, their stories often focused on their dual professional 
role of educators and caregivers, coupled with their experiences as working residents of a 
hurricane zone. A non-teacher participant related a similar story of a friend who works as 
a nurse and suffered severe burnout after Irma. She also emphasized her view that gender 
issues were an underexplored element of the effects of Irma, which resonates with existing 
research into disasters, gender, and care work (e.g., Picou and Hudson 2010; Adeola and 
Picou 2012; Nagel 2012, 2015; O’Toole 2018). Combined with the potential for impacts 
on children from families that were temporarily or permanently displaced, this indicates 
that while it was a not initially a central focus and in no way do I want to reify the 
proposition that care work should be gendered, a brief detour into the field of care work 
and gender may be merited.  
The teachers each took pride in their dual post-disaster role; no one complained 
about having to serve as an advocate for students or families. One story revolves around a 
science fair that was scheduled for shortly after school reopened after Irma. It is no secret 
that science fair projects often involve considerable parental involvement, and the teachers 
advocated for cancelling the science fair because so many families may be contending with 
homelessness or other precarity. In other cases educators described their mission to present 
a sense of normalcy in abnormal circumstances. One career teacher related his fear that 
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students would experience Irma trauma similarly to students had residual effects of past 
hurricanes. In heavy rainfall, for example, he had observed that students who experienced 
the worst of Hurricane Wilma would get nervous. The role of teachers in this hurricane 
zone, therefore, seems to include a sort of environmental emotional management. 
While due to the relatively small number of teachers interviewed and the late 
development of this theme it is difficult to make any concrete claims, it is intriguing to 
consider that care work—and specifically gendered care work—may invoke special 
cumulative concerns about post-disaster trauma. Research has long recognized gendered 
elements of disaster, including how it may affect both the financial and material burdens 
of disaster, coping strategies, health strategies and outcomes, and participation in 
preparedness and healing activities (Picou and Hudson 2010; Adeola and Picou 2012; 
Nagel 2012; see also Tierney 2007 for a detailed summary of gender research in natural 
disaster, along with numerous citations).  
Sociologists who study care work have described it as a sort of emotional 
management required by professional obligations. In some early formulations (i.e. 
Hochschild 1983) this implied a deleterious effect on the worker who was required to 
perform emotional labor. The relational approach preferred by some later scholars, 
however, distinguishes the mutual emotional connection between service providers and 
recipients (i.e. a teacher and student, or home health aide and patient) from emotional labor 
where the workers is expected to publicly present certain emotions but is less emotionally 
entangled (i.e. a bank teller who is required to be pleasant to a difficult customer). The 
relational approach, in this view “is central to understanding how paid care work can both 
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be personally fulfilling and also make workers vulnerable to burnout, emotional fatigue, or 
wage exploitation” (Duffy et al. 2015a:9).  
Moreover, these scholars have noted that paid care work can have a cumulative or 
additive effect with care work in the home—including instances of work-family conflict 
due to long or irregular hours, or dual obligations of overlapping stress in each context—
and that “inequalities related to race, class, gender, and citizenship status shape the hazards 
of paid care work” (Duffy et al. 2015b:80; Kurowski et al. 2015).  In fact, one preliminary 
study suggests that the combined effects of paid and unpaid care work may have a 
cumulative mental health effect on care workers, and directs that future work should focus 
on care work settings, including for those with poor psychosocial environments (Kurowski 
et al. 2015). It is intriguing to consider that the study of disaster provides an opportunity to 
expand both the list of inequalities presented by Duffy et al. (2015b) and the work 
environments suggested by Kurowski et al. (2015) to poor home, neighborhood, and 
community environments in which both teachers and students are subjected to stress that 
is at least partially a function of their socioeconomic status.  
One study in the field of social psychology that was conducted in the wake of the 
2011 earthquake in Christchurch, New Zealand began by observing that “the personal 
impacts of a natural disaster occurring in a teacher’s hometown are compounded by 
supporting students’ psychosocial recovery, as well as coping with their own bereavement 
and grief, reduced home amenities or total loss of their home” (O’Toole 2018:1082). 
Building off of a detailed analysis of emotional labor at work (i.e. Hochschild 1983), 
O’Toole (2018:1084) outlines the difference between two forms of emotional management 
that teachers employ in front of a classroom: “surface acting involves pretending or faking 
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desired emotions and/or hiding unacceptable emotions. Deep acting involves a more 
genuine portrayal of the required emotions by sincerely feeling the optimal emotions. 
Emotional exhaustion in teachers is more likely to result from surface acting than deep 
acting.” While she notes that there was strong individual variation among teachers, this 
study begins to develop a connection between personal situations—including housing 
precarity—and emotional exhaustion derived from the performance of their professional 
role (O’Toole 2018). Beyond emotional management and performance, it is intriguing to 
consider how the dual requirements of emotional management and student advocacy may 
develop into a cumulative impact, and how that accumulation intersects with the 
generalized frustrations expressed in relation to housing and bureaucracy. Moreover, it is 
interesting to consider how the development of trauma over time may intersect with the 
“acting” requirements of care work as the unsettling reality sinks in.   
Despite some data that suggest a connection between post-disaster care work, 
emotional labor, emotional exhaustion, and burnout, I hesitate to enter too far into analysis 
of this issue. One reason is the limited data given the number of participants in care work 
professions who participated in this study. Another is that there are differences among care 
work professions: Duffy et al. (2015) discusses the class distinction between more highly 
paid professions like teaching and nursing and lower-paid professions like home health 
work. However, a few preliminary observations are worth making. Participants who were 
teachers and affiliated education professionals, regardless of gender, seemed to evince a 
sense of fulfillment and a sense of exhaustion from the dual performance of their roles as 
community members who in some cases suffered housing damage and personal precarity, 
and their professional role as educators and healers. I cannot recall a single complaint about 
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having to care for students, either in interviews or in the many informal conversations I 
had with teachers outside of interviews.  
Instead, there was a broad sense of empathy for students and their families and a 
feeling of empowerment at being in a position so consequential for disaster recovery. This 
is not to say that their experiences were easy. Some teachers reported a sense of guilt about 
their status as victims—especially when they received aid—because in their view others 
had it so much worse off. Others were openly concerned about the combination of 
affordable housing, disaster, and cumulative trauma.  This includes one who mentioned 
“[the Keys are] not somewhere I want to live the rest of my life after everything we went 
through with Irma.” She continued:  
I’ve got tears in my eyes but it’s part of it, I mean, what we went through and not 
just me so many other people, it’s hard. You know, here you are a grown, grown 
adult. And you both have jobs and you know, you’re homeless and you have to tell 
your kids that no we can’t go back to the house and you don’t want [them] to see it 
and it’s like, as a parent that’s really hard. And then you have to pull yourself 
together and be there for your students. And then you know…there’s depression 
and, you know, I’m just gonna get diagnosed with depression. I got diagnosed with 
PTSD. I started having seizures. Seizures caused by stress. Oh, so, I mean, am I 
doing okay? I made it this far. Do I want to do it again? No, no. 
 
One part of this mirrors O’Toole’s (2018) description of surface acting but both at home 
and at work. Another part centers around an ongoing dispute about the displacement of 
affordable housing from the Keys: that affordable housing is locally known as “workforce 
housing” hints at its motivating vision and why housing loss might affect teachers and other 
working but not wealthy members of the community. The nearly constant complaint—and 
in many cases the first sign of displacement—was that the housing situation had led to a 
shortage of workers. Yet this also hints at a class-based design element that especially 
prejudices teachers and others in care work who also happen to be working class and who 
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also may have home situations that impose additional care obligations on them. Hayden 
(1984:226-227), writing at the intersection of home care work, urban and community 
planning, and home design, argues that “[h]ousing issues must include ‘work’ as well as 
‘home.’ Better spatial planning and design requires concern for employment patterns and 
household work as the basic economic issues connected to residential neighborhoods.”  
While more work is needed to develop more precise contours and recommendations, 
to Hayden’s observations we may want to add the care elements of paid employment. This 
would help ensure an adequate response to the needs of those who undertake public and 
private care work concurrently, especially in the wake of a disruptive environmental crisis 
that promotes the development of environmental inequality in housing. Especially because 
Hayden (1984) framed her work by describing how anachronistic gendered 
characterizations of work and home life motivated the form of Levittown, Pennsylvania 
and Vanport City, Oregon—two areas well known to scholars of urban and housing 
inequality—we would be wise to follow her suggestion that an important route to 
correction of emplaced inequality is through political economy. Similarly to how gendered 
assumptions about care drove some of the present suburban form, so too might assumptions 
about leaving your frustrations in the office (or at home) motivate housing responses after 




Adams, Vincanne. 2012. Markets of sorrow, labors of faith: New Orleans in the wake of 
Katrina. Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press.  
 
Adelino, Manuel, Igor Cunha, and Miguel A. Ferreira. 2017. “The Economic Effects of 
Public Financing: Evidence from Municipal Bond Ratings Recalibration.” The Review of 
Financial Studies 30(9): 3223–3268.  
 
Adeola, Francis O., and J. Steven Picou. 2012. “Race, social capital, and the health impacts 
of Katrina: Evidence from the Louisiana and Mississippi Gulf Coast.” Human Ecology 
Review 2014:10-24. 
 
Adler, Dena, Michael Burger, Rob Moore, and Joel Scata. 2019. “Changing the National 
Flood Insurance Program for a Changing Climate.” Envtl. L. Rep. News & Analysis 
49:10320. 
 
Alexander, David E. 2013. “Resilience and Disaster Risk Reduction: an Etymological 
Journey.” Natural Hazards and Earth System Sciences 13(11):2707-2716. 
 
Alexander, Jeffrey And Elizabeth Butler Breese. 2011. “On Social Suffering and Its 
Cultural Construction”. Introduction in Narrating Trauma: On the Impact of Collective 
Suffering, edited by Ron Eyerman, Jeffrey C. Alexander, and Elizabeth Butler Breese. 
Boulder, Colorado: Paradigm Publishers.  
 
Allen, Greg. 2017. “Nearly 25 Percent of Homes Destroyed In Florida Keys After 




Alvarez, Maria Khristine and Kenneth Cardenas. 2019. “Evicting Slums, ‘Building Back 
Better’: Resiliency Revanchism in Disaster Risk Management in Manila.” International 
Journal of Urban and Regional Research 43(2):227-249.  
 
Ambrosio, Natalie, Yoon Hui Kim, Stacy Swann, and Ziyue Wang. 2020. “Addressing 
Fiancial Risk in Climate Decision Making.” Chapter 7 in Optimizing Community 
Infrastructure: Resilience in the Face of Shocks and Stresses, edited by Ryan Colker. 
Cambridge, MA: Butterworth-Heineman.    
 
Anderson, Ben. 2015. “What Kind of Thing is Resilience?” Politics 35(1):60-66. 
 




Angelo, Hillary and David Wachsmuth. 2014. “Urbanizing Urban Political Ecology: A 
Critique of Methodological Cityism.” International Journal of Urban and Regional 
Research 39(1):16-27.  
 
Anguelovski, Isabelle, Linda Shi, Eric Chu, Daniel Gallagher, Kian Goh, Zachary Lamb, 
Kara Reeve, and Hannah Teicher. 2016. “Equity impacts of urban land use planning for 
climate adaptation: Critical perspectives from the global north and south.” Journal of 
Planning Education and Research 36(3):333-348. 
 
Anguelovski, Isabelle, Clara Irazábal‐Zurita, and James JT Connolly. 2019. “Grabbed 
urban landscapes: Socio‐spatial tensions in green infrastructure planning in Medellín.” 
International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 43(1):133-156. 
 
Angus, Ian. 2016. Facing the Anthropocene: Fossil Capitalism and the Crisis of the Earth 
System. New York: NYU Press. 
 
Associated Press. 2017. “The Latest: Irma regaining strength over bathtub warm water.” 
Retrieved February 7, 2020. (https://apnews.com/6a748851a28043b3af1081a052df634b)  
 
Associated Press. 2018. “Florida Keys population dropped after Hurricane Irma.” WPTV 
News 5 Online. Retrieved February 7, 2020 (https://www.wptv.com/news/state/florida-
keys-population-dropped-after-hurricane-irma) 
 
Barnard, Anne. 2020. The $119 Billion Sea Wall That Could Defend New York…or Not. 
New York Times, January 17, 2020. Retrieved February 25, 2020 
(https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/17/nyregion/sea-wall-nyc.html) 
 
Bartram, Robin. 2019a. “The Cost of Code Violations: How Building Codes Shape 
Residential Sales Prices and Rents.” Housing Policy Debate 29(6):931-946. 
 
Bartram, Robin. 2019b. “Going easy and going after: Building inspections and the selective 
allocation of code violations.” City & Community 18(2):594-617. 
 
Beatley, Timothy. 2009. Planning for Coastal Resilience: Best Practices for Calamitous 
Times. Washington, D.C.: Island Press. 
 
Beck, Ulrich. 1992. Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity. London: Sage Publications.  
 
Beck, Ulrich. 1996. “World Risk Society As Cosmopolitan Society? Ecological Questions 
in a Framework of Manufactured Uncertainties.” Theory, Culture, & Society, 13(4):1-32.  
 
Beck, Ulrich. 2008. World At Risk. Cambridge: Polity Press.  
 
Benmelech, Efraim, and Jennifer Dlugosz. 2010. “The credit rating crisis.” NBER 
Macroeconomics Annual 24(1):161-208. 
 
 180 
Bennett, Benjamin, and Zexi Wang. 2019. “Costs of Natural Disasters in Public 
Financing.” Fisher College of Business Working Paper 2019-03:009. 
 
Besek, Jordan Fox and Daniel Shtob. 2019. “Breaking the Divide: Setting Environmental 
Precedent in the Chicago River.” Law & Policy 41(4):387-410. 
 
Bhatia, Neeraj. 2012. “Unsolicited Architecture; Critical Agency Without Denial.” In What 
Is Critical Spatial Practice?, edited by Nikolaus Hirsch and Markus Miessen. Berlin: 
Sternberg Press.  
 
Bigger, Patrick. 2017.  “Measurement and the circulation of risk in green bonds.” Journal 
of Environmental Investing 8(1):273-287. 
 
Bigger, Patrick, and Nate Millington. 2019. “Getting soaked? Climate crisis, adaptation 
finance, and racialized austerity.” Environment and Planning E: Nature and Space. 
2514848619876539. 
 
Biggs, Duan, Reinette Biggs, Vasilis Dakos, Robert J. Scholes, and Michael Schoon. 2011. 
“Are we entering an era of concatenated global crises?” Ecology and Society 16(2).  
 
Birkland, Thomas A. 1996. “Natural Disasters as Focusing Events: Policy Communities 
and Political Response.” International Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters, 
14(2):221-243.  
 
Blomley, Nicholas. 2020. “Precarious Territory: Property Law, Housing, and the Socio‐
Spatial Order.” Antipode 52(1):36-57. 
 
Boehnert, Joanna. 2014. “Design vs. the Design Industry.” Design Philosophy 
Papers 12(2):119-136. 
 





Bourbeau, Philippe. 2015.  “Resilience and International Politics: Premises, Debates, 
Agenda.” International Studies Review 17(3):374-395. 
 
Bourbeau, Philippe. 2018. “A genealogy of resilience.” International Political 
Sociology 12(1):19-35. 
 
Bourdeau-Brien, Michael, and Lawrence Kryzanowski. 2019. “Municipal financing costs 
following disasters.” Global Finance Journal 40:48-64. 
 
Bowen, Glenn A. 2008. “Naturalistic inquiry and the saturation concept: a research 
note.” Qualitative Research 8(1):137-152. 
 181 
 
Brekhus, Wayne. 2007. “The Rutgers School: A Zerubavelian Culturalist Cognitive 
Sociology.” European Journal of Social Theory 10(3):448-464.   
 
Burawoy, Michael. 1998. “The Extended Case Method.” Sociological Theory 16(1):4-33. 
 
Cantor, Richard, and Frank Packer. 1995. “The credit rating industry.” The Journal of 
Fixed Income 5(3):10-34. 
 
Carruthers, Bruce G. 2013. “From uncertainty toward risk: the case of credit ratings.” 
Socio-Economic Review 11:525–551 
 
Carruthers, Bruce G. 2015. “Financialization and the institutional foundations of the new 
capitalism.” Socio-Economic Review 13(2):379-398. 
 
Carruthers, Bruce G., and Arthur L. Stinchcombe. 1999. “The social structure of liquidity: 
Flexibility, markets, and states.” Theory and Society 28(3):353-382. 
 
Carruthers, Bruce G., and Jeong-Chul Kim. 2011. “The Sociology of Finance.” Annual 
Review of Sociology 37:239-259. 
 
Catton, William R. 1994. “Foundations of Human Ecology.” Sociological Perspectives 
37(1):75-95. 
 
Cavanagh, Connor Joseph. 2017. “Resilience, class, and the antifragility of 
capital.” Resilience 5(2):110-128. 
 
Chandler, David. 2012. “Resilience and human security: The post-interventionist 
paradigm.” Security Dialogue 43(3):213-229. 
 
Charmaz, Kathy. 2006. Constructing Grounded Theory: A Practical Guide through 
Qualitative Analysis. Thousand Oaks, California: Sage. 
 
Checker, Melissa. 2011. “Wiped Out By the Greenwave.” City & Society 23(2):210-229. 
 
Christophers, Brett. 2009. “Complexity, finance, and progress in human geography”. 
Progress in Human Geography 33(6):807-824.  
 
Christophers, Brett. 2015. “The limits to financialization.” Dialogues in Human 
Geography 5(2):183-200. 
 
Christophers, Brett, Patrick Bigger and  Leigh Johnson. 2020. “Stretching scales? Risk and 




Coffee, Joyce. 2020. “Financing Resilient Infrastructure.” Chapter 6 in Optimizing 
Community Infrastructure: Resilience in the Face of Shocks and Stresses, edited by Ryan 
Colker. Cambridge, MA: Butterworth-Heineman.    
 
Colker, Ryan. 2020. “Introduction to Infrastructure Resilience.” In Optimizing Community 
Infrastructure: Resilience in the Face of Shocks and Stresses, edited by Ryan Colker. 
Cambridge, MA: Butterworth-Heineman.  
   









Connolly, James J.T. 2018. “From Systems Thinking to Systemic Action: Social 
Vulnerability and the Institutional Challenge to Urban Resilience.” City and Community 
17(1):8-11.  
 
Cornaggia, Jess, Kimberly J. Cornaggia, and Ryan D. Israelsen. 2018. “Credit ratings and 
the cost of municipal financing.” The Review of Financial Studies 31(6):2038-2079. 
 
Cowley, Robert, Clive Barnett, Tania Katzschner, Nathaniel Tkacz, and Filip De Boeck. 
2018. “Forum: Resilience & Design.” Resilience 6:(1):1-34.  
 
Cretney, Raven. 2014. “Resilience for whom? Emerging critical geographies of socio‐
ecological resilience.” Geography Compass 8(9):627-640. 
 
Curran, Winifred. 2007. “‘From the Frying Pan to the Oven’: Gentrification and the 
Experience of Industrial Displacement in Williamsburg, Brooklyn.” Urban Studies 
44(8):1427-1440.  
 
Curran, Winfred and Trina Hamilton. 2012. “Just green enough: contesting environmental 
gentrification in Greenpoint, Brooklyn.” Local Environment 17(9):1027-1042.  
 
Curtis, Katherine J., Elizabeth Fussell, and Jack DeWaard. 2015. “Recovery migration after 
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita: Spatial concentration and intensification in the migration 
system.” Demography 52(4):1269-1293. 
 
Cutter, Susan L., Lindsey Barnes, Melissa Berry, Christopher Burton, Elijah Evans, Eric 
Tate, and Jennifer Webb. 2008. “A place-based model for understanding community 
resilience to natural disasters.” Global Environmental Change 18(4):598-606. 
 
 183 
Cutter, Susan L., Kevin D. Ash, and Christopher T. Emrich. 2014. “The geographies of 
community disaster resilience.” Global Environmental Change 29(2014):65-77. 
 
Davis, Cindy and James Tim Ryan. 2020. “Building Codes: The Foundation for Resilient 
Communities.” Chapter 12 in Optimizing Community Infrastructure: Resilience in the 
Face of Shocks and Stresses, edited by Ryan Colker. Cambridge, MA: Butterworth-
Heineman.    
 
Danyluk, Martin. 2018. “Fungible Space: Competition and Volatility in the Global 
Logistics Network.” International Jounral of Urban and Regional Research 43(1):94-111.  
 
Dawson, Ashley. 2017. Extreme Cities: The Peril and Promise of Urban Life in the Age of 
Climate Change. London and New York: Verso. 
 
Desmond, Matthew. 2012. “Eviction and the Reproduction of Urban Poverty.” American 
Journal of Sociology 118(1):88-133 
 
DiMaggio, Paul J., and Walter W. Powell. 1983. “The iron cage revisited: Institutional 
isomorphism and collective rationality in organizational fields.” American Sociological 
Review 48(2):147-160. 
 
Dobraszczyk, Paul. 2017. “Sunken cities: climate change, urban futures and the 
imagination of submergence.” International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 
41(6):868-887.  
 
Duffy, Mignon, Amy Armenia, and Clare L. Stacey. 2015a. “On the Clock, Off the Radar: 
Paid Care Work in the United States.” Chapter 1 in Caring on the Clock: The Complexities 
and Contradictions of Paid Care Work, edited by Mignon Duffy, Amy Armenia, and Clare 
L. Stacey. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press. 
 
Duffy, Mignon, Amy Armenia, and Clare L. Stacey. 2015b. “Hazards of Care.” 
Introduction to Part III in Caring on the Clock: The Complexities and Contradictions of 
Paid Care Work, edited by Mignon Duffy, Amy Armenia, and Clare L. Stacey. New 
Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press. 
 
Duffield, Mark. 2012. “Challenging Environments: Danger, Resilience and the Aid 
Industry.” Security Dialogue 43(5):475-492. 
 
Dunlap, Riley E., and Aaron M. McCright. 2011. “Organized climate change denial.” The 
Oxford Handbook of Climate Change and Society 1:144-160. 
 
Easterling, Keller. 2014. Extrastatecraft: The Power of Infrastructure Space. London and 
New York: Verso.  
 
Elliott, James R. 2015. “Natural Hazards and Residential Mobility: General Patterns and 
Racially Unequal Outcomes in the United States.” Social Forces 93(4):1723-1747. 
 184 
 
Elliott, James R., Amy Bellone Hite, and Joel A. Devine. 2009. “Unequal Return: The 
Uneven Resettlements of New Orleans Uptown Neighborhoods.” Organization and 
Environment 22(4):410-421.  
 
Elliott, James R. and Matthew Thomas Clement. 2017. “Natural Hazards and Local 
Development: The Successive Nature of Landscape Transformation in the United States.” 
Social Forces 96(2):851-875.  
 
Elliott, James R. and Junia Howell. 2017. “Beyond Disasters: A Longitudinal Analysis of 
Natural Hazards’ Unequal Impacts on Residential Instability.” Social Forces 95(3): 1181-
1207. 
 
Erickson, Kai. 1991. “Notes on trauma and community.” American Imago 48(4):455-472. 
 
Erickson, Kai. 1994. A New Species of Trouble: Explorations in Disaster, Trauma, and 
Community. New York: W.W. Norton and Company.  
 
Espeland, Wendy Nelson, and Michael Sauder. 2007. “Rankings and reactivity: How 
public measures recreate social worlds.” American Journal of Sociology 113(1):1-40. 
 
Espeland, Wendy, and Michael Sauder. 2008. “Rankings and diversity.” Southern 
California Review of Law & Social Justice 18:587-608. 
 
Etcétera … 2012. “To Occupy Spaces Means to Generate Time.” In What Is Critical 
Spatial Practice?, edited by Nikolaus Hirsch and Markus Miessen. Berlin: Sternberg Press. 
 
Eyerman, Ron. 2015. Is this America: Katrina as Cultural Trauma. Austin, Texas: 
University of Texas Press.  
 
Fainstein, Susan. 2015. “Resilience and justice.” International Journal of Urban and 
Regional Research 39(1):157-167. 
 
Fasenfest, David. 2019. “A neoliberal response to an urban crisis: Emergency management 
in Flint, MI.” Critical Sociology 45(1):33-47. 
 
Filosa, Gwen. 2020. “State to send $38M to the Keys to fix its Hurricane Irma-damaged 
desalination plant and sewer systems.” Miami Herald, January 30, 2020. Retrieved 
February 15, 2020. (https://www.miamiherald.com/news/local/community/florida-
keys/article239789403.html)  
 
Fowles, Jacob, Gao Liu, and Cezar Brian Mamaril. 2009. “Accounting for natural disasters: 




Flavelle, Christopher. 2018. “Critics Say Bond Rating Agencies Ignore Municipalities’ 
Climate Risk.” The Insurance Journal. Retrieved December 15, 2019 
(https://www.insurancejournal.com/news/national/2018/11/05/506538.htm) 
 
Flavelle, Christopher. 2019. “Moody’s Buys Climate Data Firm, Signaling New Scrutiny 




Flavelle, Christopher and Patricia Mazzei. 2019. “Florida Keys Deliver a Hard Message: 
As Seas Rise Some Places Can’t Be Saved” New York Times, December 4, 2019. Retrieved 
December 15, 2019. (https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/04/climate/florida-keys-climate-
change.html) 
 
Fligstein, Neil, and Luke Dauter. 2007. “The sociology of markets.” Annual Review of 
Sociology 33:105-128. 
 
Fligstein, Neil and Adam Goldstein. 2015. “The emergence of a finance culture in 
American households, 1989-2007.” Socio-Economic Review 13(5):575-601. 
 
Fligstein, Neil and Alexander F. Roehrkasse. 2016. “The Causes of Fraud in the Financial 
Crisis of 2007 to 2009: Evidence from the Mortgage Backed Securities Industry.” 
American Sociological Review 81(4): 617-643. 
 
Florida Housing Finance Corporation. 2018. “The Vestcor Companies Break Ground on 




Foster, John Bellamy. 1999. “Marx's Theory of Metabolic Rift: Classical Foundations for 
Environmental Sociology.” American Journal of Sociology 105(4):366-405. 
 
Foster, John Bellamy, Brett Clark, and Richard York. 2011. The Ecological Rift: 
Capitalism’s War on the Earth. New York: NYU Press. 
 
Fowles, Jacob, Gao Liu, and Cezar Brian Mamaril. 2009. “Accounting for natural disasters: 
The impact of earthquake risk on California municipal bond pricing.” Public Budgeting & 
Finance 29(1):68-83. 
 
Freeden, Michael. 2007. “Ideology and Political Theory.” Pp. 1-20 in The Meaning of 
Ideology: Cross-Disciplinary Perspectives, edited by Michael Freeden. New York and 
London: Routledge.  
 
French, Shaun, Andrew Leyshon, and Thomas Wainwright. 2011. “Financializing space, 
spacing financialization.” Progress in Human Geography 35(6):798-819. 
 
 186 
Freudenburg, William R. 1997. “Contamination, corrosion and the social order: An 
overview.” Current Sociology 45(3):19-39. 
 
Freudenburg, William R., Robert Gramling, Shirley Laska, and Kai T. Erikson. 2009. 
“Disproportionality and Disaster: Hurricane Katrina and the Mississippi River‐Gulf 
Outlet.” Social Science Quarterly 90(3):497-515. 
 
Fussell, Elizabeth, and James R. Elliott. 2009. “Introduction: Social Organization of 
Demographic Responses to Disaster: Studying Population—Environment Interactions in 
the Case of Hurricane Katrina.” Organization & Environment 22(4):379-394. 
 
Gaillard, J. C., and Lori Peek. 2019. “Disaster-zone research needs a code of conduct.” 
Nature 575:440-442. doi: 10.1038/d41586-019-03534-z440-442. 
 
Gieryn, Thomas F. 2000. “A space for place in sociology.” Annual Review of Sociology 
26(1):463-496. 
 
Goodhue, David. 2018. “4 percent of Keys population has left since Irma. Businesses can’t 




Goodhue, David. 2019. “Government preparing to be sued in 2023, when the Keys stop 




Gopal, Prashant. 2019. “America’s Great Climate Exodus Is Starting in the Florida Keys.” 




Gotham, Kevin Fox. 2000. Urban Space, Restrictive Covenants, and the Origins of Racial 
Residential Segregation in a US City, 1900-50. International Journal of Urban and 
Regional Research 24(3):616-633.  
 
Gotham, Kevin Fox. 2002a. Beyond Invasion and Succession: School Segregation, Real 
Estate Blockbusting, and the Political Economy and Neighborhood Racial Transition. City 
& Community 1(1):83-111.  
 
Gotham, Kevin Fox. 2002b. Race, Real Estate, and Uneven Development: The Kansas City 
Experience, 1900-2000. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press.  
 
Gotham, Kevin Fox. 2009. “Creating Liquidity Out of Spatial Fixity: The Secondary 
Circuit of Capital and the Subprime Mortgage Crisis.” International Journal of Urban and 
Regional Research 33(2):355-371.  
 187 
 
Gotham, Kevin Fox and Miriam Greenberg. 2014. Crisis Cities: Disaster and 
Redevelopment in New York and New Orleans. New York: Oxford University Press. 
 
Gotham, Kevin Fox and Megan Faust. 2020. “Antagonisms and Adaptation: Climate 
Change Adaptation Measures in New Orleans and New York City.” Chapter 4 in 
Louisiana's Response to Extreme Weather, edited by S. Laska. Springer.  
 
Gottdeiner, Mark. 1993. “A Marx for Our Time: Henri Lefebvre and the Production of 
Space.” Sociological Theory 11(1):129-134.  
 
Gould, Kenneth A., David N. Pellow, and Allan Schnaiberg. 2004. “Interrogating the 
treadmill of production: Everything you wanted to know about the treadmill but were afraid 
to ask.” Organization & Environment 17(3):296-316. 
 
Gould, Kenneth A. and Tammy Lewis. 2016. “Green Gentrification and Hurricane Sandy: 
The Resilience of the Green Growth Machine around Brooklyn’s Gowanus Canal.” 
Chapter 7 in Taking Chances: The Coast After Hurricane Sandy, edited by Karen M. 
O’Neill and Daniel J. Van Abs. New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press.  
 
Gould, Kenneth A. and Tammy Lewis. 2017. Green Gentrification: Urban Sustainability 
and the Struggle for Environmental Justice. New York: Routledge.  
 
Gould, Kenneth A. and Tammy Lewis. 2018a. “From Green Gentrification to Resilience 
Gentrification: An Example from Brooklyn.” City and Community 17(1):12-15. 
 
Gould, Kenneth A., and Tammy L. Lewis. 2018b. “Green Gentrification and Disaster 
Capitalism in Barbuda: Barbuda has long exemplified an alternative to mainstream tourist 
development in the Caribbean. After Irma and Maria, that could change.” NACLA Report 
on the Americas 50(2):148-153. 
 
Graham, Leigh, Wim Debucquoy, and Isabelle Anguelovski. 2016. “The influence of urban 
development dynamics on community resilience practice in New York City after 
Superstorm Sandy: Experiences from the Lower East Side and the Rockaways.” Global 
Environmental Change 40:112-124. 
 
Greider, Thomas and Lorraine Garkovich. 1994. “Landscapes: The Social Construction of 
Nature and the Environment.” Rural Sociology 59(1):1–24. 
 
Hackworth, Jason. 2007. The Neoliberal City: Governance, Ideology, and Development in 
American Urbanism. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. 
 
Hall, Peter A., and Michèle Lamont. 2013. “Introduction: Social Resilience in the 
Neoliberal Era.” Pp. 1-31 in Social Resilience in the Neoliberal Era, edited by Peter A. 
Hall and Michelle Lamont. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
 
 188 
Hall, Sarah. 2013. “Geographies of money and finance III: Financial circuits and the ‘real 
economy.’” Progress in Human Geography 37(2):285-292. 
 
Hall, Stuart. 1986. “The Problem of Ideology-Marxism Without Guarantees.” Journal of 
Communication Inquiry 10(2):28-44. 
 
Hamilton, Malcolm B. 1987. “The Elements of the Concept of Ideology.” Political Studies 
35(1):18-38. 
 
Harvey, David. 2012. Rebel Cities: From the Right to the City to the Urban Revolution. 
London: Verso.  
 
Hayden, Dolores. 1984. Redesigning the American Dream: The Future of Housing, Work, 
and Family Life. New York: W.W. Norton and Company. 
 
Helmuth, Allison Suppan. 2019. “Chocolate City, Rest in Peace”: White Space-Claiming 
and the Exclusion of Black People in Washington, DC. City & Community 18(3):746-769.  
 
Heynen, Nik. 2014. “Urban Political Ecology I: The Urban Century.” Progress in Human 
Geography 38(4):598-604. 
 
Heynen, Nik, Maria Kaika, and Erik Swyngedouw. 2006. “Urban Political Ecology: 
Politicizing the Production of Urban Natures.” Chapter 1 in In the Nature of Cities: Urban 
Political Ecology and the Politics of Urban Metabolism, edited by Nik Heynen, Maria 
Kaika, and Erik Swyngedouw. London and New York: Routledge.  
 
Hochschild, Arlie. 1983. The Managed Heart: Commercialization of Human Feeling. 
Berkeley: University of California Press.  
 
Holling, Crawford S. 1973.  “Resilience and Stability of Ecological Systems.” Annual 
Review of Ecology and Systematics 4(1):1-23. 
 
Howell, Junia, and James R. Elliott. 2019. “Damages done: The longitudinal impacts of 
natural hazards on wealth inequality in the United States.” Social Problems 66(3):448-467. 
 
Hyde, Cheryl A. 2003. “Multicultural organizational development in nonprofit human 
service agencies: Views from the field.” Journal of Community Practice 11(1):39-59 
IPCC. 2014. Climate Change 2014: Synthesis Report. Contribution of Working Groups I, 
II and III to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change [Core Writing Team, R.K. Pachauri and L.A. Meyer (eds.)]. IPCC, Geneva, 
Switzerland, 151 pp.] 
https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/2018/02/SYR_AR5_FINAL_full.pdf 
Illouz, Eva. 2007. Cold Intimacies: The Making of Emotional Capitalism. Cambridge: 
Polity Press.  
 189 
 
Jacobsen, Henrik. 2016. “Book Review: Crisis Cities: Disaster and Redevelopment in New 
York and New Orleans.” Urban Studies 53(11):2443-2446.  
 
Keil, Roger. 2003. “Urban Political Ecology.” Urban Geography 24(8):723-738. 
 
Kern, Leslie. 2015. “From toxic wreck to crunchy chic: environmental gentrification 
through the body.” Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 33:67-83.  
 
Klein, Naomi. 2007. The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism. New York: 
Macmillan. 
 
Klein, Naomi. 2018. The Battle for Paradise: Puerto Rico Takes on the Disaster 
Capitalists. Chicago: Haymarket Books. 
 
Klinenger, Nancy. 2018. “Florida Keys Cope With Suicide Spike After Hurricane Irma”. 
WLRN Radio. Retrieved February 7, 2020 (https://www.wlrn.org/post/florida-keys-cope-
suicide-spike-after-hurricane-irma#stream/0) 
 
Koslov, Liz. 2016. “The Case for Retreat.” Public Culture 28.2(79):359-387. 
 
Kostof, Spiro. 1989. “Foreword.” Pp. ix-xx in Architects’ People, edited by Russell Ellis 
and Dana Cuff. New York: Oxford University Press.  
 
Krippner, Greta. 2005. “The financialization of the American economy.” Socio-Economic 
Review 3(2):173-208.  
 
Kurowski, Alicia, Jon Boyer, and Laura Punnett. 2015. “The Hazards of Health Care: 
Physical and Psychosocial Stressors in Paid Care Work.” Chapter 7 in Caring on the Clock: 
The Complexities and Contradictions of Paid Care Work, edited by Mignon Duffy, Amy 
Armenia, and Clare L. Stacey. New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press. 
 
Larrain, Jorge. 1991. “Stuart Hall and the Marxist Concept of Ideology.” Theory, Culture 
& Society 8(4):1-28. 
 
Lefebvre, Henri. 1991. The Production of Space. Oxford and Cambridge, MA: Basil 
Blackwell Ltd. 
 
Lefebvre, Henri. 2003. The Urban Revolution. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press. 
 
Leyshon, Andrew & Nigel Thrift. 2007. “The Capitalization of Almost Everything: The 
Future of Finance and Capitalism.” Theory, Culture & Society 24(7-8):97-115. 
 
Liévanos, Raoul S. and Christine Horne. 2017. “Unequal Resilience: the Duration of 
Electricity Outages.” Energy Policy 108:201-211.  
 190 
 
Liévanos, Raoul S., Pierce Greenberg, and Ryan Wishart. 2018. “In the shadow of 
production: Coal waste accumulation and environmental inequality formation in Eastern 
Kentucky.” Social Science Research 71:37-55.  
 
Linkov, Igor, Todd Bridges, Felix Creutzig, Jennifer Decker, Cate Fox-Lent, Wolfgang 
Kröger, James H. Lambert Levermann, A., Montreuil, B., Nathwani, J. and Nyer, R. 
2014.  “Changing the Resilience Paradigm.” Nature Climate Change 4(6):407. 
 
Lipsitz, George. 2011. How Racism Takes Place. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.  
 
Logan, John, and Harvey Molotch. 1987. Urban Fortunes: Toward a Political Economy of 
Place. Berkeley: University of California Press. 
 
Madden, David J. 2014. “Neighborhood as Spatial Project: Making the Urban Order on the 
Downtown Brooklyn Waterfront.” International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 
38(2):471-497.  
 
Martin, Isaac William. 2019. “Land, Power, and Property Tax Limitation.” In The Politics 
of Land (Research in Political Sociology, Vol. 26), edited by Tim Bartley. Emerald 
Publishing Limited. https://doi.org/10.1108/S0895-993520190000026007 
 
Martin, Isaac William, and Kevin Beck. 2017. “Property tax limitation and racial inequality 
in effective tax rates.” Critical Sociology 43(2):221-236. 
 
Martin, Isaac William, and Kevin Beck. 2018. “Gentrification, property tax limitation, and 
displacement.” Urban Affairs Review 54(1):33-73. 
 
Martin, Ron. 2011. “The local geographies of the financial crisis: from the housing 
bubble to economic recession and beyond.” Journal of Economic Geography 11(4):587-
618. 
 
Meerow, Sara, Joshua P. Newell, and Melissa Stults. 2016. “Defining Urban Resilience: A 
Review.” Landscape and Urban Planning 147:38-49. 
 
Meléndez, Edwin and Jennifer Hinojosa. 2017. “Estimates of Post-Hurricane Maria 
Exodus from Puerto Rico.” Centro: Hunter College Center for Puerto Rican Studies, Report 
RB2017-01.   
 
Merton, Robert. 1995. “The Thomas Theorem and the Matthews Effect.” Social Forces 
74(2):379-422. 
 





Monroe County. n.d.b. “Substantial Improvement or Substantial Damage: Information and 




Monroe County. 2019. News Releases: Monroe County Welcomes “The Quarry” to 
Rockland Key at Ribbon Cutting. Retrieved January 17, 2020 (http://www.monroecounty-
fl.gov/CivicAlerts.aspx?AID=1292) 
 
Monroe County Emergency Management. n.d. “Hurricane Irma Recovery.” Retrieved 
February 7, 2020 (http://monroecountyem.com/726/Hurricane-Irma-Recovery)    
 
Moody’s. n.d. “Moody’s Rating Scale and Definitions”. Retrieved March 1, 2020. 
(https://www.moodys.com/sites/products/productattachments/ap075378_1_1408_ki.pdf) 
 
Moody’s. 2017a. Evaluating the impact of climate change on US state and local issuers. 




Moody’s. 2017b. “Announcement: Moody's: Climate change is forecast to heighten US 
exposure to economic loss placing short- and long-term credit pressure on US states and 
local governments.” Retrieved February 7, 2020. 
(https://www.moodys.com/research/Moodys-Climate-change-is-forecast-to-heighten-US-
exposure-to--PR_376056)   
 
Moody’s. 2019. “Research Announcement: Moody's - Largest US cities take proactive 




Nagel, Joane. 2012. “Intersecting identities and global climate change.” Identities 
19(4):467-476. 
 
Neisser, Florian and Simon Runkle. 2017. “The future is now! Extrapolated riskscapes, 
anticipatory action and the management of potential emergencies.” Geoforum 82:170-179.  
 
Norgaard, Kari M. 2009. “Cognitive and Behavioral Challenges in Responding to Climate 
Change.” World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 4940.  Retrieved February 7, 2020. 
(http://elibrary.worldbank.org/doi/book/10.1596/1813-9450-4940.)  
 
Norgaard, Kari M. 2011. Living in Denial: Climate Change, Emotions, and Everyday Life. 




Offenhartz, Jake. 2020. “‘Unprecedented and Dangerous’: Trump Administration Halts 
NYC’s Most Important Climate Resiliency Study.” Gothamist, February 25, 2020. 
Retrieved February 25, 2020. (https://gothamist.com/news/unprecedented-and-dangerous-
trump-administration-halts-nycs-most-important-climate-resiliency-study) 
 
O’Hara, Timothy. 2018. “Keys population drops after Irma.” Key West Citizen, October 
22, 2018. Retrieved February 7, 2020. (https://keysnews.com/article/story/keys-
population-drops-after-irma/) 
 
Olsson, Lennart, Anne Jerneck, Henrik Thoren, Johannes Persson, and David O’Byrne. 
2015. “Why resilience is unappealing to social science: Theoretical and empirical 
investigations of the scientific use of resilience.” Science Advances 1(4):e1400217. 
 
Omstedt, Mikael. 2020. “Reading risk: The practices, limits and politics of municipal bond 
rating.” Environment and Planning A: Economy and Space 52(3):611-631.   
 
O’Neill, Karen M., Daniel J. Van Abs, and Robert B. Gramling. 2016. “Introduction: A 
Transformational Event, Just Another Storm, or Something in Between.” Introduction in 
Taking Chances: The Coast After Hurricane Sandy, edited by Karen M. O’Neill and Daniel 
J. Van Abs. New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press.  
 
O’Toole, Veronica M. 2018. ““Running on fumes”: emotional exhaustion and burnout of 
teachers following a natural disaster.” Social Psychology of Education 21(5):1081-1112. 
 
Ouma, Stefan, Leigh Johnson, and Patrick Bigger. 2018. “Rethinking the financialization 
of ‘nature’.” Environment and Planning A: Economy and Space 50(3):500-511. 
 
Pacewicz, Josh. 2012. “Tax increment financing, economic development professionals and 
the financialization of urban politics.” Socio-Economic Review 11(3):413-440. 
 
Painter, Marcus. 2020. “An inconvenient cost: The effects of climate change on municipal 
bonds.” Journal of Financial Economics 135(2):468-482. 
 
Pais, Jeremy F. and James R. Elliott. 2008. Places as Recovery Machines: Vulnerability 
and Neighborhood Change After Major Hurricanes. Social Forces 86(4):1415-1453.  
 
Pellow, David N. 2000. “Environmental Inequality Formation.” American Behavioral 
Scientist 43(4):581-601.  
 
Pellow, David N. 2018. What Is Critical Environmental Justice? Cambridge: Polity Press.  
 
Picou, Steven J., and Kenneth Hudson. 2010. “Hurricane Katrina and mental health: A 
research note on Mississippi Gulf Coast residents.” Sociological Inquiry 80(3):513-524. 
 
Picou, J. Steven, Brent K. Marshall, and Duane A. Gill. 2004. “Disaster, litigation, and the 
corrosive community.” Social Forces 82(4):1493-1522. 
 193 
 
Peck, Jamie. 2012. “Austerity urbanism: American cities under extreme 
economy.” City 16(6):626-655. 
 
Pulido, Laura. 2000. “Rethinking Environmental Racism: White Privilege and Urban 
Development in Southern California.” Annals of the Association of American 
Geographers 90(1):12-40.  
 
Quastel, Noah. 2009. “Political Ecologies of Gentrification.” Urban Geography 30(7):694-
725.  
 
Rashidi, Kaveh, Martin Stadelmann, and Anthony Patt. 2019. “Creditworthiness and 
climate: Identifying a hidden financial co-benefit of municipal climate adaptation and 
mitigation policies.” Energy Research & Social Science 48:131-138. 
 
Rayer, Stefan and Ying Wang. 2018. “Projections of Florida Population by County, 2020, 
with Estimates for 2017.” University of Florida Bureau of Economic and Business 




Reghezza-Zitt, Magali, Samuel Rufat, Géraldine Djament-Tran, Antoine Le Blanc, and 
Serge Lhomme. 2012. “What resilience is not: uses and abuses.” Cybergeo: European 
Journal of Geography. DOI: 10.4000/cybergeo.25554 
 
Rogers, Peter. 2015. “Researching Resilience: An Agenda for 
Change.” Resilience 3(1):55-71. 
 
Rogers, William W. 1996. “The Great Depression.” Chapter 17 in The New History of 
Florida, edited by Michael Gannon. Gainesville, FL: University of Florida Press.  
 
Ross, Michael S., Danielle E. Ogurcak, Susana Stoffella, Jay P. Sah, Javiera Hernandez, 
and Hugh E. Willoughby. 2019. “Hurricanes, storm surge, and pine forest decline on a low 
limestone island.” Estuaries and Coasts (2019):1-13. 
 
Rugh, Jacob S., Len Albright, and Douglas S. Massey. 2015. “Race, Space, and Cumulative 
Disadvantage: A Case Study of the Subprime Lending Collapse.” Social Problems 62:186-
218. 
 
Satake, Kenji, Kunihiko Shimazaki, Yoshinobu Tsuji, and Kazue Ueda. 1996. “Time and 
Size of a Giant Earthquake in Cascadia—Earthquake Inferred from Japanese Tsunami 





Sattar, Siamak, Therese P. McAllister, Steven L. McCabe, Katherine J. Johnson, 
Christopher L. Segura, Christopher Clavin, Juan F. Fung, Marc L. Levitan, and Kenneth 
W. Harrison. 2018. Research Needs to Support Immediate Occupancy Building 
Performance Following Natural Hazard Events. National Institute of Standards and 
Technology Special Publication (NIST SP)-1224.  
 
Saunders, Benjamin, Julius Sim, Tom Kingstone, Shula Baker, Jackie Waterfield, 
Bernadette Bartlam, Heather Burroughs, and Clare Jinks. 2018. “Saturation in qualitative 
research: exploring its conceptualization and operationalization.” Quality & Quantity 
52(4):1893-1907. 
Schnaiberg, Allan. 1980. The Environment: From Surplus to Scarcity. New York: Oxford 
University Press  
Schnaiberg, Allan and Kenneth A. Gould. 1994. Environment and Society: The Enduring 
Conflict. New York: St. Martin’s Press. 
Shatkin, Gavin. 2019. “Future of Crisis, Future of Urban Political Theory: Flooding in 
Asian Coastal Megacities.” International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 
43(2):207-226.  
 
Shtob, Daniel A. 2019. “Remembering the future: natural disaster, place, and symbolic 
survival.” Rural Sociology 84(1):123-147. 
 
Sovacool, Benjamin K., Lucy Baker, Mari Martiskainen, and Andrew Hook. 2019. 
“Processes of elite power and low-carbon pathways: Experimentation, financialisation, and 
dispossession.” Global Environmental Change 59:101985. 
 
S&P. 2019. “ESG in Credit Ratings.” Retrieved March 1, 2020. 
(https://www.spglobal.com/ratings/en/products-benefits/products/esg-in-credit-ratings) 
 
Star, S.L. and J.R. Griesemer . 1989. “Institutional ecology, ‘translations,’ and boundary 
objects: Amateurs and professionals in Berkeley’s Museum of Vertebrate Zoology, 1907-
1939.” Social Studies of Science 19:387-420.   
 
Stein, Samuel. 2019. Capital City: Urban Planners in the Real Estate State. New York: 
Verso. 
 
Strauss, Anselm, and Juliet Corbin. 1990. Basics of Qualitative Research. Thousand Oaks, 
California; Sage Publications. 
 
Sullivan, Esther. 2018. Manufactured Insecurity: Mobile Home Parks and Americans’ 
Tenuous Right to Place. Oakland, California: University of California Press.  
 
 195 
Summers, Brandi Thompson and Kathryn Howell. 2019. “Fear and Loathing (of Others): 
Race, Class and Contestation of Space in Washington, DC.” International Journal of 
Urban and Regional Research 43(6):1085-1105. 
 
Swyngedouw, Erik. 1996. “The city as hybrid: On nature, society, and cyborg 
urbanization.” Capitalism, Nature, Socialism (7)2:65-80. 
 
Swyngedouw, Erik. 2006. “Chapter 2: Metabolic Urbanization.” In In the Nature of Cities: 
Urban Political Ecology and the Politics of Urban Metabolism, edited by Nik Heynen, 
Maria Kaika, and Erik Swyngedouw. London and New York: Routledge. 
 
Swyngedouw, Erik and Nikolas C. Heynen. 2004. Urban Political Ecology, Justice, and 
the Politics of Scale. Antipode 35(5):898-918 
 
Tapp, Renee, and Kelly Kay. 2019. “Fiscal geographies: “Placing” taxation in urban 
geography.” Urban Geography 40(4):573-581. 
 
Thomas, W.I. and Dorothy Swain Thomas. 1928. The Child in America: Behavior 
Problems and Programs. Knopf.  
 
Thorén, Henrik, and Lennart Olsson. 2018. “Is resilience a normative concept?” Resilience 
6(2):112-128. 
 
Tierney, Kathleen. 2003. “Disaster Beliefs and Institutional Interests: Recycling Disaster 
Myths in the Aftermath of 9–11.” Pp. 33-51 in Terrorism and Disaster: New Threats, New 
Ideas. Emerald Group Publishing Limited. 
 
Tierney, Kathleen J. 2007. “From the margins to the mainstream? Disaster research at the 
crossroads.” Annual Review of Sociology 33:503-525. 
 
Tierney, Kathleen. 2015. “Resilience and the Neoliberal Project: Discourses, Critiques, 
Practices—and Katrina.” American Behavioral Scientist 59(10):1327-1342. 
 
Tierney, Kathleen, Christine Bevc, and Erica Kuligowski. 2006. “Metaphors Matter: 
Disaster Myths, Media Frames, and their Consequences in Hurricane Katrina.” The Annals 
of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 604(1):57-81. 
 
Tomiczek, Tori, Kiera O’Donnell, Kelsi Furman, Brittany Webbmartin, and Steven 
Scyphers. 2020. “Rapid Damage Assessments of Shorelines and Structures in the Florida 
Keys after Hurricane Irma.” Natural Hazards Review 21(1):05019006. 
 
Viele, John. 2011a. The Florida Keys (Volume 1): A History of the Pioneers. Sarasota, 
Florida: Pineapple Press. 
 
Viele, John. 2011b. The Florida Keys (Volume 2): True Stories of the Perilous Straits. 
Sarasota, Florida: Pineapple Press. 
 196 
 
Viele, John. 2011c. The Florida Keys (Volume 3): The Wreckers. Sarasota, Florida: 
Pineapple Press. 
 
Wachsmuth, David. 2012. “Three Ecologies: Urban Metabolism and the Society-Nature 
Opposition.” Sociological Quarterly 53:506-523. 
 
Wadlow, Kevin. 2018a. “Work underway on 208-unit housing complex.” Florida Keys 
News. Retrieved February 7, 2020 
(https://www.flkeysnews.com/news/local/article195743824.html.)  
 
Wadlow, Kevin. 2018b. “Big Lower Keys housing project gets boost.” Florida Keys News. 
Retrieved February 7, 2020 (https://keysnews.com/article/story/work-underway-on-208-
unit-housing-complex/) 
 
Weber, Rachel. 2002. “Extracting value from the city: neoliberalism and urban 
redevelopment.” Antipode 34(3):519-540. 
 
Welsh, Marc. 2014. “Resilience and responsibility: governing uncertainty in a complex 
world.” The Geographical Journal 180(1):15-26. 
 
Wyly, Elvin K, Mona Atia, Holly Foxcroft, Daniel J. Hammel, and Kelly Phillips-Watts. 
2006. “American Home: Predatory Mortgage Capital and Neighborhood Spaces of Race 
and Class Exploitation in the United States”. Geografiska Annaler Series B Human 
Geography 88(1):105-132 
 
Wyly, Elvin, Markus Moos, Daniel Hammel, and Emanuel Kabahizi. 2009. “Cartographies 
of Race and Class: Mapping the Class-Monopoly Rents of American Subprime Mortgage 
Capital.” International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 33(2):332-54.  
 
Xian, Siyuan, Kairui Feng, Ning Lin, Reza Marsooli, Daniel Chavas, Jie Chen, and Adam 
Hatzikyriakou. 2018. “Brief communication: Rapid assessment of damaged residential 
buildings in the Florida Keys after Hurricane Irma.” Natural Hazards and Earth System 
Sciences 18(7):2041-2045. 
 
Yin, Robert K. 1994. Case Study Research, Second Edition. Thousand Oaks, California; 
Sage Publications.  
 
Yin, Robert K. 2003. Applications of Case Study Research, Second Edition. Thousand 
Oaks, California; Sage Publications.   
 
Zebrowski, Chris. 2013. “The Nature of Resilience.” Resilience 1(3):159-173.  
